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This project argues that the British “financial revolution” ushered in a new way of 
conceptualizing time based in mathematic innovations of the seventeenth-century. As it 
was employed in financial instruments and government policies, mathematics’ spatialized 
representation of time conflicted with older, more intuitive experience of time associated 
with consciousness and duration. Borrowing from the work of Henri Bergson and Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, I examine how he interaction between these two 
temporalities reshaped conceptions of value, the public, and the body in the first half of 
the eighteenth century. 
The first two chapters of my study explore texts ranging from pamphlets that 
advocated for the establishment of banks to the periodical essays of The Spectator and 
The Tatler that advocated for political economic conceptions of time and value at the turn 
of the century. These texts reveal the subtle tensions and strange paradoxes created by the 
clash of disparate temporalities and open the door to new readings of fictional narratives 
like those of  Daniel Defoe and Aphra Behn.  My second two chapters focus on selected 
works by these two authors to explore how longer first-person narrative forms modeled 
both the possibilities and dangers of emerging political economic structures. My study 
concludes with two chapters that follow the development of the oriental tale in Britain. 
Making use of a seventeenth-century tradition that explores the tensions between 
representation and meaning in oriental fables, Arabian Nights’ Entertainments follows in 
the wake of John Paul Marana’s Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy and reshapes the oriental 
tale genre to reflect the new concerns of a global marketplace in which deferral has 
become essential to the production of value. I conclude these chapters with readings of 
Johnson’s Rasselas, Hawkesworth’s Almoran and Hamet, and Frances Sheridan’s 
Nourjahad, three tales that foreshadow late-eighteenth-century efforts to manage the 
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Joseph Addison’s January 5, 1710 issue of The Tatler presents the remarkable image of a 
woman’s petticoat so large that when lifted and fully unfurled, it balloons like a dome above the 
wondering eyes of onlookers:  
I then ordered the Vest which stood before us to be drawn up by a Pully to the Top of my 
great Hall, and afterwards to spread open by the Engine it was placed upon, in such a 
Manner, that it formed a very splendid and ample Canopy over our Heads, and covered 
the whole Court of Judicature with a kind of Silken Rotunda, in its Form not unlike the 
Cupolo of St. Paul’s.1 
Addison means to draw humor from his narrator’s comparison of the undergarment with the lofty 
structures of church and state, and certainly, we are justified in reading this essay as an 
eighteenth-century satire on the female gender and its fashions. We are also meant, however, to 
think about the century’s increasingly important questions of economy and scale. As it happens, 
Addison’s self-appointed judge learns that the relatively minor matter of a fashionable petticoat 
plays a significant part in the economic foundation of the Empire. The rope that holds together 
the skirt nourishes an entire rope-making industry at home; the whalebone that stiffens its fabric 
feeds a British whaling interest as far away as Greenland. The advocate for the petticoat cites 
 
1 Joseph Addison, The Tatler, ed. Donald F. Bond, 3 vols, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987): 
192. 
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political economist Sir William Petty and declares that such an oversized item of fashion could 
multiply the profits of the woolen trade such that its effects “could not fail to sink the Power of 
France in a few Years” (II.193).2 As ridiculous as Addison’s narrator deems the petticoat to be 
(he declares the garment forfeit at the end of the trial), the hoop skirt’s expanse reminded the 
reader that every trivial act of purchase or trade potentially multiplied to become part of the 
enormous structures of an Empire.  
  The emerging field of political economics challenged Addison’s contemporaries to 
reconcile the individual bodies of consumers and tax payers with the mathematically derived 
scale of state finance.3 Addison’s essay highlighted the significance of great masses and great 
distance to this statistical view, but with the exception of a note that the hoop-skirt wearer spends 
three days outside the doorway trying to squeeze through, this particular essay hid the 
importance of time to political economic thought. Britain’s eighteenth-century financial and 
political expansion was made possible only by the introduction of a new articulation of what 
time was and what it could do. Reimagined as a field of play from which data could be gathered 
and value extracted, time was qualitatively different from the experiential time of human 
consciousness and from early Christian articulations of mortal time and eternity. This is not to 
say, however, that mathematical articulations of time replaced or even subordinated alternative 
time concepts. In the eighteenth century as in the twenty-first, many distinct understandings of 
time shaped the world. For readers in Addison’s century the new conception of time came with 
enormous financial and political stakes and needed to be integrated with existing beliefs and 
 
2 Addison, 193. 
3 For a study of Britain’s economic growth during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Larry Neal, 
The rise of financial capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); Joyce Oldham Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); and P.G.M. Dickson’s seminal study, The Financial Revolution in 
England (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967). 
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experiences. This study seeks to better define the qualitatively different version of time that 
suffused British finances and popular culture during the long eighteenth century and to trace its 
repercussions in narrative structures and literary genres of the period. 
Over the past two decades, a significant field of critical work has emerged to focus on the 
dramatic cultural shifts that accompanied Britain’s financial revolution.4 James Thompson 
argues that the recoinage debates of the period brought into relief changing notions of value as 
Britons sought to articulate the relationship between financial value and coins or credit notes.5 
Using a Marxist lens, Thompson shows how concerns about the difference between treasure and 
capitalist wealth reemerged in the novel form, particularly in depictions of the female character 
as treasure. Deidre Shauna Lynch’s The Economy of Character asks how changing marketplace 
conditions provided the impetus for a redefinition of character over the course of the century as 
literary character lost much of its visual sign function to be replaced by an emphasis on 
psychological depth.6 Catherine Ingrassia and Sandra Sherman turn attention to the role of the 
author in this marketplace dynamic, exploring the way in which literary fiction works in an often 
disturbing parallel with the fictional quality of financial credit.7  
Looking more specifically at the state’s move toward public credit (based in long-term 
state debt), Peter Brantlinger finds that the psychological demands of living in an expansive, 
credit-based marketplace create the impetus for a new form of subjectivity, one whose value and 
 
4 Seán Moore provides a survey of work on the financial revolution. Moore, “The Culture of Paper Credit: 
The New Economic Criticism and the Postcolonial Eighteenth Century,” The Eighteenth Century: Theory and 
Interpretation 45.1 (Spring 2004): 87-108. 
5 James Thompson, Models of Value: Eighteenth-Century Political Economy and the Novel (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1996). 
6 Deidre Shauna Lynch, The Economy of Character: Novels, Market Culture, and the Business of Inner 
Meaning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
7 Catherine Ingrassia, Authorship, Commerce, and Gender in Early-Eighteenth-Century England: A 
Culture of Paper Credit (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Sandra Sherman, Finance and 
Fictionality in the Early Eighteenth Century: Accounting for Defoe (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 
1996). For a recent study of the way that fictional genres and credit functioned alongside one another see Mary 
Poovey, Genres of the Credit Economy: Mediating Value in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Britain (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
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interiority develops with the help of aesthetic discourse.8 Robert Mitchell also explores the 
effects of Britain’s state financing schemes, finding that the disruptions and anxieties brought 
about by the nation’s investment in debt helped to shape a discourse of sympathy.9 Mitchell 
argues for the importance of temporality both in Romantic constructions of sympathy and in 
financial discourse. Combining social-systems theory and the work of Gilles Deleuze, Mitchell’s 
study explains how poets employed notions of past, present, future and cyclical or linear time in 
an effort to re-shape the cultural assumptions bequeathed to their generations by the century’s 
early financing policies. 
By naming time as a crucial element in Britain’s creation of both finance and the systems 
it spurs, Mitchell’s study approaches another field of thought that has emphasized the importance 
of time concepts during the early-modern and eighteenth-century periods. Benedict Anderson’s 
Imagined Communities locates the birth of a “horizontal” modern time and the simultaneous 
demise of Christian “messianic time” in a period somewhere between the sixteenth and 
eighteenth centuries.10 Johannes Fabian reaches back further to an elite scholastic tradition of 
memory techniques to explain why anthropology spatialized time into zones of social and 
economic development during the era of colonial exploration.11 Looking specifically at time 
concepts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Stuart Sherman argues that innovations in 
time-keeping at the end of the seventeenth century initiated a new relationship between time and 
 
8 Peter Brantlinger, Fictions of State: Culture and Credit in Britain, 1694-1994 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1996). See also Peter De Bolla, The Discourse of the Sublime: Readings in History, Aesthetics and 
the Subject (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1989). Elizabeth Kowaleski-Wallace, Consuming Subjects: Women, Shopping, 
and Business in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); and Charlotte Sussman, 
Consuming Anxieties: Consumer Protest, Gender, and British Slavery, 1713-1833 (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2000) examine the emergence of consumerism and its gendered discourse in the wake of Britain’s 
early financial growth. 
9 Robert Mitchell, Sympathy and the State in the Romantic Era: Systems, State Finance, and the Shadows 
of Futurity (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
10 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991). 
11 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983). 
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individual experience.12 Sherman’s study reveals the period’s use of time as a method for 
organizing thought and experience and shows how diurnal forms made use of two distinct ways 
of using temporality in narrative structures. Sherman finally demonstrates that new ways of 
measuring and marking time led to new ways of representing the experience of subjectivity in 
time. 
  The development of Sherman’s analysis from new technologies and narrative structures 
to representations of subjectivity provides an important tool for our ongoing efforts to understand 
the development of the novel. But it also reminds us that our efforts to comprehend time tend to 
lead us back to the experience of the individual mind. Tangled somewhere between the 
historically specific world of cultural constructions and basic cognitive functions, notions of time 
challenge our methodologies. Thinking about time requires us to think about our most intuitive 
mental and biological experiences, demands that we claim at least a starting point for defining 
human consciousness. In this study, I borrow from a philosophical tradition that prioritizes the 
time experience of human consciousness and defines that time as continuous, durational and 
fundamental to the way in which human beings organize stimuli. An important inspiration for 
Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation of time, Henri Bergson posited that the distinction between this 
continuous, durational time and the time intervals of science accounts for both Zeno’s paradoxes 
of motion and for the paradoxes created by Einstein’s theory of relativity.13 Bergson sought to 
reveal the fictions behind science’s claim to represent time without representing duration. In 
 
12 Stuart Sherman, Telling Time: Clocks, Diaries and English Diurnal Form, 1660-1785 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996). See also David S. Landes, Revolution in Time: Clocks and the Making of the 
Modern World (Cambridge, MA: Belknap-Harvard Press, 1983). 
13 Henri Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity: Bergson and the Einsteinian Universe, ed. Robin Durie 
(Manchester, Eng.: Clinamen, 1999). Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990). 
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doing so, Bergson wished to define more accurately the relationship between the human 
consciousness and its sensory world.  
Borrowing from Bergson’s premises, this study addresses the historical moment in which 
mathematical and older time frameworks came together to produce a new marketplace system in 
Britain. Mathematical time arrived with promises of immense wealth and infinite productivity, 
but also with the possibility of dramatic failure. And though recognizing the role of time 
concepts provides new insights into this period, I do not intend for this study to be simply a 
history of ideas. Civic leaders, businessmen and authors employed a range of discursive 
strategies to convince their populaces that the future gifted by mathematics could be relied upon 
and manipulated to the benefit of a growing empire. In many cases the strategies they employed 
knowingly or unconsciously occluded failures in the new framework for time, opening up 
dangerous gaps between individual experience and socially shared constructions. By revisiting 
the role of time in eighteenth-century Britain’s financial revolution, I hope to unearth some of 
these discursive strategies, to provide a new framework for understanding the eighteenth-century 
debate about time and value, and to reveal the inherent conflicts in the mathematically-derived 
market system that we still inhabit.  
The six chapters that follow begin with a survey of some of the mathematic and financial 
innovations that made possible the dramatic changes to Britain’s government and marketplaces 
during the last decades of the seventeenth century and the first decades of the eighteenth. 
Beginning with a comparative look at the time theories developed by Locke, Leibniz and 
Newton, I describe how those theories were distilled and simplified for use in financial 
instruments. From among the many financing schemes proposed or tried during the period, the 
idea of national banks eventually emerged as the dominant scheme for providing cash to the 
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crown and supplementing the Empire’s shortage of coin. The second part of this chapter looks 
closely at some of the printed banking proposals that led to both successful and unsuccessful 
financial experiments during this period. Responding to the contentious debates about whether 
exchangeable money could be created absent the usual forms of specie, these pamphlets both 
reflected and helped to shape the way value would be conceived in modern political economics. 
 The second chapter explores how the concepts of time and value embedded in banking 
proposals emerged within the periodical essays of Joseph Addison and Richard Steele. Authors 
like Stuart Sherman and Erin Mackie have demonstrated the importance of Addison’s and 
Steele’s projects to shaping British readers’ experience of the marketplace.14 I build on this work 
and on existing theories of the modern public’s emergence to argue that the public is, itself, a 
symptom of the mathematical time concepts of the period. Though identified as a driving force 
behind the nation’s wealth, the bodies that buy, sell, and trade in Britain’s marketplaces cannot 
be represented within mathematical frameworks because, among other reasons, those 
frameworks provide no equivalent for the conscious present. Addison and Steele’s periodicals 
made use of their genre’s timely regularity to help bridge the divide between a mathematical 
public and the embodied reader. To this point my work follows closely alongside Stuart 
Sherman’s readings of The Tatler and The Spectator and Benedict Anderson’s reading of 
periodical genres, but I go beyond previous studies on the periodical’s relationship to the public 
in arguing that Steele and Addison used the figure of the Spectator and his observations around 
London to capture the sign nature of the public. Seen through the mathematical time that 
structures the marketplace, the public cannot be represented, but it can be approached through an 
older linking of sign and material world that Michel Foucault describes as a an episteme of 
 
14 Stuart Sherman, Telling Time; Erin Mackie, Market á la Mode: Fashion, Commodity, and Gender in The 
Tatler and The Spectator (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
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resemblances.15 Within this framework, the Spectator turns London’s human bodies into 
metonymic signs of the public even as his commentary becomes a sign to be commented on by 
others. As Foucault notes, the episteme of resemblance recognizes both the words and the 
materiality of the world as a part of a living web of meaning, prompting an infinite cycle of 
commentary and material sign. 
 Not all of the writers concerned with the period’s emerging time concepts were 
convinced of their value. In the third chapter I shift away from the periodical essays to examine 
the role of the longer, first-person narratives that were increasingly popular among readers. 
Published in 1688, at the end of the author’s career, Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko, or The Royal Slave 
garnered renewed interest among twenty-first-century critics for its depiction of slavery in a 
failing British colony and its troubling narrator. My analysis places Behn’s story in context with 
the bureaucracies that managed both colonization and the slave trade. The long distances 
between Britain and its colonies and, just as significantly, the long time frames involved in both 
local governance and trade gave birth to a bureaucratic print culture. In Behn’s colonial world, 
slaves and governors alike were represented in and by legal documents that take on a power of 
their own within administrative systems. Behn’s narrative highlights the fact that these 
administrative systems use print to mimic the patterns of mathematical time, rather than the 
cognitive and biological duration of the human body, and illustrates the dangers of a world in 
which text begins to absorb the bodies it claims to represent. 
 Chapter Four provides a counterpoint to Behn’s concerns with a reading of two of Daniel 
Defoe’s first-person narratives. I argue that Robinson Crusoe can be read as a follow-up to 
Defoe’s political economic arguments in the financially disastrous years of 1719 and 1720, 
 
15 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An archeology of the human sciences (New York: Routledge, 
2001). 
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When read for the play of competing time concepts in the story’s narrative and thematic 
structures, Robinson Crusoe proves to be part of Defoe’s evolving effort to promote his readers’ 
faith in the long-term projections of the market, and a caution that they must differentiate these 
time frames from the daily repetitions and incremental developments that fill human time. In 
1720, this effort failed dramatically with the collapse of the South Sea Bubble and Law’s 
Mississippi Company in France. Nevertheless, the awkward harnessing of embodied time and 
mathematical time continued (and continues) to dominate marketplaces. To understand Defoe’s 
response to the financial disasters, I examine Defoe’s Roxana, The Fortunate Mistress. Published 
after the collapse of the markets in 1724, Roxana shows the shifts in Defoe’s thinking about the 
British financial state. This later novel gives voice to some of the same fears that were evident 
earlier in Behn’s text as the body becomes a central rhetorical site for the battle to reconcile 
mathematically-derived time with the narrow limits of embodied time. 
 The final two chapters of the dissertation shift attention away from the loosely defined 
traditions of periodical essays and first-person narratives to a genre that reached its apex during 
the eighteenth century. Oriental tales proliferated with the growth in print culture during the 
seventeenth century. The genre was immensely popular through most of the eighteenth century 
and, in fact, most of the authors discussed in the previous chapters incorporated oriental tales 
into their other narrative work. Beginning with the oriental romans à clef that circulated among 
Western European courts, I argue for a new understanding of how and why the oriental tale 
developed as it did. Suggesting an alternative to existing versions of the genre’s history, this 
discussion finds the tales’ narrative tradition to be inextricably linked to the momentous shifts in 
political and economic power during the period. Chapter Five thus begins with my discussion of 
The Sultana of Barbary, an early roman à clef that served as a thinly-veiled critique of Charles 
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II’s court. Reading The Sultana’s elaborate plot twists for their indebtedness to the English fable 
tradition, I argue that early oriental tales used their Eastern settings to negotiate the increasingly 
permeable boundaries of political power.16 Moving from the seventeenth to the eighteenth 
century, I argue that by the time Marana’s widely read Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy is 
published, the literary market is already adjusting older tropes to the conceptual demands of the 
new marketplace. The fifth chapter concludes with a discussion of the English translation of 
Antoine Galland’s Mille et une Nuits, re-titled Arabian Nights’ Entertainments. Arabian Nights’ 
had an incalculable impact on the English literary tradition and continues to do so, but during the 
first two decades of the eighteenth century, it participated in the same discussions of time and 
value that are evident in the works of Addison, Steele, Behn, and Defoe. Arabian Nights’ models 
capitalism’s deliberate blurring of the boundaries between the material world of bodies and the 
immaterial realm of language. Using Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s discussion of desire and 
capitalism, I explore Arabian Nights’ deployment of bodies and desire mimic the ceaseless 
production of a political-economic system embedded in time.17 
 In the sixth and final chapter of this study I move beyond the early decades of the 
eighteenth century to examine how oriental tales transformed as Britain’s initial period of 
financial innovation came to a close at mid-century. Looking at Samuel Johnson’s Rasselas and 
John Hawkesworth’s Almoran and Hamet, this chapter argues that the larger shift from political-
economic discourse to moral philosophy effectively occluded the role of mathematical time in 
shaping the British populace.18 Questions how the public functioned within a new marketplace 
 
16 For a study of the oriental tale’s relation to the national-tale tradition, see Srinivas Aravamudan, “In the 
Wake of the Novel: The Oriental Tale as National Allegory,” Novel: A Forum on Fiction 33.1 (Fall 1999): 5-31.  
17 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). 
18 See Mary Poovey, History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and 
Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
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system transformed into questions about human nature, but a human nature devoid of cultural or 
historical specificity. As a result, the starting perspective of these works also shifted, such that 
what was once a blurred boundary between materiality and sign broke apart into a binary of 
presence and illusion. This new binary required a place holder to denote presence and reality. 
Authors turned once again the human body, but these later texts identified a different body, an 
insistently physiological body that inhabited the space carved out beneath the body’s visual 
character. 
 The study concludes, then, with a reading of Sheridan’s 1767 tale, Nourjahad. In her use 
of the oriental tale Sheridan gives her own shape to a tradition that by that point had spanned 
more than a century. As she re-works Johnson’s and Hawkesworth’s themes of illusion, Sheridan 
leaves us with a troubling, unresolved split between two times. And in looking forward to 
Romanticism, Nourjahad offers a starting point for new questions about the spots of time, mythic 









Finance and the Introduction of Mathematical Time 
 
In 1710, a joyfully optimistic Isaac Bickerstaff calculated that his chances of winning the 
state lottery of the day were “but an Hundred and Fifty Thousand to One against my being worth 
a Thousands Pounds per Annum for thirty two Years.”1 Naturally, Richard Steele’s fictional 
narrator decides to purchase a ticket; moreover, to advertise in the next issue of The Tatler for 
anyone willing to bet against his success. Seduced by visions of fortune and wealth, Bickerstaff 
reflects a public exuberance for gambling that still resonates. The essay itself reflects a 
convergence of mathematics, state financing and human imagination that changed the basic 
structures of the state, its marketplaces and its public. This chapter looks at the actual 
mathematics behind Bickerstaff’s dubious calculations and argues that seventeenth-century 
mathematic innovations not only popularized probability theories, but introduced a new 
articulation of time to Britain’s marketplaces. 
During the seventeenth century, British scientists and mathematicians participated in a 
remarkable period of development in mathematics. Unbounded by later notions of specialization, 




1 Richard Steele, The Tatler, ed. Donald F. Bond, 5 vols., vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 
230. 
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mechanics, classical traditions and theology. The need to improve navigational tools and 
practices inspired Edward Wright and John Napier to revise old representations of longitude and 
latitude relations and the first logarithmic tables and prompted a century-long effort to solve the 
longitude problem. Though designed to correct problems in global navigation, this early work 
opened the door to innovations in trigonometry and the subsequent development of calculus by 
Fermat, Newton and Leibniz. Within the larger field of geometry, René Descartes and Pierre de 
Fermat independently established new methods for representing spatial relations through 
algebraic equations. And Galileo’s work permitted spatial relations to be understood in motion as 
he, John Wallis, Newton and many others revolutionized our understanding of dynamics. The 
results of this work could be applied in astronomy, but also in engineering and machines. In 
1657, for instance, Dutch astronomer Christiaan Huygens fine-tuned mathematical 
representations of motion to create the first functional pendulum clock.2 
Much of the theoretical basis for this work came from a set of paradoxes developed by 
the ancient Greeks. The first of these paradoxes asked how a single point on a line relates to the 
line. Presumably, one could differentiate an infinite number of points on any given line. The line 
must be infinitely divisible into such points, which results in the conclusion that an individual 
point can have no magnitude. But a series of points without magnitude could not create a line of 
any magnitude, resulting in a theoretical negation of the line itself. The problem permitted Greek 
mathematicians to articulate a fundamental challenge to the ways in which we conceive of space, 
but the paradox that inspired eighteenth-century thinkers shifted attention to the concepts of time 
 
2 A layperson’s guide to the development of mathematic theories can be found in Carl B. Boyer, A History 
of Mathematics (New York: Wiley, 1991). See also Richard Mankiewicz, The Story of Mathematics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000). For the development of probability theory and its cultural manifestations, see 
Lorraine Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); and Ian 
Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: a Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and 
Statistical Inference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
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and motion. Known as Zeno’s paradox, this problem posited that like the hypothetical line, time 
and motion across distance are infinitely divisible. And yet these too seemed to be made up of 
something akin to magnitude that could not be conceived of without finite parts. Seventeenth-
century mathematicians found that they could use Zeno’s paradox to avoid the challenge posed 
to calculation by the concept of infinity. In this mathematical sleight of hand, infinitely small and 
therefore insignificant numbers could be used as limits in the calculation of a series and then 
disposed of at the end. This early trick paved the way for calculus, with its foundation in the 
inverse relation between integration and differentiation, and we find the thinking behind it fully 
articulated in the definitions of time, motion and fluxion to be found in Newton’s Principia and 
in the work of Leibniz on the Continent.3 
While Newton and Leibniz were exploring the very basis of measurement, others were 
building on the work of Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat in probability theory.4 Inspired 
largely by popular games of chance, probability theory provided a mathematical perspective on 
the idea of the event. Binding a series of events together by mathematical similarity, rather than 
by cause and effect, probability theories made use of space or time or both to gather the large 
number of event repetitions necessary to make such patterns emerge. With its identification of 
large patterns, this work would serve as a cornerstone for modern statistics and the social 
sciences.  
 
3 Morris Kline, Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1972). Kline’s study includes discussions of motion, time and dynamics in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century mathematical thought. See also J.M. Dubbey, Development of Modern Mathematics (London: Butterworths, 
1970). 
4 For the development of probability theory and its cultural manifestations, see Lorraine Daston, Classical 
Probability in the Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); and Ian Hacking, The Emergence of 
Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). See also Thomas M. Kavanagh, Enlightenment and the Shadows of 
Chance: The Novel and the Culture of Gambling in Eighteenth-Century France (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
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We do not need to understand the specific calculations by which seventeenth-century 
mathematics progressed to appreciate the conceptual directions that it took. How motion, time, 
change and space were reduced to representation in number relations is not so important as the 
idea that such things are both possible and productive of great innovations in everything from 
navigation to machines. But late seventeenth-century Britons had another problem on their 
hands. Spurred on by Continental successes in the Netherlands, Germany and Italy, British 
thinkers adapted their mathematic tools to the period’s vigorous debates about national financial 
policies.5 
The 1710 state lottery described in Steele’s essay was one of a series of schemes 
designed to raise immediate cash for the state during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth-
century period that P.G.M. Dickson dubbed the “financial revolution” in England.6 Later studies, 
including work by Joyce Oldham Appleby and Larry Neal, and Robert Markley, revise 
Dickson’s insulated approach to England’s financial history, demonstrating the extent to which 
Britain and other European states owed their modern financial concepts to international markets.7 
 
5 For sustained discussions of the rise of scientific thinking during the early modern period and its cultural 
permutations, see Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Peter Dear, Revolutionizing the Sciences: European knowledge and 
its Ambitions, 1500-1700 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern 
Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998). For a 
specific treatment of political-economic discourse in seventeenth-century British culture, see Joyce Oldham 
Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1978). 
6 P.G.M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 
1688-1756 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1967). 
7 Larry Neal, The Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Robert Markley, The Far East and the English Imagination, 1600-
1730 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See also Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, The World 
That Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World Economy 1400 to Present, 2nd ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 
1999). The work of economic historians has supported a number of literary studies on the influence of credit 
structures on the literary marketplace. See Martha Woodmansee and Mark Osteen, “Taking Account of the New 
Economic Criticism: an historical introduction,” in The New Economic Criticism: Studies at the intersection of 
literature and economics, eds. Martha Woodmansee and Mark Osteen (London: Routledge, 1999), 3-50. For a 
survey of literary scholarship on the financial revolution, see Seán Moore, “The Culture of Paper Credit: The New 
Economic Criticism and the Postcolonial Eighteenth Century,” The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation 
45.1 (Spring 2004): 87-108. See also Robert Mitchell, Sympathy and the State in the Romantic Era: Systems, State 
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A significant part of the story of the Britain’s financial crisis during the seventeenth century 
begins in those marketplaces and in the colonial Atlantic, where traders and governments were 
stretched to address a growing shortage of coin. Merchants argued that coin clipping and 
shortages strained their efforts to expand trade in both domestic and foreign markets. In the 
meantime, the British Crown suffered from a coin shortage of a different sort. Civil conflict and 
Continental wars meant that the state was chronically in need of funds despite the Empire’s 
steadily growing shipping, textile, and agricultural industries. In fact, the East India trade 
exacerbated the domestic coin shortage with its outflow of bullion. 
The monarchy’s indebtedness was a source of great concern for its subjects. As Dickson 
explains, prior to the ascension of William and Mary, state debt was necessarily associated with 
both financial and political weakness: 
For most of this period its reputation had been unsavoury.  To start with, the very idea of 
lending money was suspect.  As late as the seventeenth century borrowing tended to be 
regarded as an index of necessity, and lenders as those who took advantage of necessity.  
This was the line of thought behind the prohibition of usury until the sixteenth century, 
and the subsequent establishment of maximum rates of interest for loans between private 
persons.8 
In prior centuries, the discourses surrounding usury had tainted the general perception of lending 
transactions; lending was not only un-Christian, it was closely associated with the power 
dynamics of necessity.  While credit had developed its own positive associations with character 
 
Finance, and the Shadows of Futurity (New York: Routledge, 2007); Catherine Ingrassia, Authorship, Commerce, 
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Britain, 1694-1994 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Peter De Bolla, The Discourse of the Sublime: 
Readings in History, Aesthetics and the Subject (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1989). 
8 Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England, 39. 
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and trust, borrowing still implied a very short-term solution to a present need so that, even absent 
religious concerns, borrowing carried the taint of a transaction in which power was 
disproportionately weighted toward one party. These factors help explain the vitriolic discourse 
surrounding lenders throughout the early modern period and the persistence of usury laws. 
Crown debt provoked concerns about the “money men” whose loans supplied that need. 
As a matter of necessity, the Crown was exempt from the usury statutes that were in effect from 
the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. The monarch negotiated interest rates with the 
lenders at hand and usually from a position of weakness created by financial urgency. This 
generally meant that the select group of lenders who dealt with the crown could demand high 
interest rates that the Crown almost inevitably had difficulty carrying. As unpaid interest was 
added to principal, a long line of English monarchs found itself with what Dickson calls “a 
growing snowball of debt.” While the English public regularly bemoaned the power of the 
lenders or the profligacy of the Crown, the heart of the state’s chronic financial troubles lay in 
structures unsuited to the funding of a modern nation-state. Simply put, the state had no financial 
instrument or structure to make use of the long-term future.  
In this sense the Crown was no different from private merchants, nobles, or gentlemen in 
the period: 
Many a sixteenth- or seventeenth-century nobleman, paying 10% on his debts, and 
paying off old debts with new ones until the accumulated principal swallowed up his 
estate, would have recognized his case as that of the government in miniature.  
Merchants, too, though usually more prudent both in the scale of their needs and in 
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keeping accounts than kings and nobles, also borrowed and repaid on an essentially short-
term basis.9 
Economic historians attribute the short-term nature of lending during these centuries to a number 
of factors. A volatile political context, a shortage of funds for long-term loans, and the need for 
liquid capital to keep pace with the largely short-term nature of most commercial ventures all 
conspired to make long-term loans largely impractical. There were, however, precedents for 
long-term debt systems. With coin shortages and funding shortages becoming increasingly 
intractable, the British state made use of these precedents with legislation and policies that were 
no less effective for being controversial.  
The most pressing concern of late seventeenth-century financial debates was how to 
finance payments on the existing state debt while finding the most expedient way to raise new 
funds as they became necessary. Just behind that concern was the ongoing anxiety about bullion. 
Currencies in England, Scotland and Ireland were all dependent on gold and silver that were in 
short supply. The recoinage debate that later became famous in Jonathan Swift’s Drapier’s 
Letters was already focused on a dual need to restore the kingdom’s clipped, alloyed and 
otherwise diminished coins to a standard material value and to find more currency with which to 
expand commerce domestically and abroad.10 To some small extent this second problem had 
already been solved. Faced with a shortage of precious metals, England’s traders and financiers 
were conducting lucrative businesses primarily with private letters of credit, supported by 
goldsmiths and scriveners who served as proto-bankers and by foreign banks like those of 
Amsterdam and Venice. Neal describes how banks in Antwerp and later, Amsterdam, used serial 
 
9 Dickson, 40. 
10 James Thompson, Models of Value: Eighteenth-Century Political Economy and the Novel (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1996). Thompson provides an overview of the recoinage debates and argues for their 
importance in shaping the novel. 
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endorsements to create bank notes that moved efficiently amongst the two parties to a transaction 
and their banks in different cities or countries.11 The system provided security, convenience and 
speed, eliminating the need for coin and complementing the information networks that were 
tightening the ties among international markets. Moreover, Dutch banking systems were 
complemented by a joint-venture capital model that relied on long-term investments. While most 
European commercial ventures remained short-term until the eighteenth century, the East India 
trade witnessed early efforts to rely on long-term investors. According to Neal, the Dutch East 
India company depended on long-term investment by 1612, followed by the English company by 
1659.12 Beyond the practices of these corporations, Britons who traveled in Eastern marketplaces 
encountered systems of credit and capital investments that had been established for centuries.13 A 
third and no less pressing component of the financial debates was the possibility of balancing the 
various interests of Britain’s social and economic classes through long-term political economics. 
After a century of civil and Continental wars, the orderly, interlocking mathematical patterns of 
finance seemed a likely model for rebalancing power within the state. The tables and logarithms 
disseminated from seventeenth-century mathematics seemed to offer a means for harnessing the 
long-term future to Britain’s present use. 
 Probability theory suggested that events unrelated in simple cause-and-effect frameworks 
could be related in mathematical formulas. Ambitious in work as in life, William Petty offered 
theories of political economy while mathematically (if often erroneously) deriving previously 
unavailable figures for population, growth and decline in state revenues, and more.14 One could 
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12 Neal, 118. 
13 See Markley, The Far East; and Pomeranz and Topik, The World That Trade Created. 
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not accurately predict the life span of a particular annuitant using a figure for the average life 
span of a British citizen, but one might predict the average life span of a large group of 
annuitants over time. Life tables, which would form the basis for both life insurance and for 
systematic state annuity plans, first appeared in John Graunt’s 1662 Natural and Political 
Observations.15 But countless other mathematical treatises, including Johan de Witt’s The Worth 
of Life Annuities compared to Redemption Bonds (Waardije van Lyf-renten naer Proportie van 
Los-renten) and Richard Witt’s Arithmeticall Questions, offered up precise mathematical 
solutions to the question of how to structure financial schemes.  
Borrowing from the numerous tracts that offered tables, estimates and logarithms, 
financial thinkers and businessmen brought mathematic thought to the Empire’s burgeoning 
urban centers. Not only merchants and investors, but also those who mingled with them in coffee 
shops and in private homes could grasp the basic premises behind insurance policies and long-
term joint-stock investing. The popularity of games of chance made the existence of probability 
theories a matter of common knowledge. Nor could the many indebted land owners, merchants 
and consumers of Britain’s cities have remained unaware of the growing use of compound 
interest. The proponents of the new state financing schemes, whether they advocated annuities, 
lotteries or banks, all depended upon a revenue to be exacted from and in the future. 
Foundational to the early development of Britain’s credit-based economy, the new mathematics 
quietly disseminated apparently basic but highly significant changes in the way British cultures 
understood the future that they were manipulating. 
Even within private transactions the shift to longer lending terms brought about intuitive 
adjustments to how lenders considered their loans. Most famous for establishing one of the first 
 
15 Morris Kline, Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times, provides an overview of 
mathematical innovations. 
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fire insurance companies after the Great Fire of London in 1666, Nicholas Barbon was also a 
financial theorist, a builder, and a landlord of dubious distinction.16 Barbon participated actively 
in the effort to found a national bank. He established a land bank in 1695 in partnership with 
John Asgill and later obtained legislative authority for its merger with John Briscoe’s land bank. 
Though the land banks ultimately failed, the approach to credit promoted by Barbon and his 
colleagues provides insight into a manner of thinking about credit that succeeded in changing the 
British financial system. Describing the distinctions between short and long-term lending 
transactions, Barbon wrote in 1690: 
There are Two Sorts of Credit; the one, is Grounded upon the Ability of the Buyer; the 
other, upon the Honesty: The first is called a Good Man, which implys an Able Man; he 
generally buys upon short Time; to pay in a Month, which is accounted as ready Mony, 
and the Price is made accordingly.  The other is accounted an Honest Man; He may be 
poor; he Generally buys for three and Six Months or longer, so as to pay the Merchant by 
the Return of his own Goods; and therefore, the Seller relys more upon the Honesty of 
the Buyer, than his Ability: Most of the Retail Traders buy upon this Sort of Credit, and 
are usually Trusted for more than double they are worth.17 
Barbon’s distinction between the two sorts of credit reveals the challenge involved in shifting to 
an economy in which long-term debt becomes a norm. As lenders consider longer durations, they 
are increasingly unable to account for all of the possible events that might effect the repayment 
of loans. The lender dismisses the usual variables from the calculations and relies instead on a 
 
16 The most comprehensive discussion of Barbon remains William Lewis Letwin, The Origins of Scientific 
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pattern of experience, in this case “the Honesty of the Buyer.” The wealth of eighteenth-century 
materials that deal with questions of credibility and character testify to the difficulties of gauging 
honesty.18 But as the scale of state finances steadily grew, the length of time necessary to manage 
the flow of money extended well beyond the span of any single debtor, king, merchant or 
otherwise.  In response Britons turned to mathematics and its distinctive representation of time.  
As in the intuitive calculation of the “Honest man” described by Barbon above, the 
mathematics of late seventeenth-century financing substituted predictions of broad patterns of 
behavior over time (like the general honesty of the debtor) for the more difficult predictions of 
specific events and decisions. To accomplish this, mathematics needed a representation of time 
that eliminated variables, leaving room for the mathematician to superimpose just the data he 
would rely upon. Newton’s Principia illustrates an early step toward rethinking temporality: 
“Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without 
relation to anything external, and by another name is called duration.”19 Newton’s premise is that 
the myriad of ways in which we measure, perceive or understand time as associated with change 
are merely symptomatic of our own cognitive limitations (“the common people conceive those 
quantities under no other notions but from the relation they bear to sensible objects”).20 In 
contrast to our intuitive understanding, real or absolute time has no relation to change: 
All motions may be accelerated and retarded, but the flowing of absolute time is not 
liable to any change.  The duration or perseverance of the existence of things remains the 
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Business of Inner Meaning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); and Lisa Freeman, Character’s Theater: 
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same, whether the motions are swift or slow, or none at all: and therefore this duration 
ought to be distinguished from what are only sensible measures thereof.21 
Devoid of all “sensible measures,” time becomes the blank sheet on which mathematics may 
begin its work of representing a world reduced to its most essential numbers. Newton is not the 
only thinker articulating an alternative version of time during the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, but his description helps us to mark the difference between an eighteenth-
century theoretical time and an understanding of time that prevailed in the centuries before.  
Citing Arthur Lovejoy’s discussion of the “temporalization of the great chain of being,” 
Lewis White Beck writes, “At the beginning of the century . . . the chain was suspended from a 
static eternity, and every link in it was characterized by its vertical distance from God.”22 Prior 
centuries had maintained a belief in what later thinkers would call “messianic” time, a 
framework in which the eternal lives alongside and within the present. Contrasted with the no-
time of the eternal, mortal time was just that: a symptom of our own limited understandings. 
Neither the secular future nor the past held great significance in this context. While Lovejoy 
surmised that the transition from “vertical” to “horizontal” time occurred only slowly over the 
course of the eighteenth century, late seventeenth-century science and mathematics indicate that 
the transition already was well on its way. Thus Beck describes how not only Newton, but also 
Locke, Kant and Leibniz restructured conceptions of time to help produce our modern 
understanding of time as a horizontal structure, akin to space, that stretches out to accommodate 
the realm of the eternal to which time was previously contrasted. The mechanics of these 
 
21 Newton, 15. 
22 Lewis White Beck, “World Enough, and Time,” in Probability, Time, and Space in Eighteenth-Century 
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conceptions of time differed in material ways, of course, and for our purposes it makes sense to 
focus on the two early British thinkers, Locke and Newton.23   
As Beck points out, Locke’s infinite duration has a different ontology than Newton’s 
absolute time. In Locke’s thinking any conception that we have of time is abstracted from the 
sense of duration that arises through the experience of consciousness; the individual reflects on 
“a train of ideas which constantly succeed one another in his understanding,” thus producing the 
idea of succession that forms the basis for an idea of the individual’s duration.24  From an 
understanding of his own duration, the individual can imagine other coeval durations and then 
those that exist before and beyond the time of his own thoughts. Locke’s abstractions take him 
all the way to a final concept of time that is at least reminiscent of Newton’s absolute time: 
universal, infinitely divisible, and unchanging. As Berkeley argued, Locke’s move from the 
conscious experience of succession to such an abstracted concept requires some dubious logical 
leaps, but Locke’s insistence on this final construction of a universal, infinite flowing time 
demonstrates the importance of this conception by the close of the seventeenth century. 
Beck’s discussion necessarily omits much of the complexity of the relationship between 
time and the sacred in seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century thought. Robert Markley and 
others have demonstrated how Newton’s science worked within, rather than outside of or 
against, a theological framework. In particular, Newton’s commitment to the precepts of 
voluntarism and his participation in the millenarian thought of the period meant that his time 
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theory was always conditioned by the possibility of divine action or revelation.25 The role of the 
divine continued to shape the way people understood temporality and the ways in which 
philosophers theorized time, but as mathematics moved from theory to the daily praxis of 
probability calculations and compound-interest tables, scientific time lost its rich nuances and 
became merely a blank slate on which to superimpose numerical patterns. Seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century probability theories, mortgage tables, annuities and economic projections 
begin by assuming this skeletal version of absolute time.26 
In praxis mathematics eliminated the sense of continuity and motion found in Newton’s 
theory and superimposed its units of division (whether seconds, years, or even centuries as in 
some early annuity tables) upon the fixed representational space that remained.  Regardless of 
the mathematician’s unit of division, the resulting calculation needed only a single variable to 
account for time. This dynamic works precisely because the process by which mathematics 
accounts for time through measured intervals has the effect of collapsing time into space, a move 
that corresponded with seventeenth-century efforts to bridge the divide between space and 
complex numbers. But this representation of time has no way to account for the human sense of 
duration and its continuity, a failure that distinguishes mathematical time from earlier spatial 
metaphors for time. 
Human beings associated time and space long before the advent of modern mathematics. 
Even the possibility of an eternity “outside” of mortal time invokes spatial metaphors. But time’s 
most important association was primarily with change. This is the association that gives structure 
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to what Stuart Sherman calls occasional time, time that arises not out of its place in a system of 
measurement, but out of its relation to culturally significant events or practices.27 In this 
construction, we draw our understanding of time from the distinctions between experienced 
events such that we experience duration as the persistence of change in our world.28 This 
conceptual integration of time and change gives rise to familiar metaphors of motion, invoking 
space as that element in which motion becomes detectable. Thus, the metaphors hidden in 
references to time passing, flying, creeping or flowing capture the way in which intuitive 
associations between time and change emerge figuratively as a sense that time moves through 
space.29 During the seventeenth century, European thinkers revolutionized mathematics by 
finding new ways to represent change as a relation between events. But in the process, 
Newtonian thought had disassociated time from change and redefined it as a flow that could be 
divided infinitely. Mathematics imposed its own structure on that flow, stilling its motions and 
capturing change in the static relations of evenly spaced instants. 
In a response to Einstein’s theory of relativity, Henri Bergson points to the distinction 
between this mathematical time and our durational experience of time as an explanation for 
apparent paradoxes embedded in our theories of time.30 As Bergson notes, the power of 
mathematics to represent and manipulate data over long time intervals obscures the fact that 
mathematics does not in fact represent the continuity of time that fills those intervals: 
If we now observe that science works exclusively with measurements, we become aware 
that, with respect to time, science counts instants, takes note of simultaneities, but 
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remains without a grip on what happens in the intervals. [Science] may indefinitely 
increase the number of extremities, indefinitely narrow the intervals; but always the 
interval escapes it, shows [time] only in its extremities. If every motion in the universe 
was to accelerate in proportion, including the one that serves as the measure of time . . . 
the change would exist only for that consciousness able to compare the flow of things 
with that of inner life. In the view of science nothing would have changed.31 
Bergson’s illustration reveals the importance of motion to human experiences of time and the 
contrasting lack of motion in mathematical temporality. In its closed system of simultaneities, 
mathematics has no need for motion. But in the intuitive temporality of human consciousness, 
motion is a necessary byproduct of the need to represent change, whether that change is within or 
without the human mind.  
 As distinct frameworks, these two understandings of time need not conflict, but at the 
crux of Bergson’s thesis is the idea that the human mind chronically entangles the mathematical 
innovations through which we advance scientific knowledge with the intuitive concepts through 
which we experience our world. This tendency was already visible in John Locke’s explanation 
of time. Positioning his discussion of time immediately before the section on “numbers,” Locke 
understands duration as “another sort of distance, or length.”32 On the other hand, Locke feels 
bound to concede that this form of length arises, “not from the permanent parts of space, but 
from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of succession.” Nevertheless, Locke’s 
insistence, throughout the section, on defining time through a metaphor of the static 
measurement of length diverges from previous conceptions of time as dynamic and associated 
with space through motion and change. Duration in Locke’s theory thus becomes pure length as 
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“ideas” become a unit of measurement; “the distance between any parts of that succession, or 
between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds.”33 
Locke’s conflation of spatial and temporal measurements suggests the difficulty of 
keeping time concepts distinct in our minds. Bergson describes the eventual result: 
The measurement of a thing is sometimes the revealer of its nature, and precisely at this 
point mathematical expression turns out to have a magical property: created by us or risen 
at our bidding, it does more than we asked of it; for we cannot convert into space the time 
already elapsed without treating all of time the same way.  The act by which we usher the 
past and present into space spreads out the future there without consulting us.34 
The excess dimension through which mathematics demarcates time thus becomes an expansive 
past and future that are physically “present” with us now, though tantalizingly inaccessible. From 
the eighteenth century onward, that ever-present past haunts its creators with the possibility of 
doors and windows that open onto that other time. In the later part of the century, the 
psychological temptations of such a time-space will manifest themselves in powerful uses of 
history and nostalgia. But in the fixing of time, something else happens as well. Though 
mathematics has no conceptual need to associate time with motion, the human mind cannot 
dispense with that most fundamental understanding of time’s “passage.” When mathematics 
fixes the motion of time into measured intervals of space, time no longer flies; we do. Modern 
mathematics thus reconfigures the future as a temporal expanse to be glimpsed and manipulated 
in numbers. The human mind transforms that expanse into an imaginative landscape that lies 
spread out before us, waiting for a human subject that is now in motion within a whole new 
dimension. Late seventeenth-century leaders and businessmen believed that their new means for 
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financing the empire would allow the public and its government to march toward that future 
together.  
Prompted by the urgent finances of the Crown, Britain put mathematical time to work 
with a series of annuities, lotteries and tontine annuities designed to raise short-term funds for the 
state. Civic leaders had adopted all three financing tools from the Continent, and in the case of 
annuities and lotteries in particular, these tools already had found some success in private use 
within Britain. Early on, the state sought to tempt its citizens with annuities and tontine loan 
schemes. The tontine loan was a game of chance in which the government and participants bet 
on the lifespan of the participant. Under the scheme, participants received ten percent interest on 
their loans until 1700 and seven percent thereafter. To entice its participants, the state paid this 
interest on the loan as a whole, directing a pro rata share of each interest payment to a 
participant only during his lifespan or for the life of a person he had nominated at the outset of 
the contract (his nominee). As a result, the state essentially won if the nominee died early, but a 
young participant might live to see a windfall on his original investment. The scheme raised only 
£377,600, and only £108,100 remained after many participants took an option to switch their 
claims to annuities. Whether because the terms of the tontine appeared too complicated to 
potential lenders, as Dickson suggests, or because those inclined to place their money with the 
state were more interested in security than windfall, the state’s early appeal to the public’s sense 
of chance was relatively unsuccessful. 
Fortunately for the cash-strapped Crown, the annuity schemes fared better. Annuity sales 
licensed under parliamentary acts of 1693 and 1694 raised a combined total of £891,900. 
Annuity schemes came with a larger price tag for the government, however. In order to convince 
seventeenth-century Britons to lend their money to the Crown, the state had to offer annuitants 
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an interest rate of fourteen percent, well above the legal interest rate of six percent for private 
transactions. Moreover, to initiate any of these schemes, Parliament first needed to pass 
legislation designating a future source of funds with which to pay the winners or buyers of the 
schemes. A 1708 Act of Parliament paid for the 1710 lottery with an ongoing tax on “Coals, 
Culm and Cynders” and new duties on “Houses, having Twenty Windows or more.”35 
Parliament guaranteed the 1693 and 1694 annuity schemes with an added and highly 
controversial excise tax on beer, vinegar, and certain imported liquors to cover the potential 
ninety-nine year term of the annuities.36  
The British state soon found that lotteries were generally more successful for raising 
money without running too far afoul of public opinion. Privately-run lotteries had become 
popular throughout Britain and the Continent, and though an Elizabethan state-lottery attempt 
had met with mixed success, the seventeenth-century populace was ready for a state version of 
the scheme. In March of 1694, Parliament authorized the first state lottery for the amount of £1 
million. Tickets cost £10 each, with winners receiving sixteen-year annuities at varying amounts. 
The 1694 lottery tickets sold quickly and set the stage for state lotteries that would be put on 
sporadically through most of the next century.37  From the point-of-view of the state, lotteries 
worked very much like a sale of annuities. Based on revenue the Crown expected to receive in 
the future, the state could commit to making regular payments to its annuitants or lottery 
winners. By opening the offer to the general public, the Crown could increase its pool of 
“lenders” and avoid many of the political dangers of borrowing from a select group of 
 
35 An Act for Continuing part of the Duties upon Coals, Culm, and Cynders, and Granting New Duties 
upon Houses, having Twenty Windows or more, to Raise the sum of Fifteen hundred thousand Pounds, by way of a 
Lottery, for the Service of the Year One thousand seven hundred and ten, 8 Anne. 
36 The annuity payments in this scheme ended upon the death of the annuitant, such that the state was 
gambling upon the early deaths of its debtors to compensate for the interest that it had promised to pay. 
37 State lotteries ended in 1826. See Dickson, The Financial Revolution, 54. 
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moneymen. Putting aside for a moment the concerns expressed by many contemporaries that 
state lotteries might encourage private gambling, the lotteries proved to be an invaluable tool in 
late seventeenth-century efforts to raise cash without further straining the public’s relationship to 
the Crown. 
But neither state lotteries nor annuity schemes worked unless a significant part of the 
British populace shared the state’s view of its financial (and political) future. With the recasting 
of state debt as public credit, the financial interests of the government and a large number of its 
citizens become intimately aligned. J.G.A. Pocock notes the way in which a shared financial 
stake in the future changes the relationship of a people to its government.38 Pocock’s uncritical 
approach to this financially-backed nationalism is troubling, but scholars acknowledge the role 
of state debt policies to the forging of the British Empire and its marketplace culture. Peter De 
Bolla links the public’s perception of its unprecedented state debt to the discourse on the 
sublime, arguing that the individual emerges as the site of the “real” to counteract the 
disorienting boundlessness of state finance.39 Patrick Brantlinger also makes use of 
psychoanalytic theory, but combines this with a strong Marxist perspective to show that the 
national debt creates a fetishization of paper currency that underwrites the idea of nation and the 
subject’s ties to that nation.40 Brantlinger argues convincingly for the importance of colonial and 
class exploitation in sustaining the fiction of the British empire and its currency. Robert Mitchell 
addresses the effects of early state borrowing on later generations of Britons, arguing that the 
discourse of sympathy emerges to compensate for the systemic tensions inherent in that financial 
 
38 J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the 
Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
39 Peter De Bolla, The Discourse of the Sublime: Readings in History, Aesthetics and the Subject. 
40 Patrick Brantlinger, Fictions of State: Culture and Credit in Britain, 1694-1994. 
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discourse.41 Only Mitchell goes beyond the relatively simple idea of the shared future to examine 
the importance of temporality in the period. Focusing on Romantic poets of the latter part of the 
century, Mitchell reads in Wordsworth and Shelley an effort to escape the self-perpetuating 
temporal structures of state debt. 
While Mitchell is less invested in the means by which eighteenth-century Britain 
contracted for its long-term debts, both De Bolla and Brantlinger construct their discussions 
around the Bank of England. After its establishment in 1694, the Bank served as the central 
player in all of the state’s schemes; its operations centralized the state’s financing operations, and 
its credit notes dominated English currency valuations. In the next chapter, I address the 
conceptual changes that surrounded the Bank’s founding and its operation in the first decades of 
the eighteenth century. But with their explicit ties to a gambling tradition, the lotteries offer 
something that the Bank’s operations cannot: a window onto the role of chance in the financial 
construction of the state. 
Lotteries, writes Dickson, “tapped the general rage for gambling” and provided “a 
perennial way of escape into wealth and leisure – if only in the imagination.”42 Undoubtedly 
there is a solid element of truth to Dickson’s analysis of the public’s psychology, but we cannot 
imagine that most ticket buyers would have admitted to such short-sightedness. Many if not most 
lottery buyers believed in the real possibility of winning. This is not to say that ticket holders 
envisioned the same sort of carefully measured future on which annuity purchasers were betting, 
but it does mean that the lottery-playing public had its own relationship with the future.43 
 
41 Robert Mitchell, Sympathy and the State. 
42 Dickson, 54. 
43 A number of scholars have looked at the cultural significance behind lotteries, gambling and other games 
of chance during the eighteenth century. In Enlightenment and the Shadows of Chance, Thomas Kavanagh argues 
that the statistical thinking that emerged in seventeenth-century France gave birth to the idea of a universal standard 
through which all individuals could be defined, such that “probability theory offered the paradise of a purely present 
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Richard Steele’s satirical critique of that relationship gives us a glimpse of the conceptual twists 
that shaped it. The Tatler essay on the 1710 lottery begins with Bickerstaff’s account of the 
crowd forming near the Bank in a rush to purchase tickets for the latest lottery.44 After a passage 
reflecting on the creativity of a state that has turned a form of wartime taxation into a public 
diversion, Bickerstaff gets caught in the excitement of the crowd. At this point, surrounded by a 
jostling London crowd ready to gamble their money, Bickerstaff decides to purchase a ticket for 
himself. As I noted at the beginning of the chapter, Steele reveals his narrator to be considerably 
less adept with probability calculations than those who designed the lottery. And in fact, 
Bickerstaff’s faith in his mathematics finds reinforcement in “the twinkling of a certain star in 
my astronomical observations.”45 With a gambler’s confidence, Bickerstaff begins preparing for 
his future as a wealthy man: 
I am arming myself against her [Fortune’s] favours with all my philosophy; and that I 
may not lose myself in such a redundance of unnecessary and superfluous wealth, I have 
determined to settle an annual pension out of it upon a family of Palatines, and by that 
means give these unhappy strangers a taste of British property.46 
Besides these fortunate Palatines, Bickerstaff tells us that he will provide for a particular servant-
maid’s retirement to her home in Wales with an annuity. Our narrator’s beneficence is supported 
by the sympathetic bonds that he feels for the members of the milling crowd around him. His 
attention lights particularly on a young country wench who is “whirling her mop, with her 
petticoats tucked up very agreeably” and whose dance-like motions he imagines to be a 
 
rationality freeing us from the burdens of history, family, and class” (24). Games of chance countered this 
conception by revealing the limits of human rationality and control.   
44 Beginning with the 1710 lottery, ticket subscriptions were drawn at the Bank; drawings were held in the 
Guildhall. See Cornelius Walford, “Lotteries: The Part They Have Played in State Finance,” Journal of the Institute 
of Bankers 6.2 (February 1885): 71-94,80. 
45 Steele, 230. 
46 Steele, 231. 
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premonition of future success.47 Consequently, Bickerstaff is careful to greet her as he would 
someone of her future standing. He further advises “all masters and mistresses to carry it with 
great moderation and condescension towards their servants till next Michaelmas, lest the 
superiority at that time should be inverted.”48 Under Steele’s pen, Bickerstaff revels in the sense 
that he and his fellow lottery players have been gifted with a glimpse into the future and all its 
outlandish possibilities.  
But of course, Bickerstaff represents the flawed reasoning and wild optimism that Steele 
is critiquing. Bickerstaff’s mathematics mimic the conceptual process that went into the state’s 
planning of the lottery. To his mind, the success ration he has produced for himself provides the 
same sort of calculated survey out over the future that lottery advocates used to create tax-
income and debt-payment predictions decades in advance. Steele’s narrator even partakes in the 
political concerns of his financial predecessors. As Bickerstaff’s references to Greek statesmen 
suggest, lottery advocates claimed that such schemes would alleviate political concerns as well 
as financial strains. Judging from this essay alone, we cannot say that Steele disapproved of the 
lotteries themselves, but he does mean for his readers to see the potentially disastrous results of 
the lottery on the ticket-buying public. Bickerstaff’s mop-whirling companion probably cannot 
afford to be spending her wages on lottery tickets, but Steele is probably more concerned with 
Bickerstaff’s willingness to invert class differences and gamble his neighbors’ employment 
status on the twinkling of a star and a premonition.49 The problem here is that Bickerstaff has 
mistaken his own wishes and desires for a calculated version of the future. 
 
47 Steele, 231. 
48 Steele, 231-2. 
49 A secondary market that sold proportionate shares in lottery tickets quickly developed around the state 
lotteries, making it possible for lower-wage earners to participate. 
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The mathematical future given in probability theories and financial projections works 
only in large numbers if it works at all. And this is certainly a problem as Bickerstaff attempts to 
predict a specific future for himself and the few people nearest him in the crowd. But Steele’s 
essay also picks up on a conflation of two versions of time. Bergson’s analysis shows that 
mathematical time is not time at all, but a variable represented as space. The formulation works 
precisely because the consciousness that surveys the mathematical future lies outside of it, much 
as a prospector might survey a landscape from a position well above it. Bergson also tells us, 
though, that the human mind cannot help but introduce its experiences of consciousness and 
duration into that time-space the moment it is re-imagined as lived time. 
Bickerstaff’s wild optimism for a mathematical future that he believes he can lay claim to 
personally demonstrates how easily the mind slips from mathematical survey to time experience. 
This small cognitive slip opens the door to the skeletal spaces of a mathematical future, imbues it 
with a sense of motion, and brings the future to life with the rich temporality of human 
consciousness. But given the static intervals of mathematics, this conflation of times assigns its 
sense of motion to the human consciousness rather than to time itself. Bickerstaff does not watch 
time flow past like a river; he rushes headlong down a road into the future with the whirling 
energetic crowd around him. Steele’s fictional character shows us the consequences of this 
temporal confusion in Bickerstaff’s naïve belief that he foresees, experiences, and might even 
create the imminent future of the nation. So compelling is this sensation that imaginative 
projections emerge as foresight, glimpses of what is to come. It is no coincidence that Bickerstaff 
raises the money for his lottery ticket by selling two globes and a telescope. The future created 
by mathematical thinking becomes an expansive space to be explored, discovered and created by 
a human consciousness in motion. 
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With his amicable but foolish narrator, Steele wants his audience to see the illusions that 
such thinking creates. Bickerstaff has, in a temporal sense, gotten ahead of himself. His financial 
future is only an illusion of the present moment, albeit keenly felt. More disturbing still, his 
political future is also illusory. Bickerstaff has found a moment of social cohesion amongst the 
crowd as he shares with them both the physical space in front of the Bank and giddy hopefulness 
toward future prospects. But the fact that Steele has written this essay from his own apartment 
rather than from the public spaces of the periodical indicates that the patriotic sense of 
community involved in a lottery is more illusory than not. Every member of the crowd has his or 
her eyes on the future, but each of these futures differs from the rest. Concerns about how such 
state-sanctioned gambling affected the minds of the public steadily grew over the course of the 
eighteenth century, resulting finally in the end of the state lotteries (at least for a time). The 
conflation of times that made these lotteries popular, like the state’s debt, persisted long 
afterward. 
Annuity sales and lotteries played an important role in the making of Britain’s eighteenth 
century, but it was banking that emerged at the center of the Empire’s financial system. Well 
before England and Scotland founded their first national banks, governments in the Continent’s 
shipping centers were establishing banking systems designed to meet the demands of far-flung 
trade networks. The earliest banking in Britain was a relatively simple operation; a goldsmith or 
pawn broker could hold coin or goods in safekeeping and issue credit notes that would be paid at 
the demand of the bearer. These practices helped compensate for the Empire’s shortage of coins, 
and avoided the dangers and inconveniences of transporting gold and silver. Inspired by the more 
centralized efficiency of Dutch, German and Italian banks, financiers began promoting the 
establishment of a banking system within Britain. Their proposals outlined several different 
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models for banking and resulted in the establishment of a number of institutions before 
Parliament finally issued a charter for the Bank of England. Most of those early ventures failed 
relatively soon after their establishment, but the mathematical concepts on which they depended 
found their way into the basic banking model we still use in the twenty-first century. In the next 
chapter, I look back at early banking proposals and argue that their constructions of time and 











Addison and Steele’s Public in a Circulating Economy 
 
An anonymous drawing in the British Museum shows the interior of a coffee house 
sometime during the latter part of the seventeenth century or the first half of the eighteenth. The 
middle of picture shows an attentive waiter who stands facing out toward the viewer. With one 
foot positioned slightly forward, he holds a coffee pot aloft in his right hand and skillfully pours 
its contents in a long arching stream into a white china cup held in his left hand. The waiter’s 
image effectively splits the image into two balanced halves. To the waiter’s right, the drawing 
depicts the business workings of a coffee shop. A woman in a white shift manages the tea and 
tobacco from a canopied stand while another servant of the shop retrieves clay pipes for its 
clients. The floor is clean and bare in front of them, and behind them a roaring fire heats a row of 
pots in preparation for service. On the opposite side of the page, well dressed men sit in clusters 
at the tables, holding coffee cups and engaged in lively conversation over newspapers. Messages 
dot the back wall, and a man stands, his candle held high to illuminate an English landscape 
scene behind him. 
Whatever the intentions of the original artist, the drawing reflects an old but persistent 
story about the nature of the public during the eighteenth century. This was the public of the 
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British Enlightenment, a well-heeled middle class consisting primarily of men whose coffee 
shops and tobacco pipes reflected their new leisure time as effectively as their newspapers 
reflected the power of print media to reshape everything from politics and science to industry 
and the arts through the ambitions of that middle class. Since Jürgen Habermas gave this public a 
starring role in the history of capitalism and democracy, scholars have worked to revise some of 
the least convincing parts of the story.1 As Erin Mackie points out in her survey, the two 
dominant lines of criticism that have examined the eighteenth-century public have argued for its 
existence either as a discursive creation or as an historically specific reality, but are often 
challenged to articulate a relationship between the two.2 In this chapter I suggest that the 
difficulty in reconciling these two perspectives is embedded in the nature of the public itself. As 
a loosely defined group of people, the public were the power behind the state’s revenue and its 
debts and were thus central to the existence of a political economy. But as a part of the 
mathematical calculations that imagined the political economy into being, the public can only be 
assumed, not represented. The result is not just a clash of two perspectives, but a temporal 
elision; the public is both an insistently embodied present and a concept seen only from the 
prospective or retrospective data intervals of mathematics. 
To understand more clearly how this phenomenon occurred and how periodical authors 
responded, we need to look beyond the bodies depicted in conversation on the right side of the 
 
1 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1989). The 
complete list of scholarship that expands on or critiques Habermas’ analysis is too lengthy to cover here. Some of 
the most significant contributions include Paula McDowell, The Women of Grub Street: Press, Politics, and Gender 
in the London Literary Marketplace, 1678-1730 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); The Public as Phantom: 
The Phantom Public Sphere, ed. Bruce Robbins for the Social Text Collective (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993); Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 
and within that volume particularly Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of 
Actually Existing Democracy,” 102-42. 
2 Erin Mackie, “Being Too Positive About the Public Sphere,” in The Spectator: Emerging Discourses, ed. 
Donald J. Newman (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2005), 81-104. 
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coffee house drawing to the financial concepts implied by the other half of the picture. I begin 
this chapter with a review of the financial discourse that led to the founding of Britain’s first 
banks. From its reworking of the relationship between time and value, financial discourse created 
the economic concept of circulation, not to articulate that relationship, but to elide one of the 
most troubling gaps in political-economic theory. However, it was a different circulating 
medium, the periodical, that produced the most subtle and effective response to the inability of 
political economics to represent the public. Borrowing from Foucault’s analysis of representation 
and resemblances, I argue that Addison and Steele found in the older espisteme a narrative model 
that captured the temporal paradoxes and immense productivity of the modern public.   
In the second half of the seventeenth century, while British coffee shops were taking in 
their first customers, British traders and merchants were increasingly dependent upon the 
pseudo-currencies created by notes of credit from private lenders, goldsmiths and lombards 
(early pawn shops). Britain’s supply of coin specie (primarily silver and gold) was inadequate to 
meet the needs of its marketplaces. But institutions like the Dutch Wisselbank offered a model 
for a more centralized, efficient system that used negotiable credit notes in place of coin. 
Moreover, a significant bank could act as a reliable lender for the Crown. In order for such plans 
to work, Britons would need to create public trust in both the new currencies and in the banks 
that issued them even while convincing the public to come to terms with public debt as a regular 
and indefinite reality. 
Fortunately for the advocates of these banking schemes, the changes that made a national 
debt policy feasible were in place by 1688. Joint-stock companies were beginning to serve as 
repositories for long-term capital rather than short-term ventures as wealthier Britons became 
 43 
accustomed to long-term investments outside of land.3 Long-term mortgages were emerging as a 
way for landholders to gain cash and manage debts.4 As these mortgages grew more common, 
Scotland and then the other British nations established land registries that streamlined the 
process by which land title holders could borrow. And despite ongoing concerns about the 
stability of the Hanoverian Crown, lending to the government became more appealing as 
Parliament showed itself willing to guarantee state debts with tax revenues. Finally, banking 
plans were offered up in a rhetoric of patriotism as advocates argued that the Dutch competition 
would continue to draw money from Britain so long as Holland had the advantage of its banks.5 
 By the middle of the seventeenth century notables including Andrew Yarranton, the First 
Earl of Shaftesbury and Sir Josiah Child were advocating for the establishment of some form of 
public banks that could provide ready cash to the government and issue notes of credit to 
customers. The argument for banks was carried on in coffee shops and printed pamphlets as well 
as in political circles. Historian J. Keith Horsefield counts no fewer than six different types of 
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banking scheme, from lombard banks based loosely on the model of pawnbrokers, to land banks 
that claimed some or all of their security in the form of land titles, to the final development of 
banks secured by future revenues of the state.6 The proponents of these institutions produced as 
many arguments in defense of their plans: banks would lower interest rates for small merchants, 
would stabilize the government’s finances, and would raise the purchase price of land. Banks 
could deplete the power of the existing “money-men” (lenders to the Crown) and might lure 
capital investment from Holland by providing higher interest rates in Britain. Almost universally, 
banking advocates predicted that the banks would “draw out” trade, foil hoarders, and realign the 
various classes and factions under one common interest in the financial future of the nation. To 
accomplish these feats, even the authors whose plans relied upon goods or land rather than tax 
revenue recognized that the greatest challenge for the new banks lay in the need to pull value 
from the future.  
In his analysis of the period’s financial discourse, James Thompson argues that the 
recoinage debates and the proliferation of credit produced anxieties about the changing 
conceptual relationship between materiality and value.7 From his Marxist standpoint, Thompson 
argues that the early eighteenth century witnessed an historical transition from previous 
conceptions of money as a representation of “accumulation or treasure – wealth itself,” to an 
understanding of money “as a means of wealth, as capital, or as ‘money in process.’”8 Thompson 
offers valuable insights into the cultural responses to the instability of value, but his discussion 
glosses over much of the complexity of this discourse. I therefore want to look more closely at 
 
6 J. Keith Horsefield, British Monetary Experiments, 1650-1710 (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1960). 
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the ways in which financial schemers imagined and articulated value at the close of the 
seventeenth century.  
In the earlier part of the century, Thomas Mun had been an important voice in shifting 
discussions about trade from a mercantilist emphasis on retaining bullion to an analysis of import 
and export ratios that did not distinguish between the export of wares and the export of bullion.9 
Written in defense of the East India Company’s practice of exporting large amounts of bullion, A 
Discourse of Trade from England unto the East-Indies (1621) argued that wares and money bore 
the same relation to national wealth, “For let no man doubt, but that money doth attend 
Merchandize, for money is the prize [price] of wares, and wares are the proper use of money; so 
that their coherence is unseparable.”10 Using a comparison to the Venetians and French 
undoubtedly meant to provoke his countrymen, Mun argued for measures that would increase the 
national volume of trade and increase exports over imports, rather than targeting the importation 
of bullion. As Nicholas Barbon, Robert Murray, William Killigrew, and William Paterson 
entered the debates on trade in the latter part of the century, they adopted Mun’s belief in the 
sheer volume and movement of trade to create wealth. Banking would not necessarily produce 
more bullion (though it would deter hoarding), but their advocates argued that new banks would 
increase trade. 
Most of the century’s banking proposals tended to rely at least in part upon land titles as a 
basis for the issue of credit. In one such scheme Robert Murray described how his proposed 
lombard bank would make use of values captured from the future. Noting that “It frequently 
 
9 For a discussion of early mercantile theory, see Robert DuPlessis, Transitions to Capitalism in Early 
Modern Europe; an Mark Blaug, The Early Mercantilists (Aldershot, Hampshire: Edward Elgar, 1991). Andrea 
Finkelstein offers a recent study of Thomas Mun’s writings on the balance of trade, as well as discussions of trade 
theory from many of his contemporaries; Harmony and the Balance: An Intellectual History of Seventeenth-Century 
English Economic Thought (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 74-88. 
10 Thomas Mun, A Discourse of Trade From England unto the East-Indies: Answering to diverse 
Objections which are usually made against the same, 2nd printing (London: Nicholas Okes for Jon Pyper, [1620] 
1621), 25. 
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happens that several Goods are only proper to be sold at certain times and seasons,” Murray 
proposed to maximize both the value of goods and the amount of value in circulation by 
establishing magazines that would store “dead stock” until the time at which those goods could 
be expected to gain value. 11 In the meantime the bank would issue notes of credit designed to 
serve as negotiable currency: 
A clothier having a parcel of Clothes, which at present he cannot vend, must therefore 
attend the opportunity of a better Market: in the interim to carry on his Trade in the 
Country, he leaves them, as aforesaid, with order to dispose thereof at a price limited with 
the allowance of the customary Factorage, and thereupon forthwith receives the said 
Credit, which supplies him with all manner of Necessaries, as from the Salter, Oylman, 
Spanish Merchant, &c. who again furnish themselves, as their respective occasions 
require, by virtue of the same Credit.12 
Murray conceives of money in this plan as “no more than a deposite given for such Commodities 
as men part withal,” a placeholder for the eventual exchange of commodities. The word 
“deposit” refers to the storage of goods at the lombard: “such is the Credit which we propose to 
issue forth, which all men may easily obtain by depositing their dead stock.”13 In late 
seventeenth-century usage, a deposit refers to “something laid up on a place, or committed to the 
charge of a person, for safekeeping.”14 In this instance, however, Murray does not intend for 
either the money or the goods to be returned to the original owner as suggested by his 
terminology. He intends for both to be disposed of by the holder and for the goods in this way to 
 
11 Robert Murray, A Proposal for the Advancement of Trade, upon such Principles as must Necessarily 
Enforce it (London: 1676), 6. 
12 Murray, 6-7. 
13 Murray, 5. 
14 Oxford English Dictionary Online, 2nd ed. Boston College. 3 March 2007.  The OED dates the first use of 
deposit as a direct reference to banking at 1753. 
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contribute once again to the “circulation” of value in the nation. “Safekeeping” in Murray’s 
proposal is not a strategy for controlling possession, but a strategy for manipulating value via 
time.  
The values of goods that each merchant or tradesman deposits with the lombard emerge 
at designated, culturally defined moments in the future. At a conceptual level they mark the 
intervals on the mathematician’s timeline. What makes money and its instruments different from 
these other commodities is that (excepting whatever incidental market value its materials might 
command at a given moment) money marks the duration between those intervals.15 Money is not 
value, for that comes from the negotiation of human relations in a larger marketplace (this is the 
variable that Murray incorporates into his plan by using “customary factorage”). In the period 
during which the first instruments of credit capitalism are emerging, money serves as the 
essential mediator between value and time, a trace of the conceptual lines that bind the present to 
the mathematical future. Whether in the form of paper, metal or wood, money becomes a sort of 
time traveler, a reflection of that fourth dimension that mathematics has created alongside our 
present reality. And while money’s financial value consists of a promise of future exchange, its 
imaginative value often lies in its apparent ability to “reveal” the past. Thus literature of the 
period often gave voices to bank notes, guineas and shillings in the form of “it-narratives.” 
Thompson took the inspiration for his work on value from the traveling bank note in 
Fielding’s Tom Jones. Much earlier in the century, however, Joseph Addison’s talking shilling 
demonstrated a changing relationship between value and human time. Published in a November 
11, 1710 edition of The Tatler, Addison’s essay recounts the narrator’s dream vision in which a 
shilling relates its history. The animated shilling describes its birth in Peru during the exploration 
period of Sir Francis Drake. Stamped in London with the image of Queen Elizabeth, the shilling 
 
15 In later periods I would have to make a second exception for market trading in foreign currencies. 
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moves freely around England, is hoarded by an old miser, “freed” by an ungrateful heir, and 
passed rapidly from hand to hand: 
As for my self, I was sent to the Apothecary’s Shop for a Pint of Sack. The Apothecary 
gave me to an Herb-Woman, the Herb-Woman to a Butcher, the Butcher to a Brewer, and 
the Brewer to his Wife, who made a Present of me to a Nonconformist Preacher.16 
With a notable silence during the Cromwellian era, the shilling narrates a hundred and fifty years 
of modern English history.17 
This longer time frame creates a setting for the essay’s survey of human nature, 
suggesting as Mandeville had that the economy often turns on an array of human weakness. But 
Addison’s essay also creates a narrative structure for value. As in Murray’s example of the 
clothier, Addison’s fictional economy works in the continuous sequential time of narrative. The 
reader is expected to imagine this continuity even through those large temporal gaps left by the 
narration: “After this Manner I made my Way merrily through the World; for, as I told you 
before, we Shillings love nothing so much as traveling.”18 In this sense, Addison’s narrative 
structure mimics our most intuitive understandings of time. Time manifests itself as a continuous 
sequence of change like the succession of ideas in Locke’s theory or the common understanding 
against which Newton posits pure time.  
But Addison creates this narrative structure in response to an apparent paradox. The essay 
begins with a conversation between Addison’s narrator and a talkative friend who proclaims that 
 
16 Joseph Addison, The Tatler, ed. Donald F. Bond, 3 vols., vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 
270. 
17 Lynn M Festa, Sentimental Figures of Empire in Eighteenth-Century Britain and France (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) includes a brief discussion of Addison’s shilling. Festa argues that the 
personification of objects like the shilling supported eighteenth-century efforts to create and secure the boundaries of 
the self even as those narratives helped to render interpersonal relations thinkable over the new expanses of empire.  
18 Addison, 270. 
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“it required much greater Talents to fill up and become a retired Life, than a Life of Business.”19 
Businessmen, he argues, “valued themselves for being in Motion, and passing through a Series 
of trifling and insignificant Actions,” when in fact no such person could “produce half the 
Adventures that this Twelvepenny-Piece has been engaged in, were it possible for him to give us 
an Account of his Life.”20 Addison’s narrator means for the shilling to focus the audience’s 
attention on a contemporary obsession with “being in Motion.” Time has become something to 
“fill up,” and businessmen, at least, are convinced that it must be filled with some sort of motion, 
apparently regardless of effect. In this context, the haphazard trail of the shilling in time parallels 
the way in which its leisured holders are filling their time. And men of business move with no 
more direction, though with greater attention to the importance of moving. 
We must assume that these references to the value of activity in the early eighteenth 
century owe something to an early modern discourse of work and leisure and, perhaps ironically, 
to Addison’s Whiggish politics. But Addison’s reference to motion owes more to the discourse 
of political economy and its ubiquitous concept of “circulation.” In The Growth of Economic 
Thought, Henry William Spiegel credits John Law with introducing the term “circulation” into 
economic theory in the first years of the eighteenth century.21 Its use already is evident, though, 
in the pamphlets outlining bank proposals in the mid-1600’s. In a 1663 proposal to establish a 
bank based on future tax revenues to the Crown, William Killigrew notes the public concern that 
there be enough money to “Circulate our Trade.”22 His argument for how the bank’s credit bonds 
will produce value for the nation demonstrates the role of circulation in this formula: 
 
19 Addison, 269. 
20 Addison, 269. 
21 Henry William Spiegel, The Growth of Economic Thought, rev. ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1983), 175-6. 
22 William Killigrew, A Proposal, Shewing How this Nation may be vast Gainers by all the Sums of Money, 
given to the Crown, without Lessening the Prerogative (1663). 
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Now, I will suppose these Bonds, the one with the other, pass thro’ forty Hands only in a 
Year, every Trader gaining but 5 l. per Cent. then every 100 l. in these Bonds produce 
200 l. per Ann. Gains to the Nation, as long as they are standing out. If so, then the 
Nation may well dispense with the Charges of the Office and Interest, since for 2000000 
l. given, the Nation will gain 4000000 l. the first Year, little less the second and third 
Years: Consider, then, the Advantage accrues to the Nation on the whole, and before all 
the Bonds are paid off.23 
The circulation in Killigrew’s plan consists, rather vaguely, of bonds passing through hands, but 
it is that circulation that produces Killigrew’s impressive projections for the future. The same 
dynamic appears in William Paterson’s Brief Account of the Intended Bank of England: 
And if the Proprietors of the Bank can circulate their Fundation of Twelve hundred 
Thousand Pounds, without having more than Two or Three Hundred Thousand Pounds 
lying dead at one time with another, this Bank will be in effect as Nine Hundred 
Thousand Pounds, or a Million of fresh Money brought into the Nation.24 
As Spiegel points out, the circulation metaphor and its usual companions, the “drawing out” of 
money and coins that “lie dead,” all derive from a physiological discourse built on Harvey’s 
discovery of the circulation of blood in the human body.25 To this extent, early political 
economists are drawing on an older tradition of figuring the nation as a corporal body. However, 
these physiological metaphors hide a conceptual blind spot in economic thought. Murray, 
Killigrew, Paterson and the many other public figures whose advocacy finally led to the 
 
23 Killigrew, 12-3. 
24 William Paterson, A Brief Account of the Intended Bank of England (London: Randal Taylor, 1694), 13-
4. 
25 William Harvey published his findings in 1628 in the Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis et 
Sanguinis in Animalibus. Renée Descartes elaborated on Harvey’s findings in France and financial thinkers in 
France adapted it their own theory of political economy under the leadership of Barthémy de Laffemas, Jean 
Baptiste Colbert, Pierre le Pesant de Boisguilbert, Scotsman John Law, and Irishman Richard Cantillon, among 
others. See Speigel, The Growth of Economic Thought, 170-200. 
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establishment of national banks throughout Britain relied upon the use of mathematical thought 
to provide models of how values change within a marketplace. Within these models, the widest 
possible array of simultaneous events combines with an indefinitely long time frame to allow for 
patterns to emerge from a “field” of events. Banking models work very much like probability-
theory diagrams in this fashion. Two or five or even ten rolls of the dice can result in any 
combination of results, but the recorded results of a hundred rolls over time will reveal a regular 
pattern. These patterns grow stronger and more predictable the greater the number of events, 
such that longer time frames can become an important way to gather the numbers necessary to 
making the mathematics work. 
Using a similar logic, early banking plans made use of the growing time spans and the 
much slower emergence of mortality tables and statistical data to identify economic patterns in 
Britain’s marketplaces. In keeping with Bergson’s understanding of scientific time, banking 
models represented time as a spatial “field” of data, in which the mathematician could “see” all 
of his or her data simultaneously. The data is collected in calculations at a chosen point in time 
that demarcates each interval (Bergson’s points of simultaneity). In banking then, as now, these 
points usually marked intervals of one year (per annum), though the years could be compiled 
into longer time frames. For each of these intervals, banking advocates could estimated the 
number and amount of outstanding bonds, the amount of cash needed to cover redemptions, and 
the accumulation of interest paid and received. All of these considerations are represented as 
snapshots at the points that separate regular time intervals. And as we would expect from 
Bergson’s analysis, the intervals between those points are empty. 
Mathematics made possible modern economic thought, along with the estimates of 
borrowing, trading, tax revenues and public consumption on which banking is founded. But it 
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has no direct way of accounting for the individuals that power a marketplace in the continuous 
time between mathematic points. Banking proposals sometimes attempted to address this gap 
with provisions that divided up that time for their credit holders; Killigrew’s bank, for example, 
paid interest on its bonds every six months to support their function as currency. Likewise, 
banking plans addressed the interim between future projections with gestures that acknowledge 
the customer’s individual experience of timing. Most proponents of the new banks recognized 
that the public would want the right to assign or redeem their notes at any time, regardless of the 
term specified on the loan. In spite of these gestures, financial thinkers found no way around the 
failure of mathematical thought to address the individual needs, activities, and desires that 
actually determined the financial circumstances of the Empire. In lieu of a solution to the 
problem, economic thought fell back on the metaphor of circulation. 
Circulation, implying the persistent and fluid motion of blood in a living body, fills the 
empty intervals of mathematical time with a rhetorical gesture at the living time in between.  
Circulation suggests but never specifies anything about the integrated consciousness of motion 
and time that is so central to human time experience. The physiological associations of the term 
point to the fact that this is a motion that belongs to human needs and activities. Ironically, 
however, the same associations strip that very vigorous human activity of any shade of agency or 
consciousness. Killigrew’s assurance that under his plan the Crown and Treasury “remain still 
the Fountain-Head” of this circulating wealth does little to negate the fact that a circulating 
economy lacks an active subject.26 Because of its mathematical methods, political economy 
presumes a public that it can never name and to which it can never attribute consciousness.  
Early economic thought therefore put great value on the continuous activity of traders, 
merchants and consumers, but could not represent either individual choices or anything about the 
 
26 Killigrew, 7. 
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direction of that activity. In exchange for the numerical patterns that it sifted from human 
behaviors, mathematics sacrificed any representation of the embodied human beings that 
produced its patterns. Late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century publics are left, then, with the 
ambiguous premium on motion so often referenced in Addison and Steele’s essays, but no 
corresponding sense of direction.  
The obscurity left behind by mathematical perspectives on trade becomes a potent source 
of anxiety, for as Addison’s hoop-skirt trial shows, early eighteenth-century publics were aware 
that the large-scale futures they anticipated rested uneasily on blind consumer emulation. 
William Killigrew could proclaim optimistically that “all the Revenues of the Crown, all our 
Trade and Consumption, is Security, as well as the Taxes . . . which Security is far more than I 
have said, of a hundred times more than was ever given: This unites the King, and People by the 
strongest bonds.”27 The trade, consumption and taxable behaviors of a population massed 
together could create security on a scale great enough to sustain a nation. But there was always a 
danger of whole industries failing if the retailers and coffee shops should lose their appeal. 
 Mathematical time provided conceptual methods for predicting, projecting and 
manipulating value in Britain’s growing empire. But its fixed, spatial representation of time 
blended uneasily with the temporal experiences of human consciousness. As a result, the public 
that emerges during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries is already defined in part 
by its relation to time. That public is, on the one hand, a byproduct of mathematical thought and, 
on the other, an active, unpredictable, constantly changing group of human subjects. The first 
lives solely in the abstractions of the mathematician or political economist as he surveys a 
national future. But the second public whirls about in a strange, modern time experience of 
 
27 Killigrew, 9. 
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perpetual motion that becomes articulated in Addison and Steele’s early eighteenth-century 
periodicals. 
In his study of modern nationhood Benedict Anderson looks at the development of 
newspapers as a symptom of the modern temporal concepts that formed nations from “imagined 
communities.”28 In the modern era, writes Anderson, 
what has come to take the place of the medieval conception of simultaneity-along-time is, 
to borrow again from Benjamin, an idea of ‘homogeneous, empty time,’ in which 
simultaneity is, as it were, transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefiguring and 
fulfillment, but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar.29 
In a succeeding footnote, Anderson labels this modern time as “a conception of ‘meanwhile’” 
and argues that it is arguably the idea on which “every essential modern conception is based.”30 
Modern societies imagine themselves to be linked by their participation in the horizontal 
simultaneity of this “meanwhile” even when the individuals who are so bound will never meet 
one another. Using newspapers as an example of how this dynamic manifests itself, Anderson 
defines two ways in which a daily periodical embodies our modern sense of the “meanwhile.”31 
In the first case, writes Anderson, the relationship between stories on a news page reflects the 
temporal bond among members of a society: “the date at the top of the newspaper, the single 
most important emblem on it, provides the essential connection – the steady onward clocking of 
homogeneous, empty time.”32 As in the novel form, the reader is asked to imagine that the 
 
28 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, rev. ed. (London: Versa, 1991). 
29 Anderson, 24. 
30 Anderson, 24 n.34.  
31 In the previous pages Anderson applies his social time analysis to the novel form in a variety of global 
societies. 
32 Anderson, 33. 
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“characters” of a news story continue their steady progression in time even as they move in and 
out of the news coverage.  
But newspapers also embody our sense of a “meanwhile” in the manner in which we use 
them. Citing the tremendous growth in printing during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
Anderson argues that the newspaper provides one of the earliest examples of mass consumption 
in modern economic history. The newspaper is consumed, in that it becomes obsolescent the day 
after printing, and it is consumed simultaneously by large numbers of readers: 
each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated 
simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, 
yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion. Furthermore, this ceremony is 
incessantly repeated at daily or half-daily intervals throughout the calendar. What more 
vivid figure for the secular, historically clocked, imagined community can be 
envisioned?33 
Anderson’s newspapers give support to a modern experience of time as horizontally shared and 
regularly flowing past universalized intervals. All human subjects living within the geographical 
and linguistic boundaries of the society experience this temporal plane as a further, shared set of 
boundaries to the community. The large-scale public of calendars and clock time (to which we 
can now add the mathematical public of political economy) blends seamlessly in this example 
with the psychological experience through which motion and change merge as time. 
 Addison, Steele and the numerous authors of eighteenth-century periodicals capitalized 
on the sense of simultaneous consumption that Anderson so eloquently describes. Marketed by 
their publishers as an alternative to newspapers, The Tatler and The Spectator carefully framed 
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their essays within a daily format.34 In both periodicals the date and place from which each piece 
is written serves as the essay’s title. Combined with the narrators’ attention to well-known public 
landmarks, coffee shops, and topics of current interest, the date heading on each issue reinforces 
the sense that the reading audience is sharing a time frame as well as a cultural context.  
Stuart Sherman argues that in the transition from The Tatler to The Spectator, Addison 
and Steele introduced a new relation between text and time in the public experience.35 Sherman 
builds on Anderson’s work and on Jürgen Habermas’ assertion that such periodicals fostered the 
development of a public sphere by providing the reading public with an image of itself. 
Distinguishing The Spectator from its predecessors, Sherman argues that only with Mr. Spectator 
does that image of the reading public get refracted into the intensively private consciousness of a 
narrator who has willfully detached himself from his subject. The Spectator’s blend of periodical 
and diurnal forms, writes Sherman, creates the experience 
of a diary turned inside out: the work not of a public or social figure composing a more 
secret version of the self in a single, sequestered manuscript, but of a wholly secretive 
sensibility imparting itself in print, to be read by a wide and varied public in the diurnal 
rhythm, and at the running moment, of its making.36 
Sherman compares this experience of a secretive, private subjectivity with the temporally 
structured secrecy that he has identified in Pepys’ truly private diaries. What The Spectator 
participates in, he argues, is the making of a modern subjectivity defined through the closely 
 
34 See for instance, Richard Steele’s essay on The Tatler as a corrective to the poor influence of 
newspapers, No. 178, Tuesday, May 30, 1710, or Joseph Addison’s explanation of why The Spectator is not a 
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35 Stuart Sherman, Telling Time: Clocks, Diaries, and English Diurnal Form, 1660-1785 (Chicago: 
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contained moments of measured time.37 Sherman’s argument elegantly attends to both the 
eighteenth-century periodical’s sense of temporal immediacy and the importance that it grants to 
the public. And he argues convincingly that The Spectator demonstrates the increasing value 
placed on the temporality of human consciousness. But what Sherman’s analysis does not 
capture is the necessity behind periodical time: the subjective time of Bickerstaff and Mr. 
Spectator is not an extension of eighteenth-century discourse on the public, but a corrective to it. 
 The public to which Addison and Steele brought their new periodicals was a mass public, 
one that was already captured in and defined by the mathematical perspective of a capitalist 
economy. As Anderson suggests, periodical publications were arguably the first modern 
consumables. Printed and sold in bulk, they belonged to an economics of low margins and large 
numbers. And in fact, publications from this era reflect that the public understood itself in this 
way. Whether in the form of public opinion or public credit, Britons in the early eighteenth 
century had accepted the subject-less scale and duration of a mathematically conceived public. In 
financial discourse, that public congealed and functioned as easily as the hypothetical readers of 
Anderson’s morning news. In lived time, however, the clash between the mathematical public 
and its human subjects creates distortions. In the sublime or ecstatic moments when 
mathematical time seems to grant us a window onto the lived future and we feel ourselves part of 
the whirling motion of that future, the clash between these two frameworks can be as heady as 
Bickerstaff’s visions in the lottery crowd. In other contexts, the conflict between two dominant 
time concepts distorts active motion into blind wandering. Less than four months after publishing 
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his essay on the shilling, Addison reproduced the conceptual strain between his period’s two 
timeframes with his vision of the valetudinarian, Lady Credit.38 
Written for the March 3, 1711 edition of The Spectator, the vision of Lady Credit 
responds to “the many Discourses which I had both read and heard concerning the Decay of 
Publick Credit.”39 The essay’s narrator describes a nightmarish vision that he has after visiting 
the Bank of England in Grocer’s Hall. In his vision, the hall is home to “a beautiful Virgin, 
seated on a Throne of Gold” and surrounded by symbols of English political and legal history. 
As the narrator observes her, Lady Credit cycles through a multitude of physical transformations 
in response to the symbols, letters with the latest news, and phantoms that assail or reassure her: 
She was… subject to such Momentary Consumptions, that in the twinkling of an Eye, she 
would fall away from the most florid Complexion, and the most healthful State of Body, 
and wither into a Skeleton. Her Recoveries were often as sudden as her Decays, 
insomuch that she would revive in a Moment out of a waiting Distemper, into a Habit of 
the highest Health and Vigour.40 
Addison’s point here is that the well-being of public credit depends upon the political stability 
and cohesion of the nation. But the drama of his essay arises from those supernaturally fast shifts 
in the body of Lady Credit that transform her from a state of health to grave illness and back 
again.  
 
38 The figure of Lady Credit has garnered significant critical interest. Erin Mackie argues that Addison’s 
essay demonstrates masculine efforts to control female sexuality during the period through a discourse of “natural” 
behaviors and female nature. “Lady Credit and the Strange Case of the Hoop-Petticoat,” Market à la Mode: 
Fashion, Commodity, and Gender in ‘The Tatler’ and ‘The Spectator’ (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 
1997), 104-43. See also Sandra Sherman’s reading of Defoe on Lady Credit, in which she argues that Lady Credit’s 
deceptive presence becomes an allegory for his own authorship. Sandra Sherman, Finance and Fictionality in the 
Early Eighteenth Century: Accounting for Defoe (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996). See also Terry 
Mulcaire, “Public Credit; Or, The Feminization of Virtue in the Marketplace.”  
39 Joseph Addison, The Spectator, ed. Donald F. Bond, 5 vols., vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1965),14. 
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Given the financial frameworks from which it comes, public credit would be better 
figured in the moneybags that Addison’s narrator spots behind the throne. Whether we imagine it 
as money or as the airy value of government debt, public credit emerges from our financial 
estimates of trade, consumption and interest rates. By choosing a human body to represent the 
concept of public credit, Addison introduces the incompatible presence of consciousness into a 
mathematical discourse. In this regard the essay’s structure is similar to that found in his vision 
of the shilling written four months earlier; Addison animates a figure from financial discourse in 
order to provide his audience a glimpse into the hidden world behind “circulation.”  
In the earlier essay, the shilling’s well-ordered narrative of its travels balances the 
doubly-blind motion of human activity, blind in that it cannot be represented in the framework 
from which it comes and blind because in lived time, we cannot “see” our own activity in the 
mapped time of our political economies. We thus move blindly with regard to the circulation that 
claims to be the reason for our activity. As disorienting as this vision is, Addison’s Lady Credit 
essay is even more disturbing because it delves below the motion of the human body in time to 
the motion of the mind. Captive on her throne, Lady Credit manifests the rapid turns of thought, 
fears, worry, and surprise that characterize the constant progression of conscious time that Locke 
characterized as a “succession of ideas.” Addison’s essay makes this very fundamental 
experience of time monstrous merely by writing its constant changes onto the body and from 
there into the mathematical realm of economy. Not only does Addison’s essay reveal concerns 
about the British public’s ability to leap the gaps between the lived time of consciousness and the 
mathematical time of the modern world, but it also suggests a particularly modern anxiety about 
the relationship between the individual and our conception of the public.  
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The modern public is defined through its participation in the conceptual motion of the 
new marketplace. Invisible to the political-economic thought that gave birth to it, it becomes 
tangible only in the products of its activity. The public manifests itself in all that is “current,” in 
shillings and papers and ideas that “circulate,” and those aspects of our world that most clearly 
embody the rapid changes that characterize modern time.41 But in no respect should we mistake 
these manifestations for a true representation. This difficulty in identifying the public as neither 
entirely embodied nor entirely discursive brings us back to the lines of critical thought delineated 
by Erin Mackie. According to Mackie, scholars who examine the eighteenth-century public 
generally struggle to articulate how these two possible perspectives relate to one another. In her 
own response, Mackie argues that Steele and Addison’s reforming project both inhabits and 
pushes off from the unruly physical spaces and behaviors of eighteenth-century London. 
Through this re-creation of the coffee house, The Spectator “produces those differences that 
distinguish a proper rational and polite discursive realm from its faulty competitors.”42 Greg 
Polly takes an alternative approach to the problem by exploring the allegorical function of Mr. 
Spectator.43  Under this rubric, Richard Steele draws from epistolary and contract forms to create 
a representative figure that embodies its public, thus enfolding the physically present people of 
London into a rhetorical space. Neither analysis, however, allows us to address the peculiar 
temporality at the heart of the discursive public. Moreover, the persistent tension between the 
historically specific public and its discursive counterpart suggests that the relationship between 
the two could never come down to a simple matter of representation. I argue, then, that the 
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appropriate framework for understanding how Addison and Steele engaged with the notion of the 
public is not one of representation, but of resemblance.  
In The Order of Things, Michel Foucault argues that, until the later part of the 
seventeenth century, language belonged to a world of resemblances below which lay the lost, but 
partially discernible text of divine institution.44 According to Foucault, the classical thought of 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries swept away this concept of language as 
European cultures fell under the sway of a new epistemological framework of order and 
representation. The discourses on wealth and value that we see in early political-economic 
thought arise within and as a result of that shift. Foucault explains that at the beginning of the 
early modern period, language bore its own marks of a divinity such that it was integral to “an 
unbroken tissue of words and signs, of accounts and characters, of discourse and forms” of 
which the world consisted.45 Knowledge “consisted in relating one form of language to another 
form of language; in restoring the great, unbroken plain of words and things; in making 
everything speak.”46 Foucault’s description makes evident the magical quality of this process as 
the reader perpetually seeks out resemblances with an eye for an eternal truth that lies, not in the 
signs that he reads, but somewhere behind the harmony produced among them. Thus, language is 
“at the same time a buried revelation and a revelation that is gradually being restored to ever 
greater clarity.”47 Time, like space, has little importance here, since resemblances in their various 
forms obviate both: all is coeval with and beneath the divine. With the coming of classical 
thought sometime during the seventeenth century, however, the episteme of resemblances gave 
way to an episteme of order, one which Foucault identifies through the idea of representation. 
 
44 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage, 
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45 Foucault, 40. 
46 Foucault, 40. 
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Foucault’s discussion of classical thought and the episteme of order accounts in more 
general terms for much of the financial thought that I have described above. With language 
stripped of its prior integral relationship to nature, the classical period re-imagined it as the 
transparent half of a binary between signifier and signified. From this position, eighteenth-
century thinkers put language to work in a project that shifted the primary function of knowledge 
from interpretation to the creation of order. Foucault describes how the fields of grammar, 
natural history, and discourses on wealth and value emerged as analyses of representation in 
response to the new episteme. These discourses assumed grids of knowledge, laid out in time and 
representational space, whose echoes we can discern in the mathematical structures of banking 
plans and state financing proposals. Whereas the analysis of money as representation produced 
new ideas about wealth and the nation, the analyses of language as representation created a world 
in which representation constantly folds back in upon itself. Addison and Steele’s essays, and 
particularly those of The Spectator, reflect what Foucault identifies as the void at the heart of 
classical thinking on representation: “the profound invisibility of the person seeing — despite all 
mirrors, reflections, imitations, and portraits.”48 We are tempted to place Mr. Spectator and his 
anonymous movements about London within this order. But Addison and Steele’s specific 
engagement with and representations of the public trouble Foucault’s history. The temporal 
paradox that deprives the early eighteenth-century public of any presence that might be 
represented forces those who write about it to employ the devices of the older episteme. Addison 
and Steele could not represent the public, but they could mimic its strange temporality, read 
traces of it in the figures, marks and signs in which it is imagined, and perpetuate in their own 
essays the commentary that creates a public out of an endless production of resemblances. 
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Steele’s Spectator essay no. 454 has the narrator tour London for 24 hours in order to 
describe the public he finds there. The essay of August 11, 1712 begins with Mr. Spectator 
boarding from Richmond, “with a Resolution to rove by Boat and Coach . . . till the many 
different Objects I must needs meet with should tire my Imagination.”49 The “Objects” that the 
narrator encounters are in fact people, and he identifies them according to the hours of the day 
that bring them out into the streets, docks, and markets of London. Thus, “Men of Six a Clock 
give Way to those of Nine, they of Nine, to the Generation of Twelve, and they of Twelve 
disappear, and make Room for the fashionable World, who have made Two a Clock the Noon of 
the Day.”50  Steele’s narrator moves through this time-ordered succession of scenes, attentively 
describing those who come into his view but shunning interaction with most of those he 
observes. With his day divided neatly by the hands of a clock and his detached stance, Mr. 
Spectator seems to be engaged in those sciences of order that Foucault identifies. But the 
knowledge that Steele’s narrator creates is more appropriately named as a knowledge of 
resemblances. 
Amidst the apparently unrelated variety of men and women at the docks, Mr. Spectator’s 
task is to decipher the signs, gestures, appearances and languages of London’s bustling public 
spaces. The “Air” of a figure can tell us to what part of town he is bound. The gesture of a 
coachmen constitutes its own language, as does the tilted head and shifting posture of a flirting 
woman or the slang by which the town names the functions of its citizens. Within this world the 
hours of the day become a basis for correspondences, rather than distinctions, as each provides a 
new layer of text, related to the previous one by a subtle network of resemblances. Just as the 
Thames provides a physical hinge rather than a separation between its well-peopled banks, the 
 
49 Richard Steele, The Spectator, vol.2, 98. 
50 Steele, 99. 
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dockland denizens of the morning portray the beginning of the day in both their language and in 
their very being.51 The narrator notes how this hour brings together women selling fruit and the 
chimney sweepers with their blackened faces, and he makes sure that we understand the structure 
that replicates itself in this meeting of two otherwise distinct groups as they rail one another 
about “the Devil and Eve, with Allusion to their several Professions.”52 The similitude is playful, 
but the narrator uses it as a point of departure for a string of associations that will carry the 
internal logic of its structure from one observation to another. From this mention of Eve, the 
narrator’s thoughts shift to the fact that he is in Covent Garden, and as he strolls the fruit shops 
like a man in an orchard, his original Eve multiplies to “Crowds of agreeable young Women,” 
and then to families for whom the women purchase their fruit.53 To be sure, Steele’s literary 
language contains within it an impulse toward metaphor and simile, but the essay’s tropes do not 
function merely to represent. Instead, they become part of the texture of the world they describe. 
Steele’s writing participates in a process of endless production in which his own words 
add to the mass of textual threads that must be woven and re-woven through interpretation and 
commentary. His commentary in turn becomes part of the textual web that must be interpreted.  
For this reason, we see Mr. Spectator replicating rather than representing the character of the 
public.  In the story of Mr. Spectator’s day in London, Steele gives us his narrator’s resemblance 
in the figure of a female “silk-worm,” a woman who travels half-hidden in her coach just ahead 
of Mr. Spectator, and whose function is to provide to the marketplace a running commentary on 
the newest fashionable goods, though she will never purchase any of them.54 The silk-worm 
becomes, in Foucault’s terms, one of Steele’s “signatures” that alert us to the correspondences 
 
51 Steele, 99. 
52 Steele, 99. 
53 Steele, 99. 
54 Steele, 100-1. 
 65 
between the character of the Spectator and the public that is Steele’s great Text. Embedded in the 
essay, she comments on the “ceaseless motion” and the deferred moment of the public even as 
she embodies those qualities in her own character. So too does Steele’s narrator mimic the 
circulatory motion of our modern public. Invisible himself, Mr. Spectator reflects back to his 
public the invisibility of the concept about which he comments. Mr. Spectator shuns material 
transaction, for the mathematical public exists only by virtue of the market’s un-represented 
remainder, the “circulation” that is not many transactions, but all transactions as a system. 
Instead he draws value from the immaterial exchange of resemblances, which is not exchange at 
all, but the infinite production of commentary upon commentary, interpretation upon 
interpretation (with which we are still occupied). Here is the political-economic fantasy of 
endless production and accumulation realized. 
Steele wants his audience to see the correspondences that his own words both create and 
resemble. He chides that audience for the blindness that leads to men dining alongside one 
another “in dumb Silence, as if they had no Pretence to speak to each other on the Foot of being 
Men, except they were of each other’s Acquaintance.”55 But the alternative to this silence is not 
the clear articulation of a representational language. It is the “confused Humming” in which “all 
the several voices lost their Distinction” and which rises up to the listening narrator who, in turn, 
finds a pun in the correspondence between his physical position above the crowd and the divine 
perspective on humankind: “What Nonsense is all the Hurry of this World to those who are 
above it?” (Steele’s italics).56 Here, “nonsense” spills over its definition as that which is foolish 
or incomprehensible to that which cannot be articulated. Only when we hear all the diversity of 
language as a “confused Humming” do we begin to sense the magical web of convergences, 
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56 Steele, 102. 
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correspondence, sympathies and signs that together still reveal only through resemblance the 
ineffable truth that binds the world together. Faced with such a task, Steele’s Mr. Spectator 
becomes a commentator in Foucault’s sense of that word. 
Unlike Foucault’s early modern commentators, Steele’s commentator emerges in 
response to the strange temporality from which the eighteenth-century public is born. As a 
primary character in Addison’s and Steele’s daily periodical, Mr. Spectator moves swiftly in the 
imminent present of a text that will be read and bantered about on the very day on which it 
appears anew. And yet as a written record, the Spectator’s thoughts and movements are 
something that has always already occurred and that are in the process of changing even as the 
periodical’s readers strive to interpret and comment on its signs. Like the public itself, The 
Spectator’s present is revealed to be only a trace of something that has already moved on. The 
Spectator’s essays thus resemble rather than represent the process through which its audiences 
imagine a public in the blind gap of the mathematical present. 
In insisting on the role of resemblance rather than representation in The Spectator, I am 
arguing for an alternative to those readings that position Steele’s and Addison’s later periodical 
as an early step toward the psychological mind of the modern subject.57 Steele, Addison and their 
many counterparts undoubtedly contributed to this formation in many ways, but the character of 
the Spectator is still just a character: a mark that bears the signature of its correspondence to one 
of the early eighteenth century’s most compelling creations. As part of that endless commentary 
that is the function and being of the public, Mr. Spectator also gives us a new vantage point on 
the nature of a present that we still inhabit. The buying, selling, borrowing, and consuming 
human bodies that give political economics its subject matter can never be represented by the 
concepts that created that science. We glimpse their totality only through  correspondences of 
 
57 See Stuart Sherman, Telling Time. 
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motion and signs. But if this public has no present that we can grasp, it is nevertheless the force 
on which the entire future of the marketplace depends. Robert Mitchell argues that in the closing 
years of the eighteenth century, Shelley sought an antidote to a political-economic system that 
bound the future to an increasingly distant past. According to Mitchell, Shelley found his 
solution in “a fundamentally temporal dimension of sympathy, one that would reposition the 
present as the point of creation for the future.58 My own reading suggests that in its very creation, 
the concept of the public carries within it a tendency toward that “speculative mode of time 
consciousness” with which Shelley sought to redirect public opinion.59 Political economics 
claimed the authority to link the past and a predetermined future, but it left in the unrepresented 
moment of the present a public whose ineffable being was always capable of changing 
everything.
 
58 Robert Mitchell, Sympathy and the State, 164. 









Crediting and Delay in Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko 
 
 In December 1663, a recent immigrant to the island of Suriname named Henry Adis 
wrote to Lord Willoughby with a brief report on conditions in the colony.1 Mr. Adis and his 
family were Protestant, part of a group of seven families who were inspired to move to Suriname 
by Willoughby’s promises and a royal indulgence for Protestants to practice their faith in the 
colony. ”2 So it is not without a certain diplomacy that Adis commends the island, the King, and 
the British Government before getting to the reason for his letter; Adis finds that his colonial 
Eden is filled with “rude rabble” whose “drunkenness” and “debauchery” is matched only by 
their predilection for “bitter Oaths, Horrid Execrations, and lascivious Abominations,” which are 
on at least one occasion directed at Adis himself.3 Adis declares he is certain that those who 
claimed Willoughby’s promises and the King’s indulgence were “so many Decoyes to inveagle 
 
1 Francis Willoughby was the 5th Baron Willoughby of Parham. Charles II appointed him Governor of 
Barbados in 1650. In 1651, Willoughby sent a colonizing party to Suriname to establish Fort Willoughby on that 
island. Though previously a leader of the Parliamentarians, Willoughby had joined the Royalist cause in 1647. He 
therefore lost Barbados and his English properties following the Parliamentarian victories. In 1663, Willoughby 
resumed his post as Governor of Barbados with administrative power over the area’s English colonies. Maureen 
Duffy’s biography, The Passionate Shepherdess: Aphra Behn, 1640-89 (London: Cape, 1977), provides a brief 
overview of those involved in the colony at the time. See also Janet Todd, The Secret Life of Aphra Behn (London: 
Andre Deutsche, 1996). 
2 A Letter Sent from Syrranam, To His Excellency, the Lord Willoughby of Parham, General of the 
Western Islands, and of the Continent of Guianah, &c. Then residing at the Barbados. Together, with the Lord 
Willoughby's Answer thereunto. With a commendable Description of that Country (London, 1664). 
3 A Letter Sent from Syrranam, 5. 
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us, and to make us a prey” must have been wrong.4 Nevertheless, the colonist worries that in the 
absence of either Willoughby or his agent, the rabble is likely to continue in its “abuses.”5 
Taking leave of the Lord General, Adis prays “for your safe and speedy passage to us; and in the 
mean time, for a safe return of your faithful Lieutenant amongst us again,” noting that until one 
or the other official reappears on the island, Adis’ “temporal joy will in a great measure be 
eclipsed.”6 Willoughby responded to Adis with a mildly sympathetic note about new colonies 
(“you know of what sort of People they are made up”) and expresses his hope that God and 
civilizing influences might reform the colony “in time.”7 His letter makes no mention of a return 
visit from himself or his Lieutenant. 
 We have no reason to believe that Aphra Behn knew about Henry Adis, but her depiction 
of Suriname in Oroonoko; or the Royal Slave suggests that she shared his low opinion of the 
colony’s residents.8 Moreover, the novel’s strange plot, with its pattern of broken promises and 
its agonizing wait for a Governor who never comes, reflects the same practical concerns behind 
Adis’ anxious letter. I do not intend to argue here that Adis or any other non-fictional resident of 
Surinam inspired Behn’s novel. But I do want to argue that the financial structures of 
colonization offer more insight into Oroonoko than is usually imagined. Specifically, I examine 
Oroonoko with an attention to the link between two concepts that come up repeatedly in Adis’ 
exchange with Willoughby: credibility and time. 
 I argued at the beginning of this study that seventeenth-century Britain witnessed the 
emergence of a new time concept, a representation of time derived from the mathematical 
 
4 A Letter Sent from Syrranam, 5-6. 
5 A Letter Sent from Syrranam, 6. 
6 A Letter Sent from Syrranam, 6. 
7 A Letter Sent from Syrranam, 7. 
8 Aphra Behn, Oroonoko: The Norton Critical Edition, ed. Joanna Lipking (New York: Norton, 1997). All 
further references are to this edition and are cited by page number within the text. Biographers have struggled to 
piece together Behn’s early life, but seem to agree that she made a short visit to Suriname as a young woman. See 
Janet Todd, The Secret Life of Aphra Behn. 
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structures of finance. Behn’s novel reminds us that colonial spaces not only participated in these 
innovations, they were in many ways the force behind Britain’s financial shift. Not only had 
colonial conquest brought about the first flood of Spanish bullion into world trade networks 
during the fifteenth century, but colonial wars contributed heavily to the need for a long-term 
state financing. Moreover, colonial expansion required more currency and more sophisticated 
credit arrangements.9 From a financial perspective, mathematical time allowed capitalism to 
speed up time; stock holders could profit immediately from colonial projects that would not 
produce substantial goods or resources for sale in marketplaces until years later, if ever. Free 
from the constraints of human duration, mathematics also could slow time to a crawl in order to 
keep financial and legal arrangements in an unchanging state over the long spans of corporations 
and colonies. These long, slow expanses of time were no better suited to the temporality of the 
human mind than was the rapid pace of the stock market, but Behn’s narrative suggests that they 
were more destructive to the human body. 
 Behn’s story of a Coramantien prince betrayed into slavery and then promised a freedom 
that never comes illustrates the most dire consequences of a world administrated in mathematical 
time. Scholars have noted that the endless promises and delays to which the prince is subjected 
play into a prevailing theme of truth and credibility.10 If we read Behn’s concern with credibility 
to be part of a straightforward binary between truth and falsehood, we are left with the 
 
9 See Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topic, The World That Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the 
World Economy, 1400 to the Present, 2nd ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005); R.C. Nash, “The Organization of 
Trade and Finance in the British Atlantic Economy, 1600-1830,” in The Atlantic Economy During the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries: Organization, Operation, Practice, and Personnel, ed. Peter A. Coclanis (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1999); and Larry Neal, The Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital 
Markets in the Age of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
10 Robert L. Chibka, “Oh! Do not fear a woman’s invention’: Truth, Falsehood, and Fiction in Aphra 
Behn’s Oroonoko,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 30.4 (Winter 1998): 510-37. Vernon Guy Dickson 
argues that Behn deploys a concept of truth derived from late Renaissance humanism in contrast to late seventeenth-
century frameworks that associate truth with factuality; “Truth, Wonder, and Exemplarity in Aphra Behn’s 
Oroonoko,” SEL Studies in English Literature 1500-1900 47.3 (Summer 2007): 573-94. 
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proposition that at least theoretically, one could ascertain the truth value of a promise at any 
given an accurate picture of the speaker’s intentions; truth transcends temporality. But Behn’s 
novel reminds us that credibility, like financial credit, exists in the medium of time. And like the 
value of a credit note, the truth value of a promise is never fully ascertainable until it is forsaken 
or redeemed. 
Trapped between an aristocratic identity and slavery, Oroonoko also is caught between 
the mathematical time frame that now governs the young colony and the more intuitive time 
frames of the human body. Oroonoko’s failure to grasp the colonist’s version of credibility as a 
production of European mathematical time ultimately brings about his loss of faith in the 
colonists. And while Behn never makes clear whether the colonists would have made good on 
their promises had her protagonist waited, her narrator’s attempts to delay and distract the slave 
become part of the author’s critique of this commercialized relationship between truth and value. 
Behn’s narrative finally suggests that a modern, mathematically-based time threatens both 
violence and betrayal to the human bodies that political economic thought subsumes into textual 
representations. 
In his analysis of race, class and slavery in Behn’s novel, Gary Gautier argues that the 
apparent contradiction between Behn’s condemnation of Oroonoko’s slavery and her acceptance 
of slavery as an institution arises because “The problem is not slavery per se; the problem is 
commercial slavery.”11 Gautier is one of many scholars to approach Oroonoko with questions 
about its place in the development of a British discourse on slavery.12 As Gautier explains, 
 
11 Gary Gautier, “Slavery and the Fashioning of Race in Oroonoko, Robinson Crusoe, and Equiano’s Life,” 
The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation 42.2 (Summer 2001): 161-79, 163 
12 See Laura Doyle, Freedom’s Empire: Race and the Rise of the Novel in Atlantic Modernity, 1640-1940 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Adam Sills, “Surveying ‘The Map of Slavery’ in Aphra Behn’s 
Oroonoko,” Journal of Narrative Theory 36.3 (Fall 2006): 314-40; Warren Chernaik, “Captains and Slaves: Aphra 
Behn and the Rhetoric of Republicanism,” Seventeenth Century 17.1 (Spring 2002): 97-107; Joyce Green 
MacDonald, “The Disappearing African Woman: Imoinda in Oroonoko after Behn,” ELH 66.1 (Spring 1999): 71-
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Behn’s critique of commercialism warrants particular critical attention.13 Srinivas Aravamudan 
offers a more specific articulation of what makes the commercial context of Behn’s plotline so 
important to understanding the fate of her protagonist: “In the case of Oroonoko’s representation 
in England, the choice is between domestic pet and plantation laborer, or that of privatized fetish 
and public commodity.”14 Within Aravamudan’s discussion, Oronooko functions as the former, 
particularly in relation to the narrator. His status as privatized fetish permits Oroonoko a 
temporary and highly contingent subjectivity that can be reversed by the owner’s option to return 
the “pet” to the public sphere as a commodity. However, early social-contract discourse offered 
an avenue for the women and slaves who were claimed as objects to claim possession of 
themselves. In this dynamic, “The subject is simultaneously alienated (this body is property that 
belongs to someone else) and empowered (as I’m property, I can own myself).”15 Aravamudan’s 
carefully nuanced argument reminds us that Oroonoko’s status as commodity object never 
disappears, even during the periods when his fetishization offers a provisional form of 
subjectivity. A complex set of cultural markers identifies Oroonoko as “pet,” but Aravamudan 
 
86; Susan B. Iwanisziw, “Behn’s Novel Investment in Oroonoko: Kingship, Slavery and Tobacco in English 
Colonialism,” South Atlantic Review 63.2 (Spring 1998): 75-98; Laura Brown, “The Romance of Empire: Oroonoko 
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does not need to mention the legal documents that mark Oroonoko’s status as a public 
commodity. As a slave purchased at market, Oroonoko would have been registered in legal 
documents as Caeser, part and property of the Parham Estate. 
Behn’s narrative thus references a larger system of mercantile and bureaucratic 
documentation that turns out to be crucial to the action of the plot. Oroonoko’s purchase 
documents establish him as a commodity within the colonial marketplace, permitting his owners 
to buy, sell or borrow against him even in the absence of his physical body. We are told that the 
colonists receive Oroonoko “more like a Governor, than a Slave,” and our narrator claims that 
“he endur’d no more of the Slave but the Name” (37). And yet the name is more important than 
the narrator would have us believe. Even as Oroonoko is being reassured that his freedom is 
merely a matter of time, the narrator writes, “For the future therefore, I must call Oroonoko, 
Caesar, since by that Name only he is known in our Western World, and by that Name he was 
receiv’d on Shore at Parham-House, where he was destined a Slave” (37). 
The colonists have set up a dichotomy between Caesar and Oroonoko in which economic 
forms designate Ceasar a documented slave even as the narrator claims for him an existence 
outside those forms. Arguing for this existence outside commercial structures, the narrator insists 
that Oroonoko “shone through” his slave attire (36). Her description of Oroonoko’s relationship 
to the Governor’s estate seems deliberately ambiguous; Caesar is brought to “view his Land, his 
House, and the Business assigned to him,” as if he were the documented possessor, rather than 
possessed, of the Plantation (37). That ambiguity demonstrates how easily Oroonoko/Caesar’s 
status can slip back and forth as the embodied aristocratic identity that the colonists have 
conceded to him strains against the paper identity through which their culture has claimed him. 
As long as Oroonoko’s documentation identifies him as Caesar, the slave of the Governor’s 
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Plantation, his identity as Oroonoko remains in peril. And as the story progresses, both the 
protagonist and Behn’s audience begin to question the colonists’ will and ability to maintain this 
separation between Oroonoko’s embodied, aristocratic and documented, commercial identities. 
But lest we imagine that Oroonoko’s character is unique in bearing a documented, 
commercial identity, Behn’s text reminds us that the duality between body and commercial 
identity pervades late seventeenth-century colonial culture. Oroonko’s aristocratic heritage and 
slave status make the tension created by commercial structures especially visible, but characters 
with great political power also find themselves represented in text witin the new commercial 
system. The colonists’ inability to free Ceasar and reconcile the split in Oroonoko’s identity 
arises because of  their Governor’s physical absence. Trefry purchased Caesar for the Governor 
in his capacity as the Governor’s agent. Though characterized as a man sympathetic to 
aristocratic values, Trefry nevertheless belongs to the commercial order that provided him with 
his colonial employment; he is, not coincidentally, “a very good Mathematician” (35). But 
Trefry’s authority is limited. His agency extends to transactions within the commercial order, but 
not beyond. He has no power to shift a slave from public commodity to free man. The 
contractual documents that legitimate Trefry’s agency on behalf of the colonial administration 
circumscribe his agency, so that in a very important sense Trefry is merely an inscribed body that 
represents authority in the Governor’s absence. 
 Such forms of limited agency had always been part of Britain’s power structures, 
allowing sovereignty to exert itself over large areas and in distant places. And to the extent that 
estates and posts were legitimated in documents, text was an essential part of those political 
systems. Britain’s colonial ventures adopted the basic concept of allowing text to articulate 
agency, but commercial needs took this idea in new directions. The joint-stock companies of 
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early colonialism depended on the legal fiction of incorporation.16 With the recording of 
prescribed documents, a group of investors could transform itself into a new legal body, capable 
of performing all of the financial activities of the individual merchant, but with a continuity in 
time unavailable to an actual human body. Where most early business schemes amounted to little 
more than single ventures, these new corporations could outlast life spans, weather the physical 
or mental disabilities of individual members, and through the magic of textuality, remain 
“present” for the purposes of business even when their members were not. 
By the middle of the seventeenth century, the mercantile world had grown accustomed to 
using documentation in order to provide a similar continuity for the individual merchant. A 
merchant’s records of partnership, contract or agency theoretically could not outlast the life of 
their maker, but they often functioned independently of that maker for long periods. Until legal 
documents lapsed or were terminated by an administrative authority, a merchant might easily 
collect income and engage in business transactions for years after his death. Like the 
incorporation of business organizations, the incorporation of individual identities remains a 
commonplace in our time. But its familiarity should not blind us to its conceptual repercussions. 
The late seventeenth century introduced land-recording offices, modern treasury 
procedures and corporate bookkeeping to create these secondary textual identities for individual 
parties. Textual identities owned, borrowed, purchased, sold, and guaranteed, but were not 
always easily matched to the physical body they claimed to represent. What I am calling the 
incorporation of identity had the relatively simple effect of splitting the self into two subjects that 
reflected the fundamental split between the mathematical public and the embodied participants in 
 
16 For a history of the corporate form, see John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A 
Short History of a Revolutionary Idea (New York: Modern Library, 2003). See also The Atlantic Economy During 
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Organization, Operation, Practice, and Personnel; and Larry Neal, The 
Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason. 
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that public. In a world increasingly structured around the superhuman spans and speeds of 
mathematical time, text comes in as a proxy for the body to compensate for its limitations and 
replace its capacity for change and motion with the fixed abstractions of the printed word. 
Henry Adis’ correspondence with Willoughby demonstrates the importance of printed 
text to communication during the period. Adis’ complaints also suggest the inadequacy of text to 
represent embodied authority over long periods of time. The colonial administration’s promises 
remain in doubt as Adis anxiously awaits the reappearance of Willoughby or his Lieutenant. 
With a great deal more at stake, Behn’s fictional slave also waits to see the final value of the 
colonist’s promises when the Governor arrives. Long before Oroonoko reaches Surinam, 
however, Behn sets up a pattern in which the characters fail to reach a future that has been 
promised. Oroonoko’s Coramantien story takes the form of an oriental tale embedded within the 
text’s first-person narrative.17 From the beginning of the tale, Oroonoko represents a fragile link 
to the future, the last remaining heir to a king in excess of a hundred years old. The usual oriental 
motifs of harems, deceit and tyranny support a tale of the king’s decision to take Imoinda for 
himself despite his grandson’s attachment to her and despite the king’s own impotence. The old 
monarch thus sacrifices the future of his line for a woman who can be a wife in form only. 
Rather than concluding the tale, the reunion of Oroonoko and Imoinda in Surinam begins a new 
story of failed beginnings. 
Behn’s narrator thus picks up her first-person account of Oroonoko’s story with his 
arrival in the small British colony. Upon hearing Oroonoko’s story, the colonists assure the 
young slave that he will be freed as soon as the Governor returns. Their promise thrusts upon 
 
17 Though focused on a later period of the eighteenth century, Felicity Nussbaum, “British Women Write 
the East after 1750: Revisiting a ‘Feminine Orient,’” in British Women’s Writing in the Long Eighteenth Century: 
Authorship, Politics and History (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 121-39, offers a discussion of the 
conglomeration of literary genres, traditions and devices from which female authors borrowed. 
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Oroonoko a liminal status in which, though assured he is free for all practical purposes, he 
remains a slave in the political-economic world of the marsketplace. In the long scale of 
mathematical time, Oroonoko’s wait is considered unproblematic, but when Imoinda becomes 
pregnant with his child, the clock begins to tick on a second level of time derived from the 
human body’s processes. Behn gives us a protagonist who is keenly aware of the embodied time 
invoked by Imoinda’s pregnancy; Oroonoko knows that he has nine months to obtain free status 
for his child.18 But Behn creates a conflict between this time frame tied to the body and the 
mathematically constructed time in which the colony operates. And in her protagonist’s inability 
to understand the colonists’ delays, she makes clear that this second, problematic understanding 
of time belongs to the colony’s new political-economic thinking. Behn gives us no way of 
knowing what would have become of Trefry’s request for the two slaves’ freedom. The 
Governor does not arrive to prevent Oroonoko’s rebellion, and in any case, Behn’s point is that 
Oroonoko can only grasp the colonists’ delay as a symptom of dishonesty. As a representative of 
older, aristocratic values, Oroonoko understands credibility as an imminent question of truth or 
falsehood, not a process of crediting in time. 
Thus what the narrator comprehends to be an economic and social system based on 
deferred transactions, Oroonoko takes to be a symptom of deceit: “They fed him from Day to 
Day with Promises, and delay’d him, till the Lord Governor shou’d come; so that he began to 
suspect them of falshood” (41). The narrator’s phrasing here, her assertion that the colonists 
“fed” Oroonoko with their promises, reveals the narrator’s own doubts. As a member of the 
colonial elite herself, Behn’s narrator interprets the promises as sustenance, that which sustains 
over the long duration required by both economic and social “crediting” in her British context. 
 
18 See Charlotte Sussman, “The Other Problem with Women: Reproduction and Slave Culture in Aphra 
Behn’s Oroonoko.” 
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But “fed” can also figure Oroonoko as livestock to be fattened for the future marketplace.19 With 
his own life and that of his wife and child at stake, Behn’s protagonist recognizes the time that is 
tracked by Imoinda’s pregnant body. Fearful of what he might do, the narrator joins in the effort 
to “delay” Oroonoko by engaging him in a series of distractions. 
The narrator’s first effort takes the form of heroic tales paralleling an earlier portion of 
the Coramantien story in which Oroonoko is distracted from his grief with battle stories: “I 
entertain’d him with the Lives of the Romans, and great Men, which charm’d him to my 
Company” (41). As these distractions wear thin and the narrator grows more wary of her charge, 
she changes strategies to present Oroonoko with physical challenges: 
He had a Spirit all Rough and Fierce, and that cou’d not be tam’d to lazy Rest; and 
though all endeavors were us’d to exercise himself in such Actions and Sports as this 
World afforded, as Running, Wrastling, Pitching the Bar, Hunting and Fishing, Chasing 
and Killing Tigers of a monstrous Size, which this Continent affords in abundance; and 
wonderful Snakes, such as Alexander is reported to have incounter’d at the River of 
Amazons, and which Caesar took great Delight to overcome; yet these were not Actions 
great enough for his large Soul, which was still panting after more renown’d Action. (42) 
In Behn’s representation of Oroonoko’s frustration, we recognize the untenable position of a 
body trapped in a mathematical identity. Like Addison’s busy merchants, the young warrior is 
trapped in an endless practice of directionless motion. However, Behn’s passage is also a critique 
of the relationship between her reader and the text. As she describes the period during which 
Oroonoko must wait, the narrator herself grows distracted. The reference to Alexander quoted 
 
19 In his discussion of Oroonoko as seventeenth-century pet, Srinivas Aravamudan argues that the frequent 
parallels between Oroonoko and animals in the text belongs to a largely visual discourse in which the upper-class 
mistress (here Behn) signals proximity to the political power of the throne through her possession of the exotic pet. 
Tropicopolitans: Colonialism and Agency, 1688-1804. 
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above seems to have been brought on by a mention in the preceding passage that the narrator 
busied Oroonoko with stories of great men. The progress from didactic stories to embodied 
activities should lead to the heroism of a Caesar or an Alexander. But in this passage, the 
narrator only folds life back into stories, and the section concludes with a renewed plea for 
patience. The narrative wandering serves to shift the text away from its ostensible subject and 
back toward the exotic and curious qualities of the colonial space. 
Such moments are common throughout Behn’s text, as the narrative follows an odd path 
of diversions, shifts in temporal perspective and gaps where the narrator inserts herself into the 
storyline as witness or actor. Behn’s use of these diversions is not insignificant. The trees, fruits 
and animals that she details carry particular valences in this early colonial context. 20 
Thematically, a passage about the native’s ability to shoot an orange from the stem without any 
harm to the fruit resonates later in the story when Imoinda’s head is severed from her pregnant 
body (11, 61). And Oroonoko’s presentation of the tiger cub that he has orphaned comments 
disturbingly on the dynamic between the slave and his “Great Mistress” (45, 41). But in each 
case the narrative’s sidetracks are designed to elicit curiosity from the reader, to distract us as the 
narrator’s stories distracted Oroonoko. In contrast to the hapless protagonist, however, Behn’s 
readers belong to a world that is already building on the long time frames of mathematics, credit 
schemes, and colonial growth. The narrator’s strategy should prompt us to ask why even the 
European reader cannot be trusted to wait out the “time” of the story. From what is the reader 
being distracted? 
Behn sets the tone for her narrator’s relationship to the reader in the preliminary materials 
to her narrative. The introduction claims that the narrator has edited from the story “a thousand 
 
20 See Robert Markley, “Global Analogies: Cosmology, Geosymmetry, and Skepticism in Some Works of 
Aphra Behn,” for a reading of the political-economic context of some of the details in Behn’s Suriname descriptions. 
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little Accidents of his Life, which, however pleasant to us, where History was scarce, and 
Adventures very rare; yet might prove tedious and heavy to my Reader, in a World where he 
finds Diversions for every Minute, new and strange” (8). The justification for this editing is a 
strange one. Behn’s narrative shows that adventures were far from scarce in the remote colony 
and diversions “new and strange” were many. But Behn’s readers were focused on a cognitive, 
rather than a physical experience of adventure. They found their diversions in those histories that 
began to proliferate at the end of the seventeenth century. Of course, these histories, novels and 
romances were a very different sort of text from the documents that floated commercial and 
political identities in the realm of mathematical time. They did, however, negotiate the reader’s 
relation to that long time frame. 
Narrative form always contains within itself several temporal aspects. As Paul Ricoeur 
argues in Time and Narrative, narration negotiates the cognitive process by which human beings 
“think” past, present and future as a means of ordering experience.21 Moreover, textual narrative 
always reflects the overlapping temporalities of the plot, the moment in which the story was first 
told, and the present of readers who re-open the temporalities of the narrative through their 
embodied engagement with the story. Ricoeur, despite his grounding in Heidegger’s historical 
thinking, argues for a relatively timeless understanding of how narration works with the human 
mind. My own study indicates that the human mind engages with multiple versions of time, 
some tied more intimately to embodied experience. As Ricoeur’s work demonstrates, narrative 
form offers a useful structure for articulating and negotiating the complexities of time 
consciousness. But Behn’s distracted readers indicate that the manifestations of time in narrative 
literature have particular significance at the historical moment during which time became an 
 
21 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, Vol. 3. (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1984-1988). 
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essential factor in the process of determining both economic and truth values. To understand how 
narrative time functions in this novel, we need to reevaluate the role of truth claims and 
credibility in Behn’s text, beginning with the forms in which Behn couches her narrative.  
In contrast to most of the story, Behn’s narrator gives us a third-person recounting of 
Oroonoko’s early years in Coramantien. Building on a prominent tradition of the period, Behn 
has cast this section in the form of a seventeenth-century oriental tale.22 Typically set in the court 
of an Eastern empire, oriental tales developed around a loose collection of generic tropes: 
powerful tyrants, fantastic material luxuries, the enclosed spaces of seraglios, prisons and 
boudoirs, and the telling of stories. The oriental tale emerged as a part of the larger fable genre, 
regularly used by political pamphleteers during the English civil wars. Short texts like Aesop’s 
Fables were effective in encoding political meaning or moral imperatives just enough to gather 
force from the reader’s act of interpretation.23 Ros Ballaster’s study of these tales illustrates the 
variety of political and cultural purposes to which that branch of the fable could be adapted.24 
During the second half of the seventeenth century, explains Ballaster, 
The reigns of Charles II and George II in England both saw the publication of oriental 
scandal narratives concerning the monarchs’ sexual and political weaknesses, calling 
attention to Charles’s vulnerability to the influence of women . . . The analogy with the 
Ottoman dynasty proved a particularly fruitful one for English writers seeking to score 
points against a rival court faction: the covert pursuit of absolutism, effeminacy, and 
decadence in a court, the decline of empire as a result of luxury, were trends that could be 
 
22 Richard Kroll argues that the oriental tale setting of Coramantien displays the concept of romantic 
kingship while the Suriname setting shows that kingship being tested, “’Tales of Love and Gallantry’: The Politics 
of Oroonoko,” Huntington Library Quarterly: Studies in English and American History and Literature 67.4 (2004): 
573-605. 
23 See Mark Loveridge, A History of the Augustan Fable (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998) and Jane 
Elizabeth Lewis, The English Fable: Aesop and literary culture, 1651-1740 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996). 
24 Ros Ballaster, Fabulous Orients: Fictions of the East in England 1662-1785 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005). 
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located in Turkish contexts to suggest the imperiled nature of English limited 
monarchy.25 
This late-seventeenth-century context understandably tempts us to find an allegory in the 
Coramantian Court tale of an aging king who destroys the future of his own dynasty. One could 
argue, for instance, that Behn is placing Parliament rather than James II in the role of the foolish 
king who would sacrifice the future to the country under its own control. Under such a reading, 
Imoinda figures not as an eroticized “other,”  but as the future productivity of England. And the 
reading works nicely along standard eighteenth-century lines thereafter, with a country sold into 
slavery by dishonorable political alliances and a worthy prince left to fend for himself amidst the 
hazards and corruption of the modern political world.26 
My point, however, is not to work out the veiled message behind the plot, but to 
demonstrate the dynamics between reader and text in an allegorical form. As it was used in the 
oriental fables of late-seventeenth-century Britain and France, allegory veiled a fixed object of 
signification behind each major character, such that the reader was expected to substitute a real 
king for a fictional one, a rumored mistress for fictional lover. This genre’s aesthetics were less 
about distraction than about temptation as the reader squints to see behind more than one sort of 
veil. But Behn declined to write the story of her royal slave as a straightforward oriental tale. 
And in the contrast between her oriental tale and the very different hermeneutics of her first-
person narrative, Behn calls into question the nature of meaning in her story as a whole.  
Associated with religious meditations, confessionals and adventure stories, first-person 
narratives of the late seventeenth century promised to produce a final cumulative, if not always 
coherent, set of meanings for the patient reader; sailors return and souls are redeemed, but only 
 
25 Ballaster, 171. 
26 For a study of Stuart politics in Behn’s novel, see Richard Kroll, “’Tales of Love and Gallantry’: The 
Politics of Oroonoko.” 
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after many possible endings are deferred or avoided in the course of events. In the next chapter, I 
will look specifically at how spiritual narratives adapted the extended length and deferred 
meaning of this form in response to new temporal concepts during this period. For the purposes 
of Behn’s text, however, we need only consider the heightened sense of uncertainty with which 
Oroonoko confronts its readers.  
Arguing that the ambiguities of Behn’s narrative continue to lure even modern readers 
into a fixation on the narrative’s truth claims, Robert Chibka describes the instability surrounding 
themes of language and truth in Oroonoko: 
From the novel’s opening paragraphs, we see anxiety associated with characteristic 
literary activities: invention, adornment, management of words and events at the poet’s 
pleasure. The narrator diverts this anxiety with a truth-claim, but proceeds to 
problematize truth, falsehood, and the grounds of belief throughout her narrative. (531-2) 
The tension Chibka describes in this passage between the aesthetic pleasure associated with 
rhetoric and truth claims would have little bearing on explicitly allegorical forms like the late 
seventeenth century’s version of the oriental tale. The rhetorical flourishes and figures of the 
allegorical genre are specifically designed to serve the encoded meaning of the story, seducing 
readers to uncover the message that waits beneath.  These tensions are, however, common to 
first-person narratives of the period. The tensions between language and truth usually arise in 
such narratives merely by virtue of the fact that the form makes us cognizant of the narrator as a 
character, which is to say, not simply as a human representation but as a literary signifier. As 
such, we simultaneously “read” the history and the narrator to determine their significations. 
Because we are reading the narrator and the history in relation to one another, however, the first-
person narrative creates a radical instability within the text. Readers must shuttle back and forth 
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between what is being recounted and the narrator who is doing the recounting in a continual 
process of adjusting their interpretations of one element in light of the other.  
This process necessarily invokes temporality in a different way, foregrounding 
anticipation and retrospection as part of the process for determining meaning. It creates an 
unsettling experience during which the reader cannot fully distinguish between true and not true, 
significant and insignificant, valuable and valueless until the narrative has played itself out. Like 
commodities in a marketplace, the value of characters and plot twists fluctuate pending the final 
redemption of the text. In her study of Defoe at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Sandra 
Sherman argues that “long-term credit implicated the culture in a new kind of narrativity, since 
promises in stock, annuities, and negotiable instruments were verifiable only with time. Until the 
moment of payoff, narrative verged on potential fiction.”27 In Behn’s story, as in many other 
first-person narratives of the period, this process manifests itself in the narrator’s own moments 
of divergent anticipation and retrospection as the text struggles to construct a coherent set of 
meanings over spans of time and multiple events. Thus any first-person narration (not just 
Behn’s) tends to emphasize the temporal contingency that adheres to one degree or another in all 
narrative form: meaning only ever really comes to rest for the reader in retrospect. 
 In Oroonoko, Behn emphasizes the tendency of first-person narrative to blur distinctions 
between truth and falsehood and to defer final valuations. On a rhetorical level, she allows the 
meanings of key terms to shift and sway with the progress of the text. As Chibka demonstrates, 
Behn’s narrative creates a constantly changing terrain of meaning around any references to 
“belief, proof, and truth”: 
 
27 Sandra Sherman, Finance and Fictionality in the Early Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 5. 
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Placing such categories in volatile relation to one another, she endows key terms — 
“adorn,” “entertain,” “divert” — with a range of application that undercuts their 
presumptive value as indicators of sure distinctions between the aesthetic (toward which 
she proclaims a profound distrust) and the historical (for which she professes a profound 
regard). (532) 
The problem here is not only that the narrator’s multiple uses of these terms blur distinctions 
between the aesthetic and the historical, but that our ability to determine conclusively the “value” 
of these terms at any given moment is itself called into question. Chibka argues that the 
instability of key categories in Behn’s text ultimately points to the political and ideological 
power that actually shape truth claims in European thinking. But we might just as easily trace 
that instability to the political-economic thinking evident in Oroonoko’s commodification. 
The sort of anxious truth claims and unstable meanings that plague Behn’s novel 
belonged to a cultural moment in which financial and literary texts were involved in a mutually 
inflecting discourse of credit. To borrow again from Sherman’s work, “As credit instruments 
become complex embodiments of financial relations, issues of credibility arise homologous with 
the ‘credit’ owed to literary texts.”28 I address Defoe’s narrative structures in the next chapter, 
but this portion of Sherman’s analysis pertains equally well to Behn’s novel. The uneasy 
fascination with truth claims found in both literary and financial discourse arises from a 
marketplace dynamic that is quite new to Behn’s readers: “As this market develops, credit 
creates a vast, reticulating network of players, indeterminate in time and space; it imposes a 
disorienting distance between authors and readers of financial texts.”29 Value, whether it be 
 
28 Sherman, 2. 
29 Sherman, 2. 
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financial value or truth value, becomes something stretched out in and through a mathematically-
conceived rendering of time. 
This marketplace construction of value impinges on the narrative structures of Behn’s 
oriental tale, loosening the connections between character and meaning and turning the future 
into a space of chronic deferral. In selling Imoinda to a slave trader, the Coramantien king broke 
both cultural and narrative boundaries. Behn’s narrator tells us that Coramantien custom entitled 
Imoinda to an honorable death, so that the oriental tale should have ended with the demise of its 
female figure. But in selling Imoinda, the king defers this ending, and Imoinda’s borrowed time 
takes her beyond the boundaries of the oriental tale and into the first-person narrative. In this 
process, the text exchanges Imoinda’s value as a ceremonial possession of the king for 
commodity value in the colonial marketplace. This move prepares the reader for Oroonoko’s 
seduction and entrapment as a commodity himself, and it suggests that we need to focus our 
attention on that marketplace for an understanding of why deferral operates to such dangerous 
ends in Behn’s text. 
The accumulation of value that political-economic practices were intended to produce 
depends on long-sustained acts of crediting. The first-person narrative structure that Behn chose 
required readers, like merchants, to hold out against promises of future redemption. The 
recurrent references to curiosity, delay and diversion in Behn’s narrative indicate just how easily 
a process of continual re-interpretation can slip into mere distraction. If readers fail in the 
hermeneutic process of integrating new meaning in time to existing understanding, they willingly 
take the position that has been forced upon Caesar. Like the restless slave, Behn’s readers are 
kept in motion by the constant stimulation of histories. But like the slave, those readers move 
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without direction, without progress, and without the accumulation of meaning or value that 
makes up the narrative’s promise. The result is a story replete with failed beginnings. 
Having been thwarted first by the aging king and then by the events in Surinam, the story 
of Oroonoko and Imoinda and of the royal line ends violently. The child is killed in its mother’s 
womb. The colony also falters prematurely, leaving our narrator to lament that it could have 
survived and flourished if the British Crown had “but seen and known what a vast and charming 
World he had been Master of” (43). Behn’s claim in the dedication, “though I had none above 
me in that Country, I wanted power to preserve this Great Man” immediately raises the question 
of whether the narrator herself is engaged in same pattern of distraction and failure (7). After all, 
the narrator takes on the project of preserving Oroonoko early in the story, only to abandon him 
by her absence at crucial moments. Oroonoko’s body and Surinam’s future are both finally 
sacrificed, but Behn and her narrator attempt to salvage them, ironically, in text. In the final lines 
of the story, the narrator sets her own actions alongside those of Imoinda, the woman who fought 
by Oroonoko’s side. In pale contrast, the narrator can offer only a posthumous version of the 
public identity that Oroonoko fought to escape: “the Reputation of my Pen is considerable 
enough to make his Glorious Name to survive to all Ages” (65). She does, however, give him 
back his name. 
The skepticism that we find in Behn’s text toward Britain’s new temporal structures and 
its new readers does not disappear in the more politically and economically stable years of the 
eighteenth century. Credit capitalism necessitates that modern subjects will always have a 
complex and ambivalent relationship to the future. For every population statistic and mortality 
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table that it provides, mathematical thought occludes the bodies that created it, all too often 
leaving real bodies amidst the uncertainty of endings that never come.30 
 
30 For a discussion of how the numeral sign system hides the embodied experience that produces 
mathematical thought, see Brian Rotman, “Thinking Dia-Grams: Mathematics, Writing, and Virtual Reality,” South 














Daniel Defoe and the  Great Clock of Public Credit 
 
The officers of the Treasury and Exchequer, Defoe once argued, are like “the Wheels of a 
Clock, their Business is to go round; but they are subject to the Influence of their Position, the 
Operations of the Springs and Wheels that guide their Motion, they act passively . . . ”1 If the 
passive activity of political leaders sounds eerily familiar to twenty-first-century readers, Defoe’s 
anxious attention to the swings of the marketplace is even more so. Defoe wrote An Essay Upon 
Publick Credit in 1710 in an effort to settle the public’s shaken faith in their markets following 
Queen Anne’s dismissal of the Lord Treasurer, Sidney Godolphin. Public credit withstood the 
political volatility and tax strains of 1710, but fell apart ten years later with the collapse of South 
Sea Company stocks.  
Perhaps more than any other popular author of the period, Defoe seems to have 
understood and believed in the mathematical assumptions that made modern finance work. 
Beginning with An Essay on Publick Credit, I examine how Defoe advocates for a British 
marketplace that yokes together two disparate time concepts. Intervening as it does at a moment 
of potential crisis, the Essay illustrates the difficulties of trying to convince an embodied 
citizenry to conceptualize the marketplace in mathematical terms. Defoe draws upon the 
 
1 Daniel Defoe, An Essay Upon Publick Credit, in The Political and Economic Writings of Daniel Defoe, 
eds. W.R. Owens and P.N. Furbank, 8 vols., vol. 6 (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2000), 49-56. All further 
references to An Essay are to this edition and are cited by page number within the text. 
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metaphor of the great clock and an analogy to the religious experience of faith to make his case 
for a system that “act[s] passively.” Before he arrives at these tropes, however, Defoe 
experiments with a string of narrative forms and figural devices in an effort to articulate the 
strained relation between embodied agency and a public disembodied in mathematical time. 
These rhetorical experiments reemerge in Defoe’s writing in 1719 when Britain confronts 
another market crisis, this time stemming from an overconfidence in the promises of finance. 
Written during the same short period, The Chimera and The Life and Surprizing 
Adventures of Robinson Crusoe constitute two distinct genres for a twenty-first-century 
audience. In recent years scholars have dismantled the idea that eighteenth-century authors and 
readers recognized such hard generic distinctions, and this is particularly the case with Defoe, for 
whom religious and economic thought were formational to any text.2 I introduce nothing new, 
therefore, in arguing that The Chimera and Robinson Crusoe belong to the same project. My 
argument instead expands on previous work to reveal the specifically temporal concerns that 
inform these two texts. Share prices for France’s Mississippi Company and Britain’s South Sea 
 
2 Sandra Sherman, Finance and Fictionality in the Early Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), is the most comprehensive study of the homologies between Defoe’s narrative fictions and 
the period’s financial discourse. She builds on a line of work that contextualizes the development of the novel genre 
during the eighteenth century. See especially Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson, and 
Fielding (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957); Michael McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel 1600-
1740 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Lennard J. Davis, Factual Fictions: The Origins of the 
English Novel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); J. Paul Hunter, Before Novels: The Contexts of 
Eighteenth-Century English Fiction (New York: Norton, 1990); and Ros Ballaster, Seductive Forms: Women’s 
Amatory Fiction from 1684-1740 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). A number of studies simultaneous with or after 
Sherman’s book address Defoe’s work in its financial contexts: Mary Poovey examines Defoe’s role in the shift 
away from political economic thought to moral philosophy in A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of 
Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). She returns to 
Defoe in her study of the development of genre distinctions in Genres of the Credit Economy: Mediating Value in 
Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). See also John Richetti, 
“An Emerging New Canon of the British Eighteenth-Century Novel: Feminist Criticism, the Means of Cultural 
Production, and the Question of Value,” in A Companion to the Eighteenth-Century English Novel and Culture 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 365-82; Wolfram Schmidgen, Eighteenth-Century Fiction and the Law of Property 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Patrick Brantlinger Fictions of State: Culture and Credit in 
Britain, 1694-1994 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). Martha Woodmansee and Mark Osteen, eds., The 
New Economic Criticism: Studies at the Intersection of Literature and Economics (London: Routledge, 1999), offers 
a partial survey of critical work that accounts for literature’s financial context. 
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Company had transformed the stock markets in both countries with the miraculous speed that 
only mathematics can produce. Both companies hid their slight assets and slighter potential for 
success behind a complex web of wealthy investors and state favors. In the year prior to the 
crashes that devastated both markets, Defoe struggled to articulate the difference between 
mathematical time and conscious time for a reading public that needed to understand the 
machinations of their financial market before it was too late. The Chimera uses France’s 
Mississippi Company as an implicit warning to British investors. But with the fictional narrator 
of Robinson Crusoe, Defoe creates a model for both the “sin” of not comprehending the fictional 
nature of mathematical time and the cognitive exercises necessary for financial redemption in a 
long-term credit economy. 
The final pages of this chapter examine the conceptual repercussions of the South Sea 
Company’s failure on Defoe’s writing. Building on the economically-oriented readings of Sandra 
Sherman, John Richetti and others, I find in Roxana, or the Fortunate Mistress Defoe’s effort to 
illustrate the nightmarish repercussions of confusing two time concepts and two notions of value 
for a British nation unwilling or unable to master the shift to modern credit-based capitalism. 
 
Defining Public Credit 
The Essay begins with an acknowledgment of the difficulties in defining the imaginary 
construct of public credit: “I am to speak of what all People are busie about, but not one in Forty 
understands: Every Man has a Concern in it, few know what it is, nor is it easy to define or 
describe it” (51). Public credit has, he writes, “no Whereness, or Whenness, Scite, or Habit” but 
is “the essential Shadow of something that is Not” (51). Faced with such a mysterious subject, 
Defoe proposes to explain public credit by showing “how it Acts rather than how it Exists, and 
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what it does, rather than what it is” (51). Defoe’s move here is a significant one. He cannot ask 
his readers to put their faith in shadows, or at this stage of the marketplace, in an “invisible 
hand.”  He hopes instead to make visible for his readers the activity that guides that market, the 
motions of that invisible hand. 
An Essay’s initial answer to the discursive needs of this marketplace comes in the form of 
spiritual rhetoric. As he begins the essay, Defoe muses, “If a Man goes about to explain it by 
Words, he rather struggles to lose himself in the Wood, than bring others out of it” (Defoe’s 
emphasis, 51). Borrowing from a religious metaphor that imagines the penitent lost in a spiritual 
wilderness, Defoe casts both himself and his readers in the tradition of spiritual wanderers. The 
wanderer loses his direction as a result of human shortsightedness, so that, limited by his own 
flawed perception, his only recourse is to credit the direction of a divinity who has, so to speak, 
the view from above. In a move that anticipates Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,” Defoe asks his 
economic penitents to accept a similarly unattainable view out over the logic and order of credit 
capitalism. Defoe’s public must accept what Oroonoko never could: that the system that 
guarantees present value by recourse to a distant future works and that it does so by virtue of the 
faith of its participants. 
Defoe’s use of Christian spirituality is by no means inconsistent with his subject matter. 
As critics have shown, Defoe’s religious beliefs constitute an important part of his political-
economic beliefs.3 Writing in the summer of 1710, Defoe’s need for this mingled discourse of 
faith and economics was particularly urgent. Lord Godolphin’s dismissal was just one more 
symptom of Britain’s unease. The Wars of Spanish Succession had cost the allied nations tens of 
 
3 See Michael McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel 1600-1740; Leopold Damrosch, God’s Plot and 
Man’s Stories: Studies in the Fictional Imagination from Milton to Fielding (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1985); J. Paul Hunter, The Reluctant Pilgrim: Defoe’s Emblematic Method and Quest for Form in Robinson Crusoe 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966); and George Starr, Defoe & Spiritual Autobiography (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1965). 
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thousands of lives during the year prior, and both morale and finances were heavily strained in 
Britain. A rapid turn of political leadership in Parliament was matched by an agenda of 
aggressive state borrowing, including the 1710 state lottery that contributed to Britain’s 
substantial state debt through to the end of the century.4 Defoe responds to the public’s anxiety 
by challenging his readers to maintain their faith in the system of public credit that had financed 
the nation since the Glorious Revolution. To do so, Defoe attempts to give at least a rhetorical 
substance to public credit and to the mathematical thinking that makes it work.5 
Like Behn, Defoe intuitively turns to narrative form to explore the dilemmas created by 
modernity’s long mathematical time frames. But where the delays and distractions of Behn’s 
novel cast doubt on the productivity of promises embedded in mathematical time, Defoe seeks a 
(deceptively) straightforward rhetorical formula to convince his readers of the efficacy of credit 
structures. Defoe attempts to narrate a political-economic plot that shows credit in time. In fact, 
Defoe includes two narratives of public credit in An Essay, one written in accordance with a 
tradition of historical writing and one that borrows from the mathematical and scientific 
exemplum. Defoe’s narrative strategy fails in both instances, forcing the narrator to abandon his 
efforts at linear narrative and retreat into metaphor.  
The first historical narrative begins rather ambitiously with “The Brittains Inhabiting this 
Island were found to Exchange their Block tin with the Phenecian Merchants for Spices, Wines 
 
4 See Larry Neal, The Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and P.G.M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A 
Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688-1756 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1967). 
5 Defoe frequently made use of cultural associations between the female body and credit in his writing. For 
some of the strongest studies of Defoe’s gendering of credit, see John Richetti, “An Emerging New Canon of the 
British Eighteenth-Century Novel: Feminist Criticism, the Means of Cultural Production, and the Question of 
Value”; Terry Mulcaire, “Public Credit; or, the Feminization of Virtue in the Marketplace,” PMLA 114.5 (Fall 
1999): 1029-42; Ann Louis Kibbie, “Monstrous Generation: The Birth of Capital in Defoe’s Moll Flanders and 
Roxana,” PMLA 110.5 (October 1995): 1023-34; Madeleine Kahn, Narrative Transvestism: Rhetoric and Gender in 
the Eighteenth-Century English Novel (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Robyn Wiegman, “Economies 
of the Body: Gendered Sites in Robinson Crusoe and Roxana,” Criticism 31.1 (Winter 1989): 33-51; and Mona 
Scheuermann, “Women and Money in Eighteenth-Century Fiction,” Studies in the Novel 19.3 (Fall 1987): 311-22. 
 96 
and Oyles, even long before Julius Caesar set his Foot upon this Island” (52). From this mythic 
setting, Defoe’s history moves at a brisk pace through the accidental establishment of metal as 
currency, the rise of gold and silver as the prevailing coin, the consequent use of price rather than 
in-kind exchange values, and a resultant shortage of coin as marketplaces grew. Thus, in a mere 
six sentences Defoe gives us a history of commerce up to the moment at which credit is to be 
introduced: 
Tho’ this was a great Assistant to Trade, and gave a liberty to the increase of commerce 
more than ever it had before, yet such was the great increase of Trade, that it even over-
run the Money it self, and all the Specie in the World could not answer the Demand, or be 
ready just at the Time Trade called for it. (52) 
At this point, however, Defoe’s narrator abruptly abandons his historical narrative and interjects 
the phrase, “This occasioned,” followed by the sudden introduction of an entirely different sort 
of story (52). 
The historical narrative with which Defoe began efficiently captures the longer time 
frames in which mathematical thinking functions. Their epochs marked only by the transitions 
between them, Defoe’s commercial eras take on the same fixed spatial quality that Henri 
Bergson identified with mathematical time concepts; whole centuries can be denoted by a single 
event and made to pass as quickly as the reader’s eye passing over a paragraph.6 And as Paul 
Ricoeur has demonstrated, historical writing borrows the character and plot structures that 
inhabit all narration by abstracting them to longer time frames. 7 The introduction of historic 
epochs means that reifications take on the quality of active subjects. In this way Defoe’s 
narrative claims to provide active agents to direct the movement of public credit, so that “Trade” 
 
6 See my discussion of Henri Bergson and mathematical time in Chapter One. 
7 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, 3 vols., vol. 3 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984-1988). 
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demands coin, nations fall into the habit of trading with one another, and “commerce” flourishes 
(52). 
But Defoe’s historical narrative fails at just the point where it most needs to succeed. 
Defoe’s worried readers need assurance that the crises of the present moment would not mark a 
great historical shift beginning, presumably, with the destruction of Britain’s financial market. 
What those readers need, in fact, is a narrative that reflects the embodied present and then leads 
them out of the woods.  His narrative stalled at the historical status of the present, Defoe attempts 
another approach. 
Within An Essay, the sudden termination of Defoe’s historical narrative leads directly 
into a different form of narration, this time involving characters “A” and “B” (52). “This 
occasioned,” Defoe writes, “That when A Bought more Goods of B than A had Money to pay for; 
and B having no Need of any Goods that A had to Sell; it behooved, that A should leave his 
Goods with B for a certain Time . . . ” (52). Defoe’s second narrative is an exemplum of the sort 
found throughout seventeenth-century political-economic pamphlets. The device was a 
convenient one for advocates of the controversial banking initiatives. By emphasizing the simple 
pattern of commercial relations among its characters, the exemplum suggested that modern 
banking consisted of the same activities in which Britons had been engaged for years, only in 
larger numbers and over longer time frames. Thus, with its simple credit transaction, Defoe’s 
exemplum promises to bring his readers back toward the human present with which they are so 
concerned: B is holding A’s goods as security, and A is assessing his ability to pay. Defoe 
concludes their transaction with the dramatic, “And this is the Great Thing call’d CREDIT” (53). 
But of course, the narrator merely evades the problem. The simple transaction in the 
exemplum successfully describes credit as a “Thing” of value produced by the relation between 
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the characters and as an action. But the exemplum has not described public credit, and Defoe is 
aware of the discrepancy. Public credit, as Defoe’s historical narrative suggests, exists only in a 
framework that has no embodied subjects. It is not merely the proliferation of private credit 
transactions within a marketplace, but a completely different conception of the marketplace. 
Public credit takes place in a mathematical time in which all patterns of profit, loss, and debt are 
imagined to exist already at designated points in the future. We imagine the invisible consumers, 
merchants, and lenders who actually produce the financial conditions of the marketplace to be 
moving toward, rather than creating, those future realities. The mathematical foundation of 
public credit thereby erases the agency of the public; all action, everything that we “do,” has in 
some sense already been accomplished and accounted for. 
Defoe’s history and exemplum, with their fundamental structure of character and plot in 
time, cannot make visible the imaginary systems of the modern marketplace. The moment we 
meet that marketplace on its own mathematical terms, we capture its long time frames and its 
plot movements only at the expense of the bodies that should give the plot direction. Defoe’s 
narrator therefore finally relinquishes narrative structure for the clock metaphor. Public or 
“National” credit, writes Defoe, is 
produc’d by the Nations Probity, the Honour and exact performing National Engagement. 
In this the Great Officers of the Treasury and Exchequer are, as we may say, perfectly 
Passive; their business is indeed Active; as the Wheels of a Clock, their Business is to go 
round; but they are subject to the Influence of their Position, the Operations of the 
Springs and Wheels that guide their Motion, they act passively, if that may be said, that 
is, of meer Necessity; and the punctual pointing of the Hand to the Lines shewing the 
Hour, the Minutes and the Seconds, are Consequences of these Motions. (55-6) 
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Defoe’s clock identifies the temporal nature of public credit without resorting to narrative form 
and emphasizes the mathematical nature of both credit and clock. Moreover, the metaphor has 
the benefit of invoking the clockmaker analogies that had helped explain the living body for 
Descartes and the universe for Boyle, among others. In those analogies as in Defoe’s, all 
movement and event is preset by the divine maker. The future is “spring-loaded” to unfold 
predictably over and across time just like a pattern created in mathematic logarithms. In finance, 
this mathematics of unfolding patterns spreads itself out over intervals of years rather than hours. 
But its structure of intervals is adequately captured by Defoe’s image of the clock face, its blank 
cyclical course punctured by labeled points to designate hours, minutes and seconds.8 The hands 
of the clock, argues Defoe’s narrator, represent the government officials who ostensibly manage 
the public credit. The narrator’s awkward unpacking of his metaphor — “they act passively, if 
that may be said” — catches at the sense that the mathematical economy is moving toward a 
future that it has already determined. So long as Britain’s government officials constrain 
themselves to the positions in which they are placed, their actions and the consequences of those 
actions will unfold as they are destined to do. In this great clock of public credit subjects are 
always active but never have agency. 
Defoe undoubtedly knew his clock metaphor did not account for any action that fell 
outside the simple patterns of movement that its springs and wheels set in motion. Nor would it 
have been desirable in this Essay to do so. Defoe was asking his audience to trust in the 
mathematics of public credit. He was keenly aware of the dangers that would follow if even a 
few well-placed individuals ceased to believe in the imaginary mechanisms by which public 
credit was sustained. The speed of news and the attractions of emulation in England’s 
 
8 Stuart Sherman, Telling Time: Clocks, Diaries, and English Diurnal Form, 1660-1785 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), argues that the “spaces” of time created by new timepieces at the end of the 
seventeenth century provide a structure for the collection of narrative events. 
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marketplace could easily transform individual doubt into public panic, as they eventually did 
during the South Sea crisis ten years later.9 For the purposes of this essay, Defoe needed to 
occlude his readers’ sense of their own importance to the nation’s finances. He assured them that 
the rapid and unpredictable motions of human beings in the marketplace would smooth out into 
regular patterns of averages and probabilities. Offering the image of a smoothly ticking clock, 
Defoe asked his readers to think long, mathematical time spans about a crisis that threatened 
them in the urgent moment of their present. 
 
A New Economic Sin 
Faith in the future was a sufficient rallying cry for Defoe’s public during the political 
upheaval of 1710. But the fast-developing marketplaces of Europe had created an entirely new 
sort of crisis for Defoe’s readers by 1719. During that year, markets in England, France, and 
Amsterdam were reaching ominous heights under the influence of state-sponsored joint-stock 
corporations like the South Sea Company in Britain and the Mississippi Company in France. The 
rise in global ventures over the preceding century and the end of the Wars of Succession had 
inspired the public with an enthusiasm for investment that at times seemed to rival religious zeal. 
Defoe, like many others, was concerned that the sort of confidence he had argued for in the 
Essay on Publick Credit had grown into foolishness.  
As he turned his attention to the problem of the public’s excessive confidence, Defoe 
made use of conditions in France. The exiled Scotsman John Law had overseen the 
establishment of the Banque Générale Privée and the Mississipi Company under the patronage of 
the French Crown. Like the South Sea Company, France’s intertwined schemes would fail 
 
9 Mary Poovey argues that Defoe turns to emulation as the basis for stability in the modern political 
economy of Britain; A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998), 157-97. 
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dramatically in 1720 with a run on the bank and the consequent freefall of markets in France and 
throughout Europe.10 In one of the more compelling narrations of Law’s rise in France, The 
Chimera agues that the complex ties between the Banque, the Mississippi Company and the 
French Crown had been carefully manipulated by Law, all with an eye to the establishment of a 
public credit in France. 
In keeping with the prevailing political theory in Britain, Defoe argues that France’s 
institution of absolute monarchy is incompatible with the establishment of public credit; the 
Crown’s ability and willingness to nullify debts or seize land adds too much contingency for an 
economy leveraged against the future. Moreover, France’s massive war debts, high taxes, and 
coin shortages means that the Crown needs to find its own instruments of public funding. Defoe 
explains that Law has attempted to solve the French dilemma by first creating public faith in the 
private bank through a well-secured supply of bullion. When the bank proved itself able to 
withstand a run contrived by ill-intentioned competitors, the new institution secured itself as the 
center of France’s public credit.  
But Defoe argues that Law never meant for the Banque Générale (now the Banque 
Royale) to be an end in itself. Instead Defoe reveals that Law’s true plan was to create a fund of 
public credit from the establishment of a joint-stock company. In spite of the French Crown’s 
lack of financial credibility and despite the modest profits that could be expected from the joint-
stock company’s actual business, Law would make the relation between the two into a structure 
 
10 The Mississippi Company was created under the direction of exiled Scotsman John Law. For a study of 
Law and his political-economic theory, see Antoine E. Murphy, John Law: Economic Theorist and Policy Maker 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1997). For two recent studies of the South Sea Company and its demise, see Richard Dale, The 
First Crash: Lessons from the South Sea Bubble (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Malcolm Balen, 
The Secret History of the South Sea Bubble: the world’s first great financial scandal (London: Fourth Estate, 2003). 
The financial dynamics of the period are surveyed in Larry Neal, The Rise of Financial Capitalism; and Kenneth 
Pomeranz and Steven Topik, The World That Trade Created: Society, Culture and the World Economy, 1400 to the 
Present, 2nd ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999). See also Eric Kerridge, Trade and Banking in Early Modern 
England (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). 
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that could swiftly bring in unimaginable funds for its directors and for the Crown. All of this 
would be accomplished by tapping into the French public’s naïveté about the mathematical 
structures of finance that were recreating the future. 
 Defoe explains how the new joint-stock company (and the Crown’s much-needed loan) 
were carefully birthed from the credit of the bank. Law’s plans were still an unqualified success 
in 1720, and Defoe describes the rise of public credit in France with an apparently equal mixture 
of awe and suspicion. Under Law’s direction, France has 
rais’d an inconceivable Species of meer Air and Shadow, realizing Fancies and 
Imaginations, Visions and Appartions, and making the meer speculations of Things, act 
all the Parts, and perform all the Offices of the Things themselves; and thus in a moment 
their Debts are all vanish’d, the Substance is answer’d by the Shadow; [ . . . ] the Name 
of the thing is made an Equivalent to the Thing it self, transposing the Debts from the 
King to themselves, and being contented to Discharge the Publick, owe the Money to one 
another. (161) 
Defoe’s rhetorical flourishes, the oppositions of “the Name” to “the Thing” and “Substance” to 
“Shadow,” belong to a discourse of credit that, from Defoe’s time to the present, has articulated 
the conceptual nature of credit through the use of binaries. With its reliance on a future that only 
exists as hypothesis, credit provokes us to think in terms of real and lack, present and absent, 
symbol and value, or name and thing. Such binaries force credit into the category of that which is 
not there or is not, in some fashion, “real.” As Defoe sets out his expectations that Law’s public-
credit scheme must fail in the end, we would be justified in reading the passage above as a 
reiteration of this figuration of credit as lack. In Defoe’s thinking, however, credit never falls into 
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such a clear binary. He does not contrast the “chimera” of the French marketplace to traditional 
symbols of value (bullion, land, or goods), but to English credit. 
 English nationalism informs this argument, of course, but Defoe is also offering a subtle 
caution to his countrymen and women. The narrator notes early in the essay that the French have 
“turn’d the Tables upon us” as Britain’s earlier borrowing schemes have obligated it to nearly a 
century of repayment, while Law’s scheme has rid France of its state debt with miraculous speed 
(160). England must not be tempted to put its own private bank or the flourishing South Sea 
Company to the same use as their French counterparts, argues Defoe, lest the English public 
should suffer the inevitable fate of its counterpart across the Channel. Defoe’s argument 
articulates a distinction between two kinds of public debt. As we might expect, Defoe insists that 
part of this distinction arises from the difference between France’s absolute monarchy and 
Britain’s parliamentary system. But he also emphasizes the slower, more realistic, speed at which 
Britain’s debt will be repaid. In contrast with the miraculously vanishing state debt of France, 
Britain’s slow repayment is testament to the reliability of British credit: 
. . . so that very Limitation of Power, which is in other Cases our Glory and Advantage, is 
the Reason why, let our Credit be what it will, our Debts remain, and must be wasted or 
diminished off, by the slow fire of Parliamentary Proceedings, and by no other way. 
(161) 
English debt cannot vanish “in a moment” as did that of the French, but must be burned by a 
“slow fire.”  
Defoe’s use of the word “slow” here transforms the metaphor from one of debt as paper 
that vanishes quickly to debt as something dense and substantial that fire struggles to consume. 
That slow burning of the English stands in stark contrast to Law’s ideas, which “burst out like a 
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sudden Fire,” and also to “the fluttering, rash Disposition of the People of France” that makes 
possible Law’s repayment of the massive French debt with such unimaginable rapidity. The 
English debt is preferable to the fiction “by which he [Law] has restor’d a Government 
overwhelm’d with Debt and which was turn’d Bankrupt to the People, and has deliver’d a Nation 
oppress’d with Taxes, in such a manner, and in so short a Time, that Posterity will never believe 
the Relation, but will all look like a Fable or Romance in their Eyes” (171, 173, 176). 
France’s benighted public has confused the mundane human time in which colonies and 
products are grown with the mathematical time in which they are dreamed. The French (and 
implicitly their British counterparts) suffer from a “Volatile Temper” and “fluttering, rash 
Disposition” that “prompts them to push things up to the Extremity” such that time itself is no 
obstacle to desire (170-1). Moreover, the French public’s failure to understand the workings of 
mathematical time is also a failure to interpret the series of events with which they have been 
presented. Defoe’s essay reveals France’s recent economic events to be part of a complex plan, 
patiently spun by John Law. And that plan works only because the public fails to understand the 
interrelation of economic events in time.  
The French public proves itself unable to interpret economic events as part of a larger 
pattern. Its “rash Disposition” is suited to the heady flights of mathematical time, but not the 
slow weight of human time. This lack of comprehension poses an imminent problem for the 
entire nation of France. But the French are not the only public suffering from a rash disposition. 
As Britain’s own joint-stock market expands beyond all reasonable expectations and the massive 
public debt sends political and economic leaders searching for a quick solution, Defoe returns to 
the economic narratives he ventured in 1710. This time, however, he narrates the behavior of the 
embodied public and leaves its credit in the shadows. 
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The Timely Hermeneutics of Robinson Crusoe 
The political-economic circumstances at home and abroad gave impetus to the troubled 
protagonist of Defoe’s first long fictional narrative. Long read as a tale of capitalist success, of 
spiritual progress, or of colonial adventure, Robinson Crusoe offers equally compelling insights 
into the hermeneutic strategies that Defoe’s age developed to respond to the new credit-based 
political economies.11 Like characters “A” and “B” from the 1710 Essay’s exemplum, Crusoe 
enacts the plot movements that underlie public credit. With his slow development from stranded 
castaway to colonial leader, Crusoe can even be said to enact a sort of pre-trade history. But 
Defoe’s real emphasis in this novel is not on commercial transactions (for much of the tale there 
is no one with whom to carry on a transaction). Robinson Crusoe enacts the cognitive process of 
crediting and interpretation made necessary to negotiate a world structured in mathematical time. 
Sandra Sherman captures part of this dynamic when she argues that “Defoe’s texts instantiate the 
homology between financial credit and literary credibility, and engage both the discourse of 
emerging capitalism and the theory and practice of fiction.”12 But we can be more specific in 
articulating how Crusoe’s narrative pauses, progressions and regressions comment on the 
complexities of the credit marketplace. Crusoe’s original sin is identical to that of Defoe’s 
French public. He believes fervently in mathematical time, but cannot interpret the relationship 
between that disembodied temporality and the mundane time in which he must live and produce. 
Thus, after providing his readers with standard details of birth, parentage and upbringing, 
 
11 For a post-colonial viewpoint on the narrative, see Srinivas Aravamudan, Tropicopolitans, 71-102, and 
Peter Hulme, Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1797 (London: Methuen, 1986), 175-
222. 
12 Sherman, 8. 
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Defoe’s most famous character attributes his dramatic misfortune to the “rambling Thoughts” 
and “Propension of Nature” that tempt him to go to sea against the wishes of his parents.13 
Critics have written volumes on the nature of Crusoe’s sin, but for my purposes the most 
important explanation is Crusoe’s own. In response to his father’s emotional pleas, Crusoe 
responds, “that I was now Eighteen Years old, which was too late to go Apprentice to a Trade, or 
Clerk to an Attorney; that I was sure if I did, I should never serve out my time, and I should 
certainly run away from my Master before my Time was out . . .” (6). Crusoe’s predictions for 
himself prove all too accurate. Crusoe refuses to commit himself to a business, and takes up his 
maritime career with no forethought at all: “being one Day at Hull, where I went casually, and 
without any Purpose of making an Elopement that time,” he boards “without any Consideration 
of Circumstances or Consequences” (7). Unable or unwilling to subject himself to the slow work 
of learning even a sailor’s craft, Crusoe survives the first years of his career through a mixture of 
good fortune, the generosity of strangers and divine mercy. 
 Crusoe’s subsequent fall into enslavement belongs to both the adventure tale and the 
spiritual narrative. And according to the latter genre, at least, Crusoe should have emerged a 
wiser, more devout man. But while Crusoe’s preparations for the escape from Africa mark some 
improvement over his rash departure from Hull, it is the young Moorish slave, Xury, who seems 
to have learned the moral lesson. While Xury willingly accepts religious conversion and ten 
years of service toward the promise of freedom, Crusoe lasts only four years on his Brazilian 
plantation. Crusoe makes clear to his readers that in spite of all that his experience should have 
taught him, he leaves the Brazils in the same impetuous frame of mind with which he’d departed 
from Hull: 
 
13 Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, ed. Michael Shinagel (New York: Norton, 1994). All further references 
are to this edition and are cited by page number within the text. 
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As I had once done thus in my breaking away from my Parents, so I could not be content 
now, but I must go and leave the happy View I had of being a rich and thriving Man in 
my new Plantation, only to pursue a rash and immoderate Desire of rising faster than the 
nature of the Thing admitted . . . (29) 
Crusoe’s restless ambition thus lures him out to sea again, this time to acquire the slaves that 
might speed the development of his plantation beyond reasonable expectations (notably, this 
slave labor is needed in part to replace Xury). Crusoe’s break with his parents is undoubtedly a 
cause for regret, but it is his unreasonable demands upon the future that repeatedly throw him off 
course. As a result, the protagonist finds himself shipwrecked on an uninhabited island, bound to 
an apprenticeship from which he cannot flee. 
By highlighting the idea of apprenticeship in Robinson Crusoe, I want to emphasize the 
extent to which the entire narrative, and not merely the section that takes place on the island, 
challenges its protagonist with a fundamentally temporal problem. Crusoe’s accommodation to 
the slow time of human endeavor emerges in his long term economic success. At the same time 
Crusoe engages in a long process of spiritual endeavor that brings him closer to the self-
revelation required by Defoe’s Protestant tradition. Defoe’s intertwining of these two 
apprenticeships around the question of time reveals the hermeneutic process that the two 
discourses share in common.14 
 
14 The question of whether Crusoe’s story is meant to be interpreted from an economic standpoint, a 
spiritual standpoint, or some combination of the two has prompted some of the most compelling critical work on 
Defoe. Ian Watt argued that the spiritual tradition was of relatively little import to Defoe’s writing by 1719; The Rise 
of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967) and Myths 
of Modern Individualism: Faust, Don Quixote, Don Juan, Robinson Crusoe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). J. Paul Hunter and George Starr, however, demonstrated Defoe’s comprehensive use of Protestant 
spiritual biography and diary traditions in producing Robinson Crusoe. Hunter, The Reluctant Pilgrim: Defoe’s 
Emblematic Method and Quest for Form in Robinson Crusoe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins P, 1966); Starr, Defoe & 
Spiritual Autobiography (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). Maximillian E. Novak argued specifically 
for the importance of the Protestant spiritual-economic concept of “the Calling” in understanding the protagonist’s 
character flaw and his redemption; Economics and the Fiction of Daniel Defoe (Berkeley: University of California 
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As I argued in the first chapter, late seventeenth-century mathematical thought 
constructed the future as a vast space of potential, very much like the open seas and unknown 
lands of the New World. Crusoe’s restlessness marks him as a product of that era in which the 
pure potential of time and of space beckoned in similar ways. But the spiritual discourse that 
eighteenth-century Protestants deployed to counter that restlessness had its anchor in a version of 
the very same time constructs.15 Commenting on a late seventeenth-century shift in Protestant 
belief, J.P. Hunter writes: 
The broadened typology simply extended to contemporary history the principle of 
regarding one time in terms of another: biblical objects or events now might not only 
prefigure other biblical events or concepts but also the events of later history. Or put 
another way, the broadened typology offered contemporary history an extended mythic 
dimension based upon past history frozen into static form. (101) 
The broadened typology to which Hunter refers is the modern version of an older biblical 
hermeneutics. In its earlier forms (scholars date Christian typology to the first century A.D.), 
typology invited the pious to find patterns of meaning and event from the Old Testament 
reflected in the narrative structures of the New. Typology later moved beyond the boundaries of 
the Old and New Testaments to become a method for interpreting contemporary history.16 As a 
result, argues Hunter, seventeenth-century religious thought re-imagines historical time as a 
“static” space, a blank page upon which the patterns of human error and divine redemption are 
acted and reenacted moving forward. 
 
Press, 1962). See also Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse, The Imaginary Puritan: Literature, Intellectual 
Labor, and the Origins of Personal Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 
15 See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parson (New York: 
Scribner, 1958). 
16 See Paul Korshin, Typologies in England, 1650-1820 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). 
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The re-conception of time described by Hunter bears more than a coincidental relation to 
the mathematical representations of time from the same period. Seventeenth-century Protestant 
typology differs in significant ways from the non-contingent temporality of applied mathematics. 
Whether in the theoretical work of Newton or in the daily practice of Christianity, the divine 
retains its potential to intervene in or end the time of human experience.17 Despite these 
ideological differences, however, eschatological time shares with its mathematical counterpart an 
articulation of time as fixed space. Moreover, the Protestant emphasis on both daily practices and 
centuries-long historical patterns produced for believers the same temporal conundrum that 
Defoe’s putative French public had met with in the marketplace: how to interpret accurately in 
two distinct time frames at once? While the Protestant faithful sought to interpret divine meaning 
and participants in the political economy sought to interpret economic value, both discourses 
found their solutions with the use of written text. Bureaucratic and financial documentation and 
diaries both served to spatialize intuitive time, to give a material representation to thought, 
experience and event. Arguably, however, the deliberate spatialization of intuitive time did not 
begin with narration or with personal diaries, but with ledger books.  
In a passage that marks the intertwining of commerce and spirituality in Robinson 
Crusoe, the protagonist attempts to gain control over his rambling thoughts by drawing up a 
mock ledger book that he inserts into his narrative: 
I drew up the State of my Affairs in Writing, not so much to leave them to any that were 
to come after me, for I was like to have but few heirs, as to deliver my Thoughts from 
daily poring upon them, and afflicting my Mind; and as my Reason began now to master 
 
17 For a discussion of eschatological thought in the work of Isaac Newton, see Reiner Smolinski, “The 
Logic of Millenial Thought: Sir Isaac Newton Among His Contemporaries,” in Newton and Religion: Context, 
Nature, and Influence, ed. James E. Force and Richard H. Popkin (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1999), 259-
89; and Robert Markley, Fallen Languages: Crises of Representation in Newtonian England, 1660-1740 (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).  
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my Despondency, I began to comport my self as well as I could, and to set the good 
against the Evil, that I might have something to distinguish my Case from worse, and I 
stated it very impartially, like Debtor and Creditor, the Comforts I enjoy’d, against the 
Miseries I suffer’d, thus . . . (49) 
Crusoe breaks his narrative form to arrange his thoughts into two columns, with line spaces to 
create a perfect correspondence between each item in the “Good” column and its “Evil” 
counterpart. The extent to which this spatial arrangement began as a temporal one is not obvious 
unless we consider the bookkeeping form from which Crusoe is borrowing.  
In double-entry bookkeeping, the merchant keeps a running journal entry of daily 
transactions and arrangements in one book and then periodically extracts information from that 
journal to update entries in a second ledger book.18 This second book, with all entries 
streamlined and categorized as debit or credit, effectively freezes time by replacing temporal 
succession with spatial balance to such an extent that the bookkeeper must include anticipated 
profits or materials as if they are already received. 
 Crusoe, with his ledger of moral interpretation rather than commercial value, needs to 
tame the desperately rambling thoughts that the larger text has already recorded. The narrative 
account that the reader has received veers from one direction to another as Crusoe struggles to 
interpret his situation from within the narrow boundaries of the moment. Thus Crusoe’s initial 
account of his first day on the island includes an ecstatic celebration of his deliverance: “I was 
now landed, and safe on Shore, and began to look up and thank God that my Life was sav’d in a 
Case wherein there was some Minutes before scarce any room to hope ” (31). A subsequent 
period of sharp despair sees Crusoe change course to lament his “dreadful Deliverance,” while 
 
18 Mary Poovey provides a critical history of bookkeeping practices in the early modern period. A History 
of the Modern Fact, 29-91. 
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still other passages highlight either the fatigue that caused him to lie down on the ground to sleep 
or the fear that drove him to make his bed in a tree (35-6).19 Within this jumble of impressions, 
emotions, and recollections, Crusoe’s bookkeeping constitutes one of his first efforts to grasp the 
longer temporal perspective that will fix (at least provisionally) and thereby order the 
significance of his experiences. 
As one might expect from a protagonist who is overly infatuated with the flights of 
mathematical time, Crusoe skips a necessary step by bringing us straight to his ledger. He soon 
rectifies this oversight by establishing the text from which the ledger is meant to be derived: a 
daily journal. In having Crusoe begin his journal at this point, Defoe not only reminds us that his 
protagonist still has a ways to go in his development, but also emphasizes the cognitive and 
spiritual function of  such texts. Hunter describes how, like the merchant’s journal, the Protestant 
journal recorded the raw data of life so that it could be ordered and interpreted retrospectively: 
The popularity of diary-keeping among Puritans in the seventeenth century derives 
ultimately from the Puritan world view. Because all events were actively willed by God, 
and because a proper understanding of divine intention depended upon correct 
interpretation of the pattern of events, every individual was obliged to observe carefully 
all those events which impinged on his life. (83) 
All events are worthy of attention under such a belief system. But a believer could not accurately 
assess the significance of individual events until they became part of a larger pattern in time. To 
this end, journals transferred the daily experience of time onto a spatial medium by virtue of 
which all recorded events could be viewed and interpreted simultaneously. Spiritual biographies 
 
19 Paul Goetsch provides a survey of critical approaches to the contradictions of Crusoe’s first-day 
accounts. “The First Day on the Island: Robinson Crusoe and the Problem of Coherence” in Modes of Narrative: 
Approaches to American, Canadian and British Fiction, eds. Reingard M. Nischik and Barbara Korte (Würzburg, 
Ger.: Königshausen U. Neumann, 1990), 190-202. 
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and autobiographies took this process one step further by affirming the universal patterns of 
meaning that governed even the most singular lives. As Hunter explains, each reader and writer 
of spiritual biography 
is perpetually searching for the developing shape of his life, trying to draw everything he 
does and everything he sees into a unified vision that will simultaneously assure him of 
his own election and deepen his insight into the relationship of man to God. (86) 
Hunter’s careful language, the “shape” of a life and the “unified vision,” reflects the importance 
that seventeenth-century Puritanism attached to giving time a material form and a textual space. 
The journal represented the relations between temporal experiences as spatial, and the biography 
gave those diurnal patterns a meaningful shape. 
In his discussion of temporality and narrative form in Robinson Crusoe, Stuart Sherman 
positions Robinson Crusoe as an heir to Samuel Pepys’s diary, a seminal text in the development 
of diurnal forms. 20 According to Sherman, Crusoe’s famous journal marks the first use of a 
putative journal within a longer narrative text, but complicates its innovation by unmaking the 
journal even as that structure is being introduced. Using the first-day accounts as his example, 
Sherman argues that Crusoe tries out a variety of writing systems available for ordering 
information in time. Crusoe’s journal begins by trying to give a voice to his experience through a 
task-based narrative structure. His first entries prioritize the sequence of tasks that become 
necessary to his survival. In keeping with the larger cultural shifts of eighteenth-century Britain, 
the journal then shifts to adopt the calendar as its structure and the tasks as pure content “by first 
making, and then transcribing, the pages he calls his ‘Journal of Every Days Employment,’ 
Crusoe reconfigures task time as tasks timed” (229). 
 
20 See also Paul K. Alkon, Defoe and Fictional Time (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1979); Alkon 
explores Defoe’s choice of temporal structures and time reference in the narrative to shape the reader’s experience 
of the text’s fictions as both particular and universal. 
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Sherman interprets Crusoe’s changing narrative structures as part of a larger project in 
which Crusoe must master the island and its inhabitants and make audible his otherwise silent 
story. Citing the attention to space in Crusoe’s longitude estimate, the temporal structure of his 
journal, and the topical cohesion of his balance sheet, Sherman argues that Crusoe is trying out 
conceptual structures through which he might situate rather than narrate himself:  
Crusoe locates himself on many of the grids that according to Foucault were combining 
to produce a new order of things, and that according to de Certeau were facilitating the 
“scriptural economy,” under whose auspices the writing class was able to commute the 
blank page into a tool of cultural control. (230) 
As Crusoe moves back and forth between the ordering of his physical space and the ordering of 
his narrative structures, the text reveals that “spatial and temporal order is an instrument of 
ownership,” but it is also an effort at communicating what Sherman (borrowing from Defoe) 
refers to as the “Silent life” of the individual consciousness (231,235). Sherman concludes that 
Defoe’s “heteroglossia of temporal templates” leaves both the reader and the novel form with a 
central question of telling and reading: 
‘The Journal’ seems to me to suggest, early in the career, that what Defoe actually 
purveys (very successfully in Crusoe’s case) is puzzlement: an ongoing uncertainty as to 
the authenticity of the particulars (here the exactness of the copy), which ends by 
producing a heightened awareness of the degree to which mere textualization is a form of 
fiction, and all narrative making demands remaking. (235) 
Thus Sherman reads the variety of narrative and non-narrative forms that we find in Robinson 
Crusoe as a deliberate questioning of the process of textualization. 
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But Sherman’s larger thesis questions the cultural impact of a new conception of time. 
His study begins with the spread of the pocket watch and its ability to demarcate small 
increments of time and its tendency to privatize that experience for the wearer. By tracing those 
effects in Pepys’ diary and subsequent diurnal forms, Sherman develops a subject-based 
approach to his time analysis before arriving at his reading of Robinson Crusoe. Thus Sherman’s 
reading focuses on the ways in which clock time produced new possibilities for imagining the 
modern subject as a property-owning individual within a spatially ordered, private time. 
This reading diminishes the role of spiritual biography and autobiography, as developed 
by Hunter and Starr, to mere structural experiment. Not only does Defoe violate the basic 
structure of the spiritual genre (conversion occurs near the end rather than the beginning of the 
tale), but Crusoe’s conversion scene “tears apart” the time form that the journal provides. 
Sherman’s analysis of the binding between space and time in Defoe’s novel need not lead to a 
dismissal of the spiritual ideology identified in Hunters and Starr’s analyses. The transformation 
of thought and time into text in Defoe’s novel goes a long way toward explaining why long 
narrative forms became so critical to a period that re-imagined time itself. But rather than 
attributing Crusoe’s jostling narrative to “untellability” or to the early development of the novel 
genre, we need to recognize in Defoe’s text a new and crucially important hermeneutic skill. The 
seventeenth-century spiritual genres from which Defoe seems to have borrowed his hermeneutic 
model allowed subjects and readers a way to integrate the content of slow, intuitive time with the 
abstract patterns of historical time. 
By insisting that divine significance could be read into the mundane events of human life, 
seventeenth-century Puritanism made human experience in time into a secondary text. A believer 
had to be fully engaged in the moment-to-moment acts of judgment and interpretation that make 
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up a spiritual life while also keeping one eye on the “longer” view through which these 
experiences were part of historic divine patterns. As a practical matter this meant that the 
believer always operated from a perspective of historical contingency; one’s interpretation of the 
moment is always cast in doubt by the fears, desires, and flaws that characterize human 
existence. All interpretations are prone to correction as experience accumulates like data, and 
judgments are adjusted. In his critique of nineteenth-century biblical hermeneutics Hans-Georg 
Gadamer provides an account of the reading process demanded by text: 
A person who is trying to understand a text is always performing an act of projecting. He 
projects before himself a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning 
emerges in the text. Again, the latter emerges only because he is reading the text with 
particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. The working out of this fore-
project, which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the 
meaning, is understanding what is there. (236)21 
As Joel Weinsheimer explains in an essay on Gadamer’s hermeneutics, this process reorients 
interpretation from a vertical search for hidden meaning to a lateral negotiation or fusion with the 
author.22 Gadamer’s reader “penetrates into the meaning,” but this “into” is very different from 
the reader of allegory or, as Weinsheimer notes, the postmodern critic who searches “below” the 
level of text for meaning. It is this lateral dimension for interpretation that became so important 
in Defoe’s eighteenth-century reading culture. For if credit structures cast doubt on vertical 
binaries for value and its representations, Protestant belief systems also prioritized the sort of 
 
21 In a critique of both Kant and nineteenth-century hermeneutics, Gadamer expressly denies the existence 
of a historically transcendent perspective. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Puritans certainly would have 
disagreed with this claim; God’s truth was both historically transcendent, and in limited ways, accessible to 
humankind. But interpreting one’s spiritual well-being was a lifelong process and one that prevented the closing of 
that hermeneutic circle. 
22 Joel Weinsheimer, “Meaningless Hermeneutics?” in Gadamer’s Repercussions: Reconsidering 
Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 158-66. See also Philosophical 
Hermeneutics and Literary Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). 
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lateral hermeneutic described by Gadamer as the only option available to a flawed human race 
reading in a corrupt language.23 
Defoe’s novel illustrates the processes of lateral hermeneutics and its demand for 
continual self-interpretation and revision in Crusoe’s constant narrative backtracking while on 
the island and in his shifts between present tense and retrospective analysis. These processes 
becomes especially clear in those sections in which Crusoe struggles to match his experience to 
biblical tradition. I have already noted the conflicting uses of  “deliverance” in Crusoe’s 
description of his first day on the island. The term reemerges many times throughout the 
narrative, but nowhere more dramatically than when Crusoe comes across the term in the Bible. 
Crusoe comes upon the forgotten Bible during his illness, and his account of the moment is 
cluttered with varying temporal perspectives: 
The Words were very apt to my Case, and made some Impression upon my Thoughts at 
the Time of reading them, tho’ not so much as they did afterwards; for as for being 
deliver’d, the Word had no Sound, as I may say, to me; the Thing was so remote, so 
impossible in my Apprehension of Things . . . (69,71) 
Crusoe first interprets the biblical passage as a promise that God will rescue him from the island, 
but weeks later reinterprets the passage as God’s promise to deliver him from his dangerous 
illness. A few days afterward, however, Crusoe is ready to receive yet another meaning: 
Now I began to construe the Words mentioned above, Call on me, and I will deliver you, 
in a different Sense from what I had ever done before; for then I had no Notion of any 
thing being call’d Deliverance, but my being deliver’d from the Captivity I was in; for 
tho’ I was indeed at large in the Place, yet the Island was certainly a Prison to me, and 
 
23 Robert Markley, Fallen Languages: Crises of Representation in Newtonian England, 1660-1740, offers a 
discussion of the status of language in eschatological thought in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. 
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that in the worst Sense in the World; but now I learn’d to take it in another Sense: Now I 
look’d back upon my past Life with such Horrour, and my Sins appear’d so dreadful, that 
my Soul sought nothing of God, but Deliverance from the Load of Guilt that bore down 
all my Comfort . . . (71) 
And yet there is no real end to Crusoe’s conversions. Immediately following the passage above, 
Crusoe resigns himself happily to a life of solitude on the island, only to re-engage in a series of 
desperate projects to escape a few pages later. In fact, only Crusoe’s extended “apprenticeship” 
on the island forces him to engage in the perpetual act of self-projection and interpretive 
correction that Puritanism requires. 
Crusoe’s apprenticeship is both spiritual and economic, and we now can understand the 
relationship between spiritual discourse and economic discourse in Robinson Crusoe as neither 
oppositional nor coincidental, but mutually instructive. Thus, even while Crusoe is wrestling 
with the question of his “deliverance” on the island, he is made to go through an exercise in 
determining material value. Crusoe wakes from his first night’s rest on the island to find that the 
ship he and his crewmates abandoned had beached itself safely during the night (37). Not for the 
first or the last time in the story, the narrator tells us that he would have behaved differently had 
he better understood his circumstances. The fate of the ship is a matter of chance, an outcome 
that no reasonable person could have predicted. But Crusoe’s salvage project is a matter for 
thought and interpretation.  
He begins by meeting his most immediate needs: “being very well dispos’d to eat, I went 
to the Breadroom and fill’d my Pockets with Bisket, and eat it as I went about other things, for I 
had no time to lose” (37). Because he has boarded the ship too late, Cruse rushes the task, loads 
his raft too heavily and forgets to account for the tides that drag him away from his landing spot. 
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Crusoe consequently finds himself standing in a stream with his back buttressed against his raft 
waiting for the tide to rise (38-9). Having learned his first lesson, Crusoe returns to the ship 
eleven times more, each time aware that if another storm appears, the present trip will be his last 
opportunity to salvage the much-needed supplies. During this early period on the island, Defoe 
shows Crusoe adapting to the timing of the tides and adjusting his motions to their regular 
pattern. At the same time, Crusoe is learning to order his tasks and goods according to what is 
most likely to serve him in the future. 
As he slowly creates his small kingdom, Crusoe’s long apprenticeship on the island 
allows him to build incrementally on his capacity to interpret the value of choices over time. 
Despite frequent setbacks, Crusoe gradually moves from the daily rhythms of the tides to the 
longer time spans of seasons and finally, to a colonial project that must be gradually extended 
out over years. As his ability to think in longer time grows, Crusoe’s new civilization emerges 
one man (and later, several women) at a time. Fortunately for Crusoe, the author spares him the 
actual enactment of his colonial plan. Crusoe and Friday are transported back to Europe, and 
Crusoe learns that his modest investments in England and in the Americas have grown 
exponentially. Crusoe becomes a testament to the rewards of a modern relationship to the future, 
one that offers a new version of value and meaning. 
Just as our credit marketplaces prompt an unending process of prediction and re-
evaluation, Defoe’s narrative was never meant to reach a true ending. Credit capitalism 
continually throws us forward in time to draw value from a potential that always lies one more 
year out, one more voyage away. This accounts in part for the sequels that quickly followed 
Robinson Crusoe and offered not only “Serious Reflections,” but also new trade ventures in 
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other parts of the world.24 Despite his concerns, Defoe’s version of the marketplace’s temporal 
structure is fundamentally optimistic; if the public learns to think in the interwoven motions of 
two times the future can be secured by the present. The financial crash of 1720 did not alter 
Defoe’s support for the credit-based marketplace, but it does seem to have changed his opinion 
of the public’s ability to function effectively in that marketplace. Published in 1724, Roxana 
depicts a public unable to disentangle the new economy from older ideas about value, 






France, Holland, and Roxana’s Fortunes 
The strange complexity of Roxana’s character has earned the novel a place alongside 
Robinson Crusoe in studies of the early novel genre.25 Defoe’s choice of a female narrator has 
 
24 Daniel Defoe published Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe in 1719 and Serious Reflections in 1720. 
The proliferation of sequels and (in the case of Roxana, or the Fortunate Mistress) endings supports Sandra 
Sherman’s claim in Finance and Fictionality that eighteenth-century literary texts, like financial texts, depended on 
the ability to avoid closure.  Robert Markley, “’I Have Now Done with My Island, and All Manner of Discourse 
about It’: Crusoe’s Farther Adventures and the Unwritten History of the Novel,” in A Companion to the Eighteenth-
Century English Novel and Culture, eds. Paula R. Backscheider and Catherine Ingrassia (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2005), 25-47, argues that Farther Adventures illustrates Defoe’s repudiation of the colonialist model put forth in 
Robinson Crusoe as the author turns his attention to a hostile and vilified Asia. 
25 See Michael Boardman, Defoe and the Uses of Narrative (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
1983), and Narrative Innovation and Incoherence: Ideology in Defoe, Goldsmith, Austen, Eliot, and Hemingway 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992). See also John Richetti, Defoe’s Narratives: Situations and Structures 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); William Ray, Story and History: Narrative Authority and Social Identity in the 
Eighteenth-Century French and English Novel (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Press, 1990); Jesse M. Molesworth, “’A 
Dreadful Course of Calamites’: Roxana’s Ending Reconsidered,” ELH 74.2 (Summer 2007): 493-508; Paula 
Backscheider, “The Genesis of Roxana,” The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation 27.3 (Fall 1986): 211-
29; Ian A. Bell, “Narrators and Narrative in Defoe,” Novel: A Forum on Fiction 18.2 (Winter 1985): 154-72; David 
Durant, “Roxana’s Fictions,” Studies in the Novel 13.3 (Fall 1981): 225-36. 
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likewise inspired feminist approaches to Roxana’s narrative structure.26 Sandra Sherman works 
off these approaches with her argument that Roxana returns Defoe to the question of whether the 
author’s textual elusiveness is still viable in an England reeling from the market crash.27 
Sherman’s reading of this novel focuses primarily on the character of Susan, the daughter that 
Roxana will not own and cannot escape. Reading Susan as a representation of the reader who has 
entered the text and insisted on an account of its origins, Sherman prioritizes the novel’s ending. 
But her argument also offers a useful starting point for understanding Roxana’s character. 
Naming Roxana as “the ironic reemergence of Lady Credit,” Sherman places Defoe’s female 
protagonist in a category somewhere between emblem and fully-fledged character and identifies 
her as part of Defoe’s long-standing project to describe and define public credit.28 Roxana’s 
multiple identities and sexual promiscuity support the argument that she is simply a reiteration of 
the early Lady Credit. However, her position in the market and her failure to master its concepts 
lead to the troubling suggestion that what Roxana actually represents is the English public itself.  
Roxanna (née Susan) is French by birth, having fled to London with her parents in 1683 
to escape religious persecution. By adulthood, Roxanna tells us, she has lost every French quality 
about her except the language. Her parents were part of the industrious middle class that brought 
about England’s financial revolution in the late years of the seventeenth century. Roxana 
nevertheless begins the story of her ignominious career with financial disaster. Her parents have 
died, her brother has lost her inheritance in a merchant venture, and her husband has failed at the 
business his father left him. The list of circumstances could begin a nineteenth-century novel, but 
 
26 See Madeleine Kahn, Narrative Transvestism: Rhetoric and Gender in the Eighteenth-century Novel 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). For recent studies of the female narrator, see Haskell Hinnant, “Moll 
Flanders, Roxana, and First-Person Female Narratives: Models and Prototypes,” Eighteenth-Century Novel 4 (2004): 
39-72; and Julie Crane, “Defoe’s Roxana: The Making and Unmaking of a Heroine,” Modern Language Review 
102.1 (January 2007): 11-25. 
27 Sandra Sherman, Finance and Fictionality. 
28 Sandra Sherman, 158. 
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Defoe’s narrator is very keen to emphasize the foolishness of her late husband. His business fails 
particularly because of his attitude toward his business and his capital:  
he had no Knowledge of his Accounts . . . it was below him to inspect his Books, he 
committed all that to his Clerks and Book-Keepers; and while he found Money in Cash to 
pay the Malt-Man, and the Excise, and put some in his Pocket, he was perfectly easie and 
indolent, let the main Chance go how it would.29 
When her husband sells the business off, Roxana is relieved until she realizes that he continues 
to live and spend money just as he had before. With no trade to produce income, the couple 
begin their slide toward destitution. Roxana pleads with her husband, telling him, “how fast our 
Money wasted, and what would be our Condition when it was gone,” only to find that she makes 
no impression on him, “but like one stupid, he went on, not valuing all that Tears and 
Lamentations could be suppos’d to do; nor did he abate his Figure or Equipage, his Horses or 
Servants, even to the last” (11). Once the money is gone, Roxana’s husband abandons his family 
to “seek his Fortune” elsewhere (11). 
 In light of the recent turn in England’s fortunes, Defoe’s vivid description of the foolish, 
self-absorbed husband and the tearful wife serve as a commentary on the nation’s approach to its 
marketplace. Roxana’s critique of her husband mimics the verbal and printed attacks on officials 
the public believed responsible for the South Sea debacle. In the wake of the crash, officials were 
accused (probably correctly) of ignoring or hiding the Company’s lack of income and engaging 
in the sort of insider-trading cronyism suggested by the “scoundrels” with whom Roxana’s 
 
29 Daniel Defoe, Roxana, the Fortunate Mistress, or, A history of the life and vast variety of fortunes of 
Mademoiselle de Beleau: afterwards called the Countess de Wintselsheim in Germany: being the person known by 
the name of the Lady Roxana in the time of Charles II, ed. John Mullan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 10. 
All further references are to this edition and are cited by page number within the text. 
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husband spends his money (11).30 Roxana and her husband thus perform the mistakes leading up 
to the South Sea Company’s failure and the consequent blow to public credit. 
In a typical reading of the novel, Roxana responds to this catastrophe by losing her 
conscience but improving her financial skills.31 As Christopher Gabbard argues, however, it is 
not at all clear that Roxana masters either finance or commerce.32 In his re-examination of 
Roxana’s business prowess, Gabbard argues that much of Roxana’s air of financial acumen 
comes with one of her chosen identities, that of a Dutch woman and wife to a Dutch merchant. 
Notwithstanding Defoe’s representations of the Dutch as brutally mercenary in the Crusoe 
trilogy, Defoe and his readers were all familiar with the common association between the 
Netherlands and efficient commerce. Roxana’s Dutch husband assumes that his wife will keep an 
eye on her own financial well-being and thus offers to let her see the household books and 
participate in the management of assets. Noting that Defoe himself advised women to learn 
bookkeeping skills for just this purpose, Gabbard points out that Roxana not only admits to the 
reader her inability to read the books, but turns over all management of her affairs to her various 
husbands or to Amy throughout the novel.33 The protagonist’s failure is particularly telling in 
light of her castigation of the first husband for just this omission. 
 
30 There are many studies of the collapse of South Sea stock and its impact on British financial markets. See 
Richard Dale, The First Crash: Lessons from the South Sea Bubble; and Malcolm Balen, The Secret History of the 
South Sea Bubble: the World’s First Great Financial Scandal. 
31 See particularly John Richetti, “An Emerging New Canon of the British Eighteenth-Century Novel: 
Feminist Criticism, the Means of Cultural Production, and the Question of Value,” in A Companion to the 
Eighteenth-Century English Novel and Culture, eds. Paula R. Backscheider and Catherine Ingrassia (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2005), 365-82; Laura Brown, Ends of Empire: Women and Ideology in Early Eighteenth-Century English 
Literature (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1993); William Warner, Licensing Entertainment: The Elevation of 
Novel Reading in Britain, 1684–1750 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1998); and Janet Sorensen, “‘I Talk to 
Everybody in Their Own Way’: Defoe’s Economics of Identity,” The New Economic Criticism: Studies at the 
Intersection of Literature and Economics, ed. Martha Woodmansee and Mark Osteen (New York: Routledge, 1999). 
32 Christopher D. Gabbard, “The Dutch Wives’ Good Husbandry: Defoe’s Roxana and Financial Literacy,” 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 37.2 (Winter 2004): 237-51.  
33 Gabbard, 239, citing Defoe, The Complete English Tradesman (1726). 
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 Roxana’s association with France is even more troubling, however. If, to borrow from 
Gabbard, “the Netherlands stands for economic discipline,” then France stands for the “luxury 
and corruption” associated with the aristocratic “vices of idleness, moral laxity, and 
sensuality.“34 Roxana’s fascination with French power and luxury, and the necessity of her 
repeated escapes from France to Dutch territories and Dutch husbands suggests that the would-be 
businesswoman is caught between two financial systems.35  The novel’s ending suggests that she 
could not or did not choose the correct one. Defoe, after all, wrote Roxana as a tragedy, forcing 
his lead character into prostitution and then lashing her to a sordid past. 
Expanding on previous studies of Roxana as narrator, Gabbard concludes that Roxana’s 
“deficient bookkeeping skills find an analogue in her equally inadequate literary ones . . . 
because she [Roxana] cannot take stock of herself or accomplish a serious personal reckoning, 
she cannot bring this spiritual autobiography to a meaningful close.”36 But Roxana is not just 
misreading her account books and mis-writing her life, she also misreads her assets. Gabbard 
notes that Roxana’s fascination with the jewels she gains in France indicates that she has put her 
faith in an older form of wealth.  Roxana repeatedly details her growing accounts, but she does 
not actually manage any portion of that wealth herself with the exception of her movable 
possessions. Leaving the account books, contracts, and commercial arrangements to Amy and 
others, Roxana prefers the physical manifestations of value. The coins that seal her contract with 
her first lover, the jewels that she accepts as security before his death, and the goods that fill her 
households receive particular attention from the narrator. 
 
34 Gabbard, 240-1. 
35 Several studies note the novel’s spatial emphasis in Roxana’s movement around European financial 
capitals. Janet Sorensen calls this a “a spatial semiotic economy”; “’I Talk to Everybody in Their Own Way,’” 84. 
As in my analysis, Roxana’s travel is usually associated with the global trade network and the contrast between 
Dutch and French commercial systems. See David Blewett, introduction to Roxana by Daniel Defoe (New York: 
Penguin, 1982); John Richetti, Daniel Defoe (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1987); and Bram Dijkstra, Defoe and 
Economics: The Fortunes of Roxana in the History of Interpretation (London: Macmillan, 1987). 
36 Gabbard, 248. 
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 Roxana’s fascination with material wealth extends to the fundamental concepts behind 
that wealth. Wealth in this older system depends upon the assumption that certain materials have 
intrinsic value, and valuation depends upon vertical binaries of truth and representation, 
employing the same metaphors of inside and out or surface and depth that also characterize 
allegorical figures. Just as a claim is either true or not true, so is a coin either real or not real. 
Roxana’s veiled and costumed figure at the masque gives embodiment to this older concept of 
value.37 This concept of wealth clashes in obvious ways with the credit marketplace that Roxana, 
Defoe and Defoe’s readers all inhabited. Roxana’s greatest failure is not that she participates in a 
system of wealth that Britain has abandoned, but that she participates in it only partially. 
Scholars who have proclaimed Roxana’s character a successful businesswoman are 
correct at least in acknowledging in Defoe’s protagonist a certain understanding of her economic 
context. Roxana’s multiple fictions of identity mimic the proliferation of credit that a long-term 
credit market can produce.38 Roxana has produced not only her own fictional lives and her 
capital, but also the physical bodies of numerous children. But the credit marketplace gives birth 
to such a proliferation of wealth by disregarding the restrictions of linear time. Mathematical 
concepts gave the marketplace a way to view past, present and future simultaneously so that 
many possible results of a single transaction could exist at once, preparing the ground for their 
multiplication in more transactions, more credit notes. However, mathematical time is not the 
time of the human body, nor the mortal time given by the divine. Defoe recognized that 
mathematical representations of the temporal were limited constructs; to confuse them with 
 
37 For a discussion of this passage and its French and oriental references, see Katie Trumpener, “Rewriting 
Roxanne: Orientalism and Intertextuality in Motesquieu’s Lettres Persanes and Defoe’s The Fortunate Mistress,” 
Stanford French Review 11.2 (Summer 1987): 177-91. 
38 See especially John Richetti, “An Emerging Canon of the British Eighteenth-Century Novel”; Janet 
Sorensen, “’I Talk to Everybody in Their Own Way’: Defoe’s Economies of Identity,” in The New Economic 
Criticism; and Sandra Sherman, Finance and Fictionality, 156-78. 
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human experiences of the world or to grant them more power than they had constituted a danger 
to the marketplace and a danger to the man or woman who was thus mistaken. 
Roxana shapes herself in the image of the financial fictions that surround her, never 
understanding that those fictions operate in a time and space not available to the human being; 
the very corporeality that makes Roxana’s fortune is what binds her to the limited durational 
time of the human mind. Roxana does not have access to an expansive temporal realm in which 
to keep apart the multiple fictions and bodies that she has produced. The relentless presence of a 
child signifies more strongly than anything else the impossibility of a body escaping linear 
time.39 As Roxana once again relinquishes control to Amy in the handling of her daughter, 
Defoe’s novel seems to conclude that the British public has learned very little from the 
catastrophe that temporarily damaged the market. Worse still, Roxana suggests that the public 
finally might not be capable of understanding the complex temporalities on which the modern 
public and its nations depend.
 
39 In this final point my argument approaches that of Anne Louise Kibbie, “Monstrous Generation: The 
Birth of Capital in Defoe’s Moll Flanders and Roxana,” PMLA 110.5 (October 1995): 1023-34. Kibbie traces the 









The Oriental Tale and Its Deferred Endings: 
Arabian Nights’ Entertainments in Commercial Context 
 
Defoe’s Roxana warned readers of the dangers of conflating older notions of materially-
inherent value with the mathematically-derived value of political economics.1 Drawn to the 
productivity of a political-economic future, but seduced by the trappings of traditional wealth 
and power, the post-bubble British public of Defoe’s novel seemed bound to fail again. But was 
that conflation of old and new frameworks really a failure of the public’s understanding, or was 
the dynamic that Defoe critiqued central to Britain’s political-economic marketplace? 
Throughout his work, Defoe sought to distinguish between two time concepts, one embedded in 
embodied experience, the other a mathematical construct free from the constraints of duration 
sequentiality. Defoe’s misdirected characters failed to recognize that the human body had no 
access to mathematical time, and they repeatedly endangered both their bodies and their purses 
as a result. But early-eighteenth-century literature offered other frameworks for constructing the 
body in relation to mathematical time. With The Tatler and The Spectator, Addison and Steele 
nurtured a public that belonged to mathematical time but gestured toward real bodies by 
fashioning their resemblances in narrative text.2 Addison and Steele might well have found 
 
1 See my discussion of Defoe’s novels in Chapter Four. 
2 See my discussion of The Tatler and The Spectator in Chapter Two. 
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inspiration for Mr. Spectator in the same genre that Defoe mined when he named his famous 
protagonist, Roxana. 
A reference to an Ottoman courtesan and a common prostitute, Roxana’s name came 
from the dress and character she adopted to gain the attentions of the English Court. Roxana’s 
careful blending of Ottoman adornments and French mannerisms invoked a literary genre that 
was well-established by the time that the South Sea Bubble struck the English stock market. 
Dominated in the 1720’s by the English-language version of Antoine Galland’s Mille et Une 
Nuits, the oriental tale genre elicited critique for its use of magical creatures, fanciful plots, and 
in earlier versions, erotic content. When Defoe wrapped his female protagonist in a thin veil of 
Turkish mystique, he made use of these associations and drew, as well, on the genre’s 
indebtedness to an illicit French print culture. 
But the story of the oriental tale in Britain is more than the history of a literary fashion or 
of an early step toward orientalism. As they flirted with the cultural and material cross-currents 
between Europe and the Middle East, oriental tales negotiated the growing power of print culture 
to intervene in politics and in markets. Mid-seventeenth-century romans á clefs in Ottoman or 
Persian settings were self-conscious in their use of print forms. As the metaphor in the genre’s 
name suggests, romans á clefs envisioned printed text as a material form to be “opened” by a 
reader for whom the “key” would radically transform the text’s meaning. The fixed existence of 
print on a page thus contrasted significantly with the deliberate instability of language. 
Deploying this contrast of fixity and fluidity, oriental tales played with the notion of boundaries. 
Printed text presupposed the capacity to contain, if not stabilize, the possibilities for narrative 
meaning, and the genre mimicked that containment in the heavily-guarded spaces of harems, 
walled gardens, and palaces. Unlike their Aesopian counterparts, however, oriental tales 
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explored the permeability of those boundaries and the realignment of power and meaning that 
necessarily followed. The oriental tale thus reflected its own tendency to cross boundaries; these 
texts were commodities that traveled among the same international commercial webs as the silks 
and slaves depicted in their pages, often moving illicitly across national and social borders. 
Moreover, oriental tales accomplished their task through an erotic discourse. The sexual frissons 
among human bodies in their pages marked otherwise hidden shifts in real political power. With 
their focus on the political, seventeenth-century tales did not address overtly the conflict between 
political-economic and embodied time that so troubled Defoe, but they provided all the elements 
to do so. 
John Paul Marana’s Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy and the English translation of Antoine 
Galland’s Mille et Une Nuits marked a re-deployment of the tropes and themes of the oriental 
tale to respond to Britain’s political-economic marketplace. In my reading of Marana’s 1684 
text, I mark the decay of  the genre’s focus on boundaries as allegorical gaves way to an 
uncertain epistolary and print forms encroached on the centralized power of traditional authority. 
When the first Grub street translation of Arabian Nights’ appeared in England in 1704, the 
oriental tale genre shifted its tropes and themes again to address a marketplace embedded in 
mathematical time concepts. In this regard, Arabian Nights’ confronted the same dynamic among 
text, time and bodies that inspired Addison and Steele’s periodical essays. But Arabian Nights’ 
Entertainments offered a slightly different version of that dynamic. Where The Spectator drew 
on the endless commentary of what Foucault labeled an episteme of resemblance, Arabian 
Nights’ bred both wealth and pleasure from the charged interplay between deferral and 
anticipation. 
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Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari argue that capitalism first nourished itself on the 
decaying codes of feudal societies and continued to developed through the de-codification and 
de-territorialization of all cultures it encountered.3 Threatened by its own tendency toward chaos, 
capitalism averts its destruction by offering a mock replacement for the codes and territories it 
helped dissolve. Where once different signifying systems in a culture worked in correspondence, 
capitalism imposed only “axiomatics” that linked empty symbols to one another in an infinite 
progression that corresponded only to capitalism’s own syntactic rules. Deleuze and Guttuari’s 
work provides an important critical perspective on the oriental tale’s fascination with the 
permeability of boundaries and the increasing fluidity of semiotic play. But seventeenth-century 
oriental tales introduced the flux and fluidity of semiotic value to their narratives through 
depictions of sexual desire, and it is in this regard that eighteenth-century narrative shifts offer 
new insights into how early capitalism framed its project. 
Using Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of desire as a starting point, I argue that Arabian 
Nights’ “story about stories” illustrated the wealth-producing potential of a semiotic system 
coded in time and mediated by the body. As it borrowed from the self-conscious textuality of the 
oriental fable tradition, Arabian Nights’ offered bodies and goods that, even within the narrative, 
slipped in disorienting fashion from material reality to mere story and back again. Within this 
layered narrative structure, Arabian Nights’ did more than illustrate the commodity value of 
semiotic signs. The collection emerged as an argument for the productivity of a system in which 
every material exchange only reproduces anticipation. My reading thus ends with an analysis of 
Arabian Nights’ as a text (and commodity) that participated in the development of a marketplace 
that resisted either boundaries or endings.  
 
3 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). 
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From the East via France 
The oriental tales and fashions that shaped so much of eighteenth-century British culture 
began with the very particular concerns of the seventeenth century. Scholars of seventeenth-
century Britain have show that print technologies were closely intertwined with the political 
conflicts of the period. As Nigel Smith writes, “Never before in English history had written and 
printed literature played such a predominant role in public affairs, and never before had it been 
felt by contemporaries to be of such importance.”4 Though somewhat dramatic, Smith’s assertion 
captures the significance of the printed texts for seventeenth-century leaders and their supporters. 
Literature was seen to be a powerful influence on the course of political events, as it provided a 
greater dissemination of the ideas of more of Britain’s subjects. The threat was not simply words, 
but printed words, those that could be easily and quietly disseminated. By the mid-1640’s, 
authors were working in a variety of new and re-fashioned rhetorical styles that “functioned as 
modes of simultaneous political commentary, explanation and satire.”5 Smith explains that these 
new styles were in part a response to the growing distrust of rhetoric, so that their authors 
increasingly turned to satirical or ironic forms. 
Emerging from within these mid-century styles, short fables facilitated the volatile 
political and religious debates that Britons continued to wage in print. In her study of the 
Aesopian fable in England, Elizabeth Jane Lewis argues that these tales appealed to readers of 
the Augustan period because of the genre’s “aptitude for reactive mediation between opposing 
 
4 Nigel Smith, Literature and Revolution in England, 1640-1660 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1994), 1. See also Robert Markley, Fallen Languages: Crises of Representation in Newtonian England, 1660-1740 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Steven N. Zwicker, Lines of Authority: Politics and English Literary 
Culture, 1649-1689 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); and James Holsten, ed, Pamphlet Wars: Prose in 
the English Revolution (London: Frank Cass, 1992). 
5 Smith, 44. 
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sides.”6 Fables, writes Lewis, were “often visibly driven by a combative sociopolitical context, 
and by a determination to confer on words the status of objects.”7 In their awkward binding of 
representational simplicity and discursive instability, fables demonstrate a self-consciousness 
about their own rhetorical processes that confronts the question of how words make and 
represent meaning: 
More than their superficial invocation of the sensible world, it is fables’ demonstration of 
their own contingency — of the ways meaning is made — that, in Augustan eyes, 
invested them with something akin to natural authority. Indeed, fables’ thematic 
preoccupation with the phenomenal world may be seen as a trope for the concrete acts of 
meaning-making that they perform structurally. More than their actual invocation of 
sensible things, it was this complex materiality that made fables antidotes to a figural 
crisis that was also a political and cultural one.8 
The threat of the printed word to political stability played itself out in these fables through a self-
reflexive questioning of how printed words relate to the material world. At the heart of this 
questioning, of course, is a challenge to the truthfulness and reliability of printed rhetoric. 
According to Lewis, Augustan fabulists often played in their introductions with puns and irony 
that emphasized the difference between language and the material world it claimed to represent. 
And yet these authors finally needed to persuade their readers. The genre self-consciously turned 
the phenomenological qualities of print (the visible marks on a material page) into a trope to 
suggest that the author’s rhetoric was, in fact, anchored in a more credible material world: 
 
6 Elizabeth Jane Lewis, The English Fable: Aesop and Literary Culture, 1651-1740 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 3. For other studies see Laura Brown, Fables of Modernity: Literature and Culture in the 
English Eighteenth Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Mark Loveridge, A History of the 
Augustan Fable (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Enlightening Allegory: Theory, Practice, and 
Contexts of Allegory in the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. Kevin L. Cope (New York: AMS, 1993). 
7 Lewis, 9. 
8 Lewis, 7-8. 
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“Aesopian self-consciousness reflects not only contemporary thinking about figurative language 
but also an obsessive perception that figurative language is inseparable from the material forms 
(the very printed pages) that convey it.”9 According to Lewis, it was this self-conscious 
insistence that the printed fable belonged to the material realms that helped to counterbalance the 
radical instability of its discourses. A fable could be (and sometimes was) used to convey two 
opposing political positions, but the fable’s textual materiality was imagined to be a visible 
indication that there were discursive boundaries. Meaning was not stable, but at least its 
possibilities might be contained.10 
In contrast to the oral culture with which later critics associate fable forms, seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century fables insistently and self-consciously belonged to a modern, dynamic 
print culture. This context becomes all the more important when we consider the importance of 
the print revolution in the eighteenth-century construction of the nation. Beyond the act of 
reading the same texts or even the sense of a shared time, printed genres created a discursive 
space for debate and disagreement within the phenomenologically stable structure of the printed 
page. And as Lewis demonstrates, the simple allegorical structure of the fable doubly 
emphasized this balance, revealing “a symbolic economy in which objects are demonstrably 
equivalent to verbal signs, and vice versa.”11 Lewis concludes that Aesopian fables never lost 
touch with the power dynamics with which their authors and readers wrestled: “fables weld 
together the material, the political, and the symbolic.” Maybe it was only fitting, then, that the 
Aesopian fable became a marker of English liberty and progress, an affirmation of the nation’s 
 
9 Lewis, 4. 
10 Lewis’ emphasis on materiality approaches other recent work on the materiality of the book. See for 
instance The Book History Reader, eds. David Finklestein and Alistair McCleery (London: Routledge, 2006); Karin 
Littau, Theories of Reading: Books, Bodies, and Biblomania (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2006); Roger Chartier, The 
Culture of Print: Power and the Uses of Print in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1989); Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe, Canto ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). 
11 Lewis, 8. 
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commitment to the discursive process of Enlightenment thought that was also structurally 
bounded enough to nurture the sense of a cohesive nation. The Aesopian fable thus became part 
of the process of creating Englishness, “initiating generations of English readers into a common 
understanding of symbolic practice.”12  
Lewis’ study of Aesopian fables lays the groundwork for a better understanding of the 
oriental tales that also grew popular in Britain during the last half of the seventeenth century. 
Like their Aesopian counterparts, oriental fables worked self-consciously with allegorical 
structure and print medium to make use of the discursive space created between meaning and 
materiality. However, while Aesopian fables reinforced the self-contained space of the nation 
with their claim to a particularly English discursive field, oriental tales of the seventeenth 
century did just the opposite.13 Many, if not most of these tales traveled to England from France, 
where they had already acquired an air of intrigue for both French and English readers. French 
print culture made use of oriental fables and fairy stories to create a distinct structure for its own 
political discourse.14 From 1648 to 1715, while Britain wrestled with dramatic changes in 
government and government structures, the powerful Court of Louis XIV provided fodder for 
gossip, discussion and critique in France. The fable’s allegorical structure, preferably coupled 
with an anonymous printing, offered a discreet space for France’s political discussion and court 
gossip. Those with enough talent could make money from secretive printings and sales of these 
romans à clefs. But of course, the Eastern courts and harems in which these tales were often set 
were more than mere narrative veils. France’s merchants established their capitulations with the 
 
12 Lewis, 8. 
13 My argument approaches that of Srinivas Aravamudan, who observes that the oriental tale offers a 
different type of  “cosmopolitan currency” than does the domestic novel: “If domestic realism performs endocultural 
reification, or the consolidation of the national stereotype from within, the oriental tale features a fluid circulation of 
endocultural and exocultural processes . . . ” Srinivas Aravamudan, “In the Wake of the Novel: The Oriental Tale as 
National Allegory” Novel: A Forum on Fiction 33.1 (Autumn 1999): 5-31. 
14 For a survey of the oriental tale in France see Marie-Louise Dufrenoy, L’Orient Romanesque en France, 
1704-1789: Étude d’histoire et de critique littéraires (Montréal: Beauchemin, 1946). 
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Ottoman government well before Britain, and France took up a prominent role in Western 
Europe’s import routes. A small circle of elite English readers received their romans à clefs as 
part of the expansive movement of luxury goods and political intrigue that constantly circulated 
amongst the most powerful courts of the West and the Islamic East.15 
Distributed in England during the late seventeenth century, The Amours of the Sultana of 
Barbary demonstrates the role of foreign courts and long-distance trade routes in these tales. In 
this story, the anonymous author makes use of a purportedly oriental tale to critique the influence 
of Charles II’s mistress, Louise de Kéroualle.16 The central plot is relatively simple; a Christian 
slave named Indamora seduces the Ottoman Emperor, Acmat, into granting her the title of 
Sultana of Barbary. When a former lover appears at the Court, Indamora must balance her own 
desires with the Sultan’s favor while fending off the conspiracies of the Sultan’s earlier mistress, 
Homira. As Ros Ballaster argues in her reading of the story, the plot plays out English suspicions 
that surrounded the court of Charles II and de Kéroualle during the 1670’s.17 De Kéroualle had 
come to Britain with Charles’ sister, Henrietta Maria duchess d’Orléans in 1670, and had begun 
her affair with Charles the following year. After news erupted of an alleged Popish plot in 1678, 
the public suspected de Kéroualle of serving as a French agent in the Court. The “key” to this 
tale, handwritten onto a copy of The Amours of the Sultana of Barbary held at the British 
 
15 For a study of the significance of Islam in English literature prior to the Romantic period, see Bernadette 
Diane Andrea, Women and Islam in Early Modern English Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007); Matthew Birchwood, Staging Islam in England: Drama and Culture, 1640-1685 (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 
2007); Benedict Scott Robinson, Islam and Early Modern English Literature: the Politics of Romance from Spenser 
to Milton (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Linda McJannet, The Sultan Speaks: Dialogue in English Plays 
and Histories about the Ottoman Turks (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Matthew Dimmock, New Turkes: 
Dramatizing Islam and the Ottomans in Early Modern England (Aldershot, Hampshire, Eng.: Ashgate, 2005); and 
Nabil Matar, Islam in Britain, 1558-1685 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
16 The Amours of the Sultana of Barbary, A Novel in Two Parts, the Story finish’d (London: R. Baldwin, 
1689). The text used in this study includes the following handwritten notation on the title page: “i.e. Dutchess of 
Portsmouth.” 
17 Ballaster, 172-4. 
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Library, reveals the analogue between the Sultan and Charles that readers were expected to 
discern in the text.  
Ballaster’s meticulous study of oriental tales places this narrative within a discursive field 
of cultural analogies that seventeenth-century English and French readers drew between 
European and Ottoman power struggles: 
The analogy with the Ottoman dynasty proved a particularly fruitful one for English 
writers seeking to score points against a rival court faction: the covert pursuit of 
absolutism, effeminacy, and decadence in a  court, the decline of empire as a result of 
luxury, were trends that could be located in Turkish contexts to suggest the imperiled 
nature of English limited monarchy. Moreover, the Sunni and Shi’ite split in Islam 
provided a useful analogue between Catholic and Protestant controversy, not least 
because the territorial distinction between the two (Turkey versus Persia) could provide 
support for the complaint that English Protestantism was threatened by French 
Catholicism.18 
Settings in luxurious courts undoubtedly piqued readers’ interest, but the characters, plot twists, 
and props of those fictional orients were meant to serve as relatively straightforward analogies to 
the British and French courts that were actually under scrutiny. Ballaster adds to this framework 
an argument about the oriental female as story teller. She identifies Indamora as part of a long 
tradition of Roxana and Roxolana characters who, inspired by somewhat dubious accounts of 
Ottoman history, repeatedly appear in text and on stage to coax Kings back to redemption or to 
lead them astray. As Ballaster writes in her account of Richard Knolle’s 1603 Generall Historie 
of the Turks, Roxolana displays all the elements of tales set in the Ottoman courts: “luxury, 
 
18 Ros Ballaster, Fabulous Orients: Fictions of the East in England 1662-1785 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 171. 
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concealed female agency, slave government, cruelty, despotism, the will-to-power, religious 
hypocrisy, and imposture.” 19 Focusing on the “concealed female agency” of women who seduce 
with language, Ballaster argues that The Sultana of Barbary demonstrates a recurrent power 
dynamic between female subject and male ruler. Though this tale’s version of Charles II eschews 
the conventional tyrant character, “Where these representations of  Charles II do chime with 
conventional representations of the oriental despot is in their exploitation of the familiar contrast 
between the oriental ruler enslaved to the pleasures of the eye and the harem woman gaining 
access to power and influence through the subtle use of language.”20 Ballaster goes on to 
examine these female characters as part of a larger question about how oriental literary 
references registered changing British perceptions of the East. Ballaster argues that it is the 
gender dynamics in oriental fictions that open possibilities for change and transformation, 
whether in the relations between characters or the relations between East and West. With the 
ubiquitous figure of the female storyteller at its center, a tradition of oriental seductresses (and 
ocassionally, reformers) brings words and stories to an ongoing contest with the more overtly 
powerful male gaze. 
As Ballaster’s reading shifts toward its post-Lacanian perspective, her argument leaves 
behind the attention to narrative structures with which she began and loses much of its historical 
specificity in the process. We do better to look at one of Ballaster’s other works. In Seductive 
Forms: Women’s Amatory Fiction from 1684 to 1740, Ballaster explores the interplay of politics 
and sexual tension in these narratives. Arguing that Aphra Behn conceals her own political 
ambitions beneath depictions of female desire, Ballaster explains: 
 
19 Ballaster, 61. See Ballaster’s discussion of the Roxolana and Roxana roles, 59-69. See also Katie 
Trumpener, “Rewriting Roxane: Orientalism and Intertextuality in Montesquieu’s Letters Persanes and Defoe’s The 
Fortunate Mistress”, Stanford French Review 11 (1987): 177-91, 178. 
20 Ballaster, 174. 
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Manley’s claims to be trafficking solely in love, the ‘proper’ sphere of the female 
novelist, are considerably more transparent than Aphra Behn’s. The disguise is meant to 
be seen through. Rather than engaging with and reworking contemporary ideological 
debates with politically charged meanings . . . Manley focuses on specific and personal 
satire in her ‘key’ novels. Nearly every character in her novels has his or her correlative 
in the ‘real’ world of political intrigue.21  
Rather than looking for psychology in the characters of another ‘key’ novel, we need to be 
looking at structural relation. Like other fables, oriental tales of this period produced characters 
who were read and identified in relation to one another. But the relations amongst them are not 
psychological. In the politically-charged world of Delarivier Manley, vivid sexual attractions 
between characters indicate the fickle shifts of political power in Britain and France. The Sultana 
of Barbary does not provide its readers with a stable “value” for any character, with the possible 
exception of the notoriously mild Sultan. With its nested structures, sudden plot twists, and 
above all, sexual liaisons, this tale explores the constant realignment of characters and the 
consequent change in their relative values. The sheer number of plot twists in this tale makes a 
detailed summary impractical, but the early development of Indamora’s fate demonstrates how 
this elaborate narrative structure operates upon its characters. 
The first of the tale’s inset narratives has Indamora as a young girl without fortune living 
in isolation with her father. After a chance encounter with Alexander, a young nobleman, she 
falls in love. She nevertheless declines when Alexander makes his “first cruel Proposals of [her] 
 
21 Ros Ballaster, Seductive Forms: Women’s Amatory Fiction from 1684-1740 (Oxford: Clarendon,1992), 
117. For another study of amatory fiction and its veiled political commentary, see Toni Bowers, “Representing 
Resistance: British Seduction Stories, 1600-1800,” in A Companion to the Eighteenth-Century English Novel and 
Culture, eds. Paula R. Backscheider and Catherine Ingrassia (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 140-63. 
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ruin.”22 A letter from Alexander threatening to end their romance unless she gives in to his 
sexual advances accomplishes what his verbal protests could not, and Indamora agrees to the 
meeting that Alexander has demanded. In the interim, however, a story dissuades her. The story, 
told to the Archduchess in Indamora’s presence, details the ruin of a young woman in the same 
circumstances as Indamora. Treating the story as an example of her own situation and the 
consequences that would likely come of it, Indamora writes a letter of her own offering an 
excuse for postponing their meeting. Alexander angrily spurns Indamora and a new lover, the 
Prince Augustus, presents himself. After telling the young woman that Alexander has provided 
him with all of their love letters, Augustus makes his own advances. Indamora gives in this time: 
I still loved Alexander, and must look on him as the cause of all my Ruin; it was, to be 
revenged on him, that I abandoned my Honor, and suffered myself to be undone by a 
Man I then only esteem’d; ‘tis true, had I never seen Alexander, I should have loved 
Augustus, but the Prince had nothing of my Tenderness, though he possess’d, and, in a 
word, enjoy’d me.23 
The ruin of Indamora only spurs on further twists in the story. After growing to love Augustus as 
much as she had Alexander, Indamora learns that the Prince has told Alexander of their affair 
(Alexander has written to assure her that he is not offended by her choice since he had urged the 
Prince to use the letters in Augustus’ own sexual proposals). Indamora spurns both men, but then 
grows fond of them again through public meetings and further letters. Alexander then gains 
Indamora back by assuring her that the letter confessing his role in Augustus’ advances was 
actually penned by Augustus. Indamora believes the accusation, pens her own accusing letter to 
Augustus, and then regrets her credulity when Augustus challenges Alexander to a duel. This 
 
22 The Amours of the Sultana of Barbary, 21. 
23 The Amours of the Sultana of Barbary, 29. 
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elaborate shuffling of lovers ends with Alexander killed in the duel and Augustus exiled, though 
the plot will be taken up in new form near the end of the tale when Augustus reappears in the 
Sultan’s court to contend again for Indamora’s affections. Nor is this the only plotline in which 
the narrative indulges the reader’s sense of drama. A conspiring Vizier, Indamora’s own 
deceptions, and the strangely sympathetic character of Homira force the reader constantly to 
reassess the alliances and relative positions of each character. The Amours of the Sultana of 
Barbary demonstrates all of the qualities that Ballaster lists as standard for the oriental tale: 
“luxury, concealed female agency, slave government, cruelty, despotism, the will-to-power, 
religious hypocrisy, and imposture.” 24 But it demonstrates one other quality that is typical of the 
romans of the period: an insistent and persistent shuffling of these themes amongst the various 
characters. 
 What is remarkable about The Sultana of Barbary and other oriental tales of this period is 
their ability to contain so many plot twists among a limited cast of characters and without leaving 
the relatively bounded setting of the royal courts. In large part this occurs because the tales, like 
the Aesopian fables, refer to a select few individuals who are made recognizable in the narrative 
through their relations to one another; the more characters and settings that the story introduces, 
the more difficult the reader’s task in interpreting. But the tight constraints of these tales does 
something else. As characters retreat to walled gardens and guarded harems, the genre reenacts 
that particular understanding of the relation between print materiality and discourse that is an 
established part of the fable genre in the seventeenth century. By its very nature, allegorical 
narrative affirms the tendency for language to take on multiple meanings. By its historical 
 
24 Ballaster, 61. See also Katie Trumpener, “Rewriting Roxane: Orientalism and Intertextuality in 
Montesquieu’s Letters Persanes and Defoe’s The Fortunate Mistress.” 
 141 
association with print and materiality, the fable promises that if meaning cannot be fixed, it can 
at least be contained.  
Like its Aesopian counterpart, the oriental fable makes use of the gap between language 
and that which it claims to represent. But where Aesopian fables help to circumscribe emerging 
ideas of Englishness, the oriental fable carried a different valence. Oriental tales unfolded almost 
entirely within the walls of palace gardens, harems, or palaces. They did permit, however, more 
than one such space. Just as Indamora travels the trade routes from Western European courts to 
the Russian Court and the Ottoman power centers, The Sultana of Barbary provides its readers 
with a constant reminder that in the real world both politics and finance constantly cross the 
geographical boundaries of the nation, changing the relative systems of value and meaning 
within. As the seventeenth century gave way to the eighteenth, the existing articulations of 
meaning and of value were strained to breaking. Credit, after all, did more than unlock a stable 
cache of wealth; embedded in longer time frames, it could produce value that had not been there 
before. Likewise, print helped to produce a new, disembodied and de-centralized political power 
in the form of a public. This destabilization of early modern concepts of wealth and political 
power finds articulation in a narrative that uses its troubled protagonist to undermine the 
semiotics of allegorical narrative. 
 
The Turkish Spy’s Uncertainty 
Exported from Italy to France and then to Britain, John Paul Marana’s Letters Writ by a 
Turkish Spy played upon familiar elements of earlier tales by trading in the seductive body of an 
oriental woman for the malformed body of a world-weary and reluctant Muslim spy. The initial 
volume was first published almost simultaneously in France and Italy in 1684; an English 
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version of volume one appeared in London in 1687.25 Like the French and Dutch editions that 
had come before, the English edition varies very little from the original Italian, though English 
publishers redacted one of the 102 letters that indicated pro-Stuart leanings. 
By way of advertisement, the 1702 English edition shows on its title page, “The Eight 
Volumes of Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy, Who Lived Five and Forty Years, Undiscover’d, at 
Paris: Giving An Impartial Account to the Divan, at Constantinople, of the most Remarkable 
Transactions of Europe; And Discovering Several Intrigues and Secrets of the Christian Courts 
(especially that of France) from the Year 1637, to the Year 1682.”26 A divided section on the 
page goes on to advertise: “Written Originally in Arabick, Translated into Italian, from thence 
into English. And now Published with a Large Historical Preface and Index to Illustrate the 
Whole. By the Translator of the First Volume.” Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy thus gives a 
predictable if new twist to the oriental fables to which British readers were accustomed. Though 
playing with oriental settings and characters, the explicit function of the genre’s allegorical 
structure was always to reveal the “Several Intrigues and Secrets of the Christian Courts.” For 
 
25 Both the authorship and editions of Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy have a tangled history. Marana 
apparently presented a manuscript to Louis XIV in April 1683, claiming that the papers had been found by an Italian 
in Paris in 1682 and translated from the original Arabic (this matches the editor’s claim in the introduction to the 
volume). Marana received permission for the printings in Italy and France in early 1684, the French version having 
been translated from the Italian with only minor changes. A French edition was published in Amsterdam that year. 
Two years later, Marana sought the King’s license to publish the second and third parts and was granted permission 
in 1686 after offensive passages were removed. Marana ceded his copyright to Henry Wetstein in Amsterdam, who 
published the letters in a single volume, but in four parts. More French editions appeared in 1689 and 1690. 
The first London edition appeared in April 1687 from John Leake, licensed by Sir Roger L’Estrange. This 
edition named Marana as the author and claimed the text had been written in Arabic and translated to Italian before 
being translated into English. A second edition, also from Leake, claimed the volume had been translated from 
Arabic to Italian and then to French before its English translation. This second edition came in a single volume, 
divided in four parts, but omitted letter XCIX on the topic of the English Revolutions and the death of the Viceroy 
of Ireland (the letter praised Charles I). Thereafter, all English and all but one Dutch editions omit the ninety-ninth 
letter and are published as single volumes in four parts. Unfortunately, records from the period have created 
confusion about whether Marana is the author and about the number of volumes published. John Paul Marana is now 
widely viewed to be the author of the text. See C.D. Lee, “The Authorship of Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy: The 
Oxford Connection,” Bodleian Library Record 18.4 (October 2004): 333-64; and William H. McBurney, “The 
Authorship of the Turkish Spy,” PMLA 72.5 (December 1957): 915-35. 
26 Giovanni Paolo Marana [John Paul Marana], Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy, Who Lived Five and Forty 
Years, Undiscover’d, at Paris (London: Printed for H. Rhodes and S. Sare, 1702). 
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British audiences in the first years of the eighteenth century, the fact that these were secrets of 
the French Court was all the better. But Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy set the oriental fable genre 
on its head with a simple change of narrative structure. Unlike any fable, The Turkish Spy 
unfolds from within the unreliable perspective of the spy, Mahmut. 
In the Introduction to the volumes, the reader learns that the Italian translator has found 
the letters in an apartment that he lets in Paris. From questioning the landlord, the translator 
learns that the previous tenant was “greatly Studious, of small Stature, of a very coarse 
Countenance, but of surprising Goodness of Life.”27 Claiming to be from Moldavia, the spy had 
lived in the house eighteen years before disappearing suddenly at the age of about seventy years. 
The Landlord suspects that his tenant had been disposed of in the river. Like other texts within 
the oriental-fable tradition, Mahmut’s collection of letters reveals the duplicity, ambition and 
betrayal hidden within the French court on which Mahmut spies.  But Letters Writ by a Turkish 
Spy introduces an uncertainty into its narrative structure that was not present in earlier tales in 
England. As several critics have pointed out, the spy’s opinions, tone and moral grounding seem 
to change depending upon his correspondent. What seems established in one letter is undermined 
by another. In this way Mahmut’s letters accomplish the sense of relative value and instability 
that we find in the fickle characters of earlier fables. But the instability of meaning in the spy’s 
letters is made more radical by the narrator’s own position. Marana writes his narrator as a 
character chronically prone to doubt. We learn at the beginning of the letters that our spy 
embodies the dangerous distinction between the visible structure of the material world and the 
invisible world of meaning: “Being of low Stature, of an ill-favoured Countenance, ill-shap’d, 
and by Nature not given to Talkativeness, I shall the better conceal my self . . . I make two 
Figures; being in Heart what I ought to be; but Outwardly, and in Appearance, what I never 
 
27 Turkish Spy, 24-25. 
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intend.”28 The Preface encourages the reader to accept Mahmut’s status as an outsider as 
assurance of the credibility of his writings. The marks on these pages are not subject to the 
partisanship and political maneuvering of those within the partially closed system of court or 
nation: “as we are, perhaps, less just than in Ages past, it is difficult to write things as they are, 
particularly during the Lives of Princes, whose History cannot be writ without Fear, nor the 
Truth said without Danger. For these Reasons, we ought not to question the Credit of our 
Arabian, who reports with Liberty what came to his knowledge.”29 And yet, Mahmut can never 
position himself entirely outside of the systems on which he reports.30 
Beginning with his narrator’s concerns about compromising his Muslim faith in the 
service of his mission, Marana allows own doubts and suspicions to creep into the letters. What 
he hears and observes colors his wavering belief systems, both religious and philosophical. The 
apparent inconsistencies of this character provoked a separate preface in the combined English-
language edition: 
It is though necessary to prefix something more by way of General Preface, not so much 
regarding the Translation, as the seeming Original Abruptness and Obscurity of our 
Arabian Author Himself in some Places, with his frequent Change of Subjects, his 
Digressions and Startings from Matter of Fact, the then present Wars, Transactions, and 
Intrigues of Christian Courts, States, and Kingdoms, (for which he was chiefly sent to 
Paris) and his Immethodical falling upon Philosophical, Divine, and Moral 
 
28 Turkish Spy, 1. 
29 Turkish Spy, Preface, 3. 
30 See Srinivas Aravamudan, “Fiction/Translation/Transnation: the Secret History of the Eighteenth-
Century Novel,” in A Companion to the Eighteenth-Century English Novel. Aravamudan points to the narrator’s 
failure to remain outside the systems on which he spies as part of his argument that Marana’s novel takes part in a 
literary form that challenges national boundaries. 
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Contemplations, and even to Ancient, Obsolete Histories, which some think were 
altogether Foreign to his Business. 31 
Our editor attempts to remedy this “Original Abruptness” with his own version of a narrative 
“key,” in this case a brief history of political events in Turkey and Western Europe during the 
decades in which Mahmut wrote his letters. But he must also provide some sort of key for 
Mahmut himself, not an analogue for unlocking the spy’s identity but an interpretation designed 
to make the spy’s character more stable. Toward this end, the editor reminds his readers that 
change is natural over the long span of time captured in these letters, that Mahmut must negotiate 
changing circumstances, and that the apparent contradictions in his philosophical and religious 
views are best understood to be a product of his learning and general deism. Notwithstanding the 
efforts of the editor, the spy’s ability to provide a stable, objective perspective fails dramatically 
with the progression of the plot. When he is recognized by a former acquaintance, Mahmut finds 
himself imprisoned and subject to the power of the state he is meant to observe. And the 
imprisonment, coupled with his fear of letters gone astray and conspiracies against him, slowly 
draws Mahmut into the position of a player in this game rather than a spectator. The spy’s 
growing anxiety and dismay end with his sudden disappearance. In the final reckoning, 
Mahmut’s identity and that of his editor both elude the reader. Despite the claims of the 
volumes’ Preface, British readers debated the text’s authorship and origin. Letters Writ by a 
Turkish Spy successfully emphasizes the stable, material quality of its letters, but the narrative 
leaves open and uncontrolled the fickle nature of meaning in a world where both meaning and 
value are now always relative.32 
 
31 Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy, General Preface, 2-3. 
32 See Ros Ballaster’s discussion of parallels between Marana’s life and that of his fictional character, 
Fabulous Orients, 145-60. 
 146 
Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy thus marks an important shift in narrative structure, but it 
also makes one more pivotal change to the way oriental tales would function at the turn of the 
century. As one would expect from the oriental tales and dramas that preceded it, Letters Writ by 
a Turkish Spy makes use of its readers’ interest in luxurious courts and harems with its own 
references to both. But the narrator soon ventures into a different setting. The spy sent to report 
on activities at court finds his interest drawn instead to people he finds in streets and churches. 
By the end of Marana’s tale, it is life in France and the precarious position of the spy that come 
through as the dominant themes of this text. What Marana’s emphasis on French street life 
introduces to the oriental tale is a focus on a power that reaches beyond the immediate circles at 
court. Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy reflects the emerging power of the public, and not 
coincidentally, a public that finds its strongest articulation in figures of the gossiping female. 
Thus Mahmut notes quite early the importance of mingling with women: 
I have not as yet any Acquaintance with Women, and yet it is necessary I find Means to 
Introduce my self into their Companies. It is a Sex that will not pardon, when they think 
themselves neglected. They are proper to discover Things one would know, and to say 
them when one would have them published; and likewise, they as much penetrate into the 
Secrets of hearts, as the most refined and spiritualest Courtiers. Further, there are many of 
them that can conceal nothing, but what they do not know.33 
The narrator is merciless in his castigation; women are characterized by vanity, intrusiveness, 
and inability to be discreet. But the narrative is quite clear about the power of this group. Women 
facilitate an unrestricted flow of language.  Though relying on different passages from Marana’s 
text, Ros Ballaster finds in Mahmut’s observations a tension between feminine language and the 
masculine gaze: “The axis of sight is paralleled with that of the tongue and language; rigid 
 
33 Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy, 15. 
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control must be exercised over both if they are not to put the user in peril.”34 Living within the 
narrow constraints of a secret identity forces Mahmut into constant acts of dissimulation. As a 
result, argues Ballaster, we find Mahmut struggling against a feminization of his own character: 
“He consistently represents dissimulation as a feminine characteristic displayed by women and 
eunuchs and asserts his preference for honesty and openness.”35 
 Ballaster’s discussion reveals the text’s anxious preoccupation with both the visual and 
the verbal. But we have no reason to believe that the seventeenth-century readers of Marana’s 
text would have made a gendered distinction between the tongue and the eye. The vaguely 
grouped “Women” who “are proper to discover Things one would know, and to say them when 
one would have them published,” are indeed dangerous for their uncontrolled tongues. But they 
are equally dangerous for their uncontrolled pens. Mahmut’s seventeenth-century French 
“Women” are those same “women” who wrote, read, discussed and disseminated the oriental 
romans à clefs that plagued the courts of seventeenth-century France (and continued to do so at 
the time of Marana’s publications).36 Marana replaced the allegorical characters of the roman à 
clef and their carefully contained courts for a discursive structure that seems to have no 
boundaries at all. In this re-imagined Paris, words, wealth and power flow uncontrolled and all 
but unconstrained by the political center of the court. The battle of French authorities to control 
the dissemination of political commentary continued throughout the reign of Louis XIV as 
Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy made its way swiftly around the market centers of Europe. In 
Britain, Marana’s popular tale of a spy in Paris paved the way for a new twist in the oriental tale. 
 
34 Ballaster, 154. 
35 Ballaster, 160. 
36 We must put the term “women” in quotes, however, for whether in Marana’s fiction or in discourse of 
the period, the feminization of the reading public is itself a discursive trope. 
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By the time Galland’s Les Mille et Une Nuits appeared in its first English translation, the British 
marketplace was ready to receive a tale that privileged not politics, but credit.  
 
‘Arabian Nights’ and Infinite Entertainments 
The first English translation of The Thousand and One Nights probably came out in 
London sometime in 1704, though our earliest extant editions are dated 1706.37 As with so many 
of the oriental tales that entered the British marketplace, these stories came in through France. 
Antoine Galland, antiquary to Louis XIV and assistant to Barthélemy d’Herbelot on the 
Bibliothèque orientale ou Dictionnaire universal contenant généralement tout ce qui regarde la 
connaissancedes des peoples de l’Orient, gathered the stories from a number of sources. 
Galland’s linguistic abilities (he had studied Latin, Greek, Turkish, Arabic and Persian) and his 
penchant for rare artifacts led him first to a manuscript version of “The Voyages of Sinbad.” 
Galland had already published an array of treatises and translations related to his experience in 
the Levant, but the success of “Sinbad” prompted him to turn his hand to other tales. Between 
1704 and 1717, Galland published Les Mille et une Nuits in twelve volumes. Galland found the 
majority of these stories in a three- or four-volume manuscript that he had received from Syria, 
known as Alf Layla wa-Layla. 
As Galland’s interests suggest, Alf Layla wa-Layla belonged to a much older Middle 
Eastern culture. Middle Eastern scholars continue to unravel the myriad of origins and 
transmutations of the story cycle that includes settings in India and China as well as Turkey, 
Syria and Iran, and mixes Hindu and Persian names with colloquial Arabic and Arabic poetic 
 
37 Mushin Mahdi’s The Thousand and One Nights (New York: Brill, 1995) provides the most developed 
discussion of origins, translations and publication of the tales in France and Britain. Most of my discussion derives 
from this work. See also Husain Haddawy, “Introduction” to The Arabian Nights: Alf Layla Wa-laylah, trans. 
Husain Haddawy, ed. Mushin Mahdi (New York: Norton, 1995), ix-xxxi. 
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forms. Tales from the cycle can be found in various forms throughout the Near and Middle East 
and, in fact, seem to be related to ancient and medieval narratives from the Western canon.38 
However, the cycle in its most recent forms seems to date back to the medieval period, and the 
places, people and customs that inhabit its stories situate it within the Islamic commercial culture 
of that period. Alf Layla Wa-layla obviously circulated among trading centers in oral form, but it 
also shows signs of having belonged to the strong literary culture in those cities. Galland’s 
Syrian manuscript continued to be one of our earliest textual sources for the tales. But as was the 
case with “Sinbad,” many of the tales had never been part of the cycle until Galland’s translation. 
Galland derived seven of these added tales from conversations with Hana Diab, a Christian Arab 
from Aleppo. We have no source at all for other tales, including “Aladdin,” “Ali Baba and the 
Forty Thieves,” “Prince Ahmed and his Two Sisters,” and “The Ebony Horse,” which leaves 
open the possibility that Galland invented some of the tales in his effort to fill the volumes. In 
any event, the extant volumes of the manuscripts from which Galland worked and his notes from 
the conversations with Hana Diab indicate that Galland took great liberties with his translations, 
at least by twenty-first-century standards. 
 Notwithstanding the dubious origins of much of Galland’s text, it was from Les Mille et 
une Nuits that a Grub Street translator derived the English Arabian Nights’ Entertainments in the 
first years of the eighteenth century. Galland’s volumes were selling well in France, and the 
anonymous Grub Street translators quickly churned out English editions as new volumes 
appeared in the French market. The collection was an immediate success, selling in great 
numbers to the much-disparaged “fair sex,” but also read by Joseph Addison and Alexander 
 
38 Robert Mack comments on possible ties between the tales of Les Mille et Une Nuits and early Western 
literature in the Introduction to the Oxford edition of Arabian Nights’ Entertainments. See also Robert Irwin, The 
Arabian Nights: A Companion (London: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2005). 
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Pope.39 By the middle of the century, Arabian Nights’ functioned as a common touchstone for 
readers of English literature.  
The majority of critical writing on the Arabian Nights’ stories takes some version of a 
comparative cultural approach. That perspective continues to resonate, given our current efforts 
to negotiate differences, alliances, and conflicts in a world that often seems intent on re-dividing 
along religious lines. Thus recent work on Arabian Nights’ includes such titles as The Arabian 
Nights in Transnational Perspective, Literary Modernity Between the Middle East and Europe, 
and The Arabian Nights and Orientalism: Perspectives from East and West.40 In their effort to 
redefine historic relations between the Islamic East and Christian Europe, these texts build on the 
work of Edward Said. 
Though part of a larger effort to examine troubling characterizations of Islam in the 
contemporary U.S. and Europe, Said’s text was seminal in its clear articulation of how categories 
of East and West developed alongside one another in an overwhelmingly European tradition. 
Drawing on Foucault, Said defined orientalism as a self-perpetuating discourse of representations 
that stood in for anything we might identify with the actual cultures, politics, finances, and 
people who inhabited the Islamic regions of the Middle and Near East. The fact that orientalism 
was self-perpetuating, that it circumscribed what was observed and described by Westerners 
abroad just as it created what was imagined about the Islamic East within Western Europe, 
allowed that illusory East to serve as a foil for Western European self-articulations. These self-
 
39 Peter L. Caracciolo, The Arabian Nights in English Literature: Studies in the Reception of The Thousand 
and One Nights (New York: St. Martin’s, 1988). 
40 Ulrich Marzolph, ed. ‘The Arabian Nights’ in Transnational Perspective (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 2007); Kamran Rastegar, Literary Modernity between the Middle East and Europe: Textual 
Transactions in Nineteenth-Century Arabic, English, and Persian Literatures (London: Routledge, 2007); Yuriko 
Yamanaka and Tetsuo Nishio, eds. ‘The Arabian Nights’ and Orientalism: Perspectives from East and West 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2006). See also Wen-chin Ouyang, New perspectives on ‘Arabian Nights’: Ideological 
Variations and Narrative Horizons (London: Routlege, 2005). See also Madeleine Dobie, “Translation in the 
Contact Zone: Antoine Galland’s Mille et une nuits: contes arabes” in The Arabian Nights in Historical Context, 
eds. Saree Makdisi and Felicity Nussbaum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 25-50. 
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articulations in turn led to a now well-explored concept of “otherness” that consigns all Islamic 
culture to a static, timeless existence in contrast with European modernity. In this way the 
Islamic East becomes an early victim of what Johannes Fabian calls asynchronous time, the 
anthropological perspective that carved the earth’s populations into incommensurate zones of  
modern, primitive and past.41 
Many of the themes that Said’s and later studies identify with orientalism are clearly 
evident in the seventeenth and early eighteenth-century texts I have already discussed. To borrow 
again from Ros Ballaster, an eighteenth-century reader might reasonably expect to find in any 
writing about the Islamic East, “luxury, concealed female agency, slave government, cruelty, 
despotism, the will-to-power, religious hypocrisy, and imposture,” with “concealed female 
agency” frequently replaced by a depraved sexuality.42 The same tropes appear in the stories of 
Arabian Nights’ Entertainments. Critics, including Ballaster, point to the collection’s repetitious 
themes and structures and to Scheherazade’s famous deferral of her death sentence as evidence 
that these stories participate in consigning the Islamic East to an imaginary space of temporal 
stasis. Portrayals of a decayed and static East fit orientalist discourse of the late eighteenth 
century, when European empires sought to justify their colonial incursions. But this reading 
makes little sense for the earlier period, in which Britain and France were struggling for a 
foothold in a politically and economically dominant Ottoman Empire. The persistent repetitions 
and deferrals of Arabian Nights’ Entertainments require another explanation. Representations of 
the Islamic East in this period demand a more accurate understanding of their context. 
 
41 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983). 
42 Ballaster 61. See Ballaster’s discussion of the Roxolana and Roxana roles, 59-69. See also Katie 
Trumpener, “Rewriting Roxane: Orientalism and Intertextuality in Montesquieu’s Letters Persanes and Defoe’s The 
Fortunate Mistress”, Stanford French Review 11 (1987): 178. 
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One of two extant copies of a 1706 edition, the volume held at Princeton University 
proclaims on its title page: 
Arabian Nights Entertainments: consisting of one thousand and one stories, told by the 
Sultaness of the Indies, to divert the Sultan from the execution of a bloody vow he had 
made to marry a lady every day, and have her cut off next morning to avenge himself for 
the disloyalty of his first Sultaness, etc. [. . . ] Translated into French from the Arabian 
Mss. By M. Galland, of the Royal Academy; and now done into English.43 
In keeping with England’s seventeenth-century oriental-tale tradition, the title immediately calls 
attention to its textuality; this tale, the advertisement tells us, is about stories borrowed from an 
authenticated manuscript and about the global trade routes to which it belongs.  But Arabian 
Nights’ claims a representational quality in which its predecessors had little interest. Between the 
plot summary and the translation history, the 1706 edition promises to convey an understanding 
of the people and places of the East: “Containing a better account of the customs, manners, and 
religion of the Eastern nations, Tartars, Persians, and Indians, than is to be met with in any 
author hitherto published.”44 This new claim places the edition squarely within the early 
orientalist tradition identified by Said, a tradition in which both fictional and ostensibly non-
fictional texts participating in the making of  a discursive “Orient.” And as Said demonstrates, 
this discursive orient owes more to European efforts toward self-identity than it does to any 
“real” eastern culture. 
 The original stories of Arabian Nights’ did evolve from historically specific pasts and 
places along the trade routes from the Levant to China before being transformed for the French 
market, but the distinctive English edition takes up a British debate about representation and 
 
43  James Holly Hanford, “Open Sesame: Notes on the Arabian Nights in English,” The Princeton 
University Library Chronicle XXVI.1 (Autumn 1964): 48-56, 51. 
44 Hanford, 51. 
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boundaries within the framing tale. The narrator carefully sets out the events that will position 
Scheherazade for her storytelling.45 Two brothers who are sultans of distant kingdoms decide to 
reunite after a long absence from one another. Schahzenan begins the journey to his brother’s 
kingdom but, on a whim, returns to the palace to see his wife one more time. He finds her in his 
bed with a domestic servant, kills the lovers, and proceeds sadly with his journey. Arriving at 
Schahriar’s palace in a state of grief, Schahzenan initially refuses to share the cause of his 
sadness, but spies Schahriar’s wife in her own act of betrayal, this time with a large group of 
ladies and slaves in the courtyard of the palace. Schahzenan reveals to his brother that both have 
been betrayed by their wives, and Schahriar lays in wait the following day to witness his wife’s 
perfidy himself. He watches as the queen and her women unlock the gates of the palace to 
smuggle in an entire group of lovers. In the aftermath, Schahriar is inclined to blame these 
betrayals on his and his brother’s positions of power. He proposes, therefore, to quit their palaces 
and fame. Schahzenan agrees to this proposal only on the condition that the two brothers will 
return to their palaces if they meet with someone less fortunate than they. They do, of course, but 
what the sultans find only reinforces the pattern established by their queens. 
  Having stopped on their journey to rest, the sultans witness an immense genie emerging 
from the sea. In his possession, the genie holds a woman locked within a glass box. The box is 
designed to keep his mistress under his control, but while the genie sleeps, his captive leaves her 
prison and forces the two brothers to copulate with her under the threat that she would wake the 
genie if they did not comply. Having thus engaged in a betrayal of their own, the Sultans return 
to their palaces with the conclusion that women and not fame or fate are the real origin of 
betrayal: “do you not agree that there is no wickedness equal to that of women?” (9). In the 
 
45 Arabian Nights’ Entertainments, ed. Robert L. Mack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). All 
further references to the Arabian Nights’ will be to this edition unless otherwise specified and will be cited by page 
number within the text. 
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context of a genre that was always conscious of print and language, the story of the woman in the 
glass box is suggestive. Like a romans á clef, this box must be unlocked with a key. And for the 
two Sultans, the “contents” are clearly identifiable within their transparent walls. Reading his 
experience like a fable, Schahriar vows to kill each successive wife after one night: “being 
persuaded that no woman was chaste, he resolved, in order to prevent the disloyalty of such as he 
should afterwards marry, to wed one every night, and have her strangled next morning” (9). But 
in reaching this conclusion, the Sultan disregards an alternative interpretation offered by the 
woman in the box: 
You may see by this, that when a woman has formed a project, there is no husband or 
gallant that can hinder her putting it in execution. Men had better not put their wives 
under such restraint, if they have a mind they should be chaste. (9) 
The difficulty of determining a definitive meaning from this story emerges as a pattern once 
Scheherazade enters the framing tale. Scheherazade’s father, the Vizier, tries to dissuade his 
daughter from marrying the Sultan by telling her a fable about a farmer and his wife. In response, 
Scheherazade explains, “I beg you would not take it ill that I persist in my opinion. I am nothing 
moved by the story of that woman. I can tell you abundance of others, to persuade you that you 
ought not to oppose my design (15).” As she begins her thousand and one nights, Scheherazade 
makes no promise of a single, clear meaning behind each of the tales she tells. What the framing 
tale already communicates is uncontrollable nature of meaning. Like the woman in the glass box, 
language by nature surprises, deceives, copulates and produces more stories and more 
interpretations. 
 The collection reinforces the idea of language’s promiscuity in its own narrative 
structures and themes. Arabian Nights’ is permeated by repetitions that begin in the framing tale. 
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Not only are the brothers doubles of one another, but the story of sexual betrayal repeats, 
growing in intensity as the number of illicit lovers increases. Schahriar’s plan continues the 
repetition of sexual liaisons, but controls it by forcing sexual encounters into a lawful (by the 
Sultan’s standards) series of events rather than a proliferation of sexual encounters. 
Scheherazade, of course, offers a different response to the questions raised by those sexual 
betrayals. Her scheme and her tales create a pattern in which trust is temporarily extended in 
return for stories. Scheherazade’s stories seem merely to buy time, but as I will argue, the play of 
time and deferral allowed by trust are the real focus of this story collection. 
My reading suggests that the gender battle set forth in the framing tale of Schahriar and 
Scheherazade and in the embedded tale of the woman and the genie serves to articulate the 
tension between language and meaning in a print culture. Such an interpretation does not conflict 
with the feminist readings that already have been brought to bear on the stories.46 However, the 
collection’s preoccupation with repetition and deferral implicates another layer to our language-
based reading. In her meticulous study of “The Porter and the Three Ladies,” Sandra Naddaff 
argues that the story’s self-conscious use of repetition demands that its readers pay heed to the 
function of time. 
Naddaff’s analysis begins with an Arabic-language version of the tale, but her attention to 
how repetition works with narrative temporality provides a useful starting point for looking at the 
later English tales. In her argument, then, Naddaff breaks down the various types of repetition 
 
46 Eva Sallis, Sheherazade Through the Looking Glass: the Metamorphosis of the ‘Thousand and One 
Nights’ (Richmond: Curzon, 1999); Sandra Naddaff, Arabesque: Narrative Structure and the Aesthetics of 
Repetition in the 1001 Nights (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1991); Fedwa Malti-Douglas, 
“Shahrazâd Feminist” in The Arabian Nights Reader, ed. Ulrich Marzolph (Detriot: Wayne State University Press, 
2006), 347-64; and Susanne Enderwitz, “Shahrazâd Is One of Us: Practical Narrative, Theoretical Discussion, and 
Feminist Discourse” in The Arabian Nights in Transnational Perspective, ed. Ulrich Marzolph (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 2007), 261-78. See also Daniel E. Beaumont, Slave of Desire: Sex, Love, and Death in The 
1001 Nights (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2002). 
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that permeate the story of “The Porter and the Three Ladies.”47 One of the Baghdad stories from 
Galland’s manuscript, “The Porter and the Three Ladies” begins with a clever porter who is 
invited to dine with the three sisters by whom he has been employed that day. Before the evening 
is well underway, three dervishes, all blind in the right eye, come to the door begging entry. 
Next, Haroun Alraschid, the Caliph who ties together many of the Baghdad tales with his 
nocturnal ramblings, arrives at the door claiming to be a merchant. As happens throughout the 
collection of stories, this tale uses its characters as transitions to other nested stories. In this case 
the dervishes have never met and each has a different narration of the journey that brought him 
to this point. The women force each guest to tell his story as punishment for their curiosity. The 
women, after all, interrupt the evening’s merriment to bring out two black dogs, whom they beat 
brutally, though with obvious remorse. The women only tell their own story the following day on 
order of the Caliph. 
The larger plot unfolds in the tension between two impulses. On the one hand, each 
visitor enters the ladies’ courtyard under condition that he will abide by the admonition carved at 
the doorway, “Speak not of what concerns you not, lest you hear what pleases you not.”48 The 
midnight courtyard thus acts as a magical space that opens up the strange occurrences and 
coincidences that occur there, but also attempts to constrain the speech acts that might threaten 
its boundaries. On the other hand, the repetitions of character, event and even word choice work 
to provoke speech, and the Caliph (still disguised as a merchant) demands the ladies’ story in 
spite of the admonition. The sisters respond by requiring stories from their guests on penalty of 
 
47 In Arabian Nights’ Entertainments, the tale is given as “The Story of the three Calendars, Sons of Kings; 
and of the Five Ladies of Baghdad,” 66-140. See also Richard Van Leeumen, “The Art of Interruption: The 
Thousand and Once Nights and Jan Potócki” in New Perspectives on ‘Arabian Nights’: Ideological Variations and 
Narrative Horizons, eds. Wen-chin Ouyang and Geert gan van Gelder (Abbingdon, UK: Routledge 2005), 51-66, for 
a discussion of the collection’s narrative structure. 
48 I am using Naddaff’s translation here, 77. In Arabian Nights’ the characters above the gate read, “He 
who speaks of things that do not concern him, shall hear of things that will not please him,” 71. 
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their lives. In turn, the Caliph calls the sisters to his court the following day to hear their tale. The 
story ends with the Caliph rectifying the injuries that brought the sisters to their strange situation, 
thus creating a single happy ending for the tale. 
Naddaff argues that the story takes the repetitions natural to any narrative and amplifies 
them; the tale “consciously manipulates its repetitive underpinnings, plays with them, mirrors 
and mocks them, so that even the reader who is not particularly sensitive to such manipulation is 
forced to come to terms with its significance.”49 After detailing the types of repetition that 
permeate not only the frame of this tale, but within the various stories themselves, Naddaff 
argues that the multiplication of character, theme, event and sign finally creates “a fundamental 
disturbance and confusion of temporal levels within the work as a whole and the cycle in 
particular.”50 Naddaff goes on to find a parallel between this deliberate destruction of a clear 
narrative temporality and the efforts of the stories’ characters to thwart death: 
The motivating force behind Shahrazad’s telling of the 1001 Nights is, as it is for her 
counterparts in Baghdad, a desire to forestall death, to impede time’s natural flow, to 
ward off the sense of an ending . . . It is ironic but essential that in order to kill time, and 
thereby to avoid the inevitable end of time, the narrators must make time, create narrative 
time. Not surprisingly, they narratively manifest this irony by developing their tales 
according to repetitive structures of story and discourse which counteract the forward 
movement of time and in so doing undercut the fundamental impulse of narrative.51 
Necessarily such efforts must finally fail, and Naddaff concludes that the relatively simple 
progression of the last sister’s narrative marks the slow return to a standard temporal order. In a 
move that Ballaster and others will also follow, Naddaff finally shifts the focus of her argument 
 
49 Naddaff, 64. 
50 Naddaff, 94. 
51 Naddaff, 95. 
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to the power dynamics of gender in this text. The tale’s women, she argues, recognize “a 
discourse that focuses on the female body and on the relation of this body to metaphoric 
language” that allows them to “not only control their own bodies and celebrate their own 
sexuality, but also [to] determine their own language and their own narrative rules” in “an 
alternative society with radically different customs and laws that they themselves have 
determined.”52 
Whether or not we agree with the equation of character and bodies in this final stage of 
the argument, Naddaff’s attention to the relentless play of repetition and time merits further 
consideration. The characters in Arabian Nights’ version (renamed “The Story of the Three 
Calendars, Sons of Kings; and of the Five Ladies of Baghdad”) must use narrative and repetition 
to forestall death. But if we recall this text to its British literary context, we need to ask whether 
repetition and deferral invoke something more specific than a basic human aversion to death. In 
British literature of the early eighteenth century, female characters also are used to invoke the 
powerful discourse of credit.53  Re-examined as a fable of economy, the framing tale 
demonstrates for its British readers the impossibility of controlling the directionless proliferation 
of the long-term credit marketplace; the more direct the efforts at control, the more excessive the 
failure. The complexity of Arabian Nights’ lies in its ability, like a good fable, to serve multiple 
interpretations with equal force. 
The oriental-tale genre in France and Britain was self-conscious about the technique its 
used to represent the real people and events of contemporary politics. The homologous 
 
52 Naddaff, 101-2. 
53 See Sandra Sherman, Finance and Fictionality; Anne Louise Kibbie, “Monstrous Generation: The Birth 
of Capital in Defoe’s Moll Flanders and Roxana,” PMLA 110.5 (October 1995): 1023-34; John Richetti, “An 
Emerging New Canon of the British Eighteenth-Century Novel: Feminist Criticism, the Means of Cultural 
Production, and the Question of Value”; and Terry Mulcaire, “Public Credit; or, the Feminization of Virtue in the 
Marketplace,” PMLA 114.5 (Fall 1999): 1029-42. 
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relationship between meaning and value was always at play in this tradition. As eighteenth-
century financial shifts took hold, however, the question of value gradually came to the fore. 
Political power was increasingly shaped by political-economic thought, and more specifically by 
the long-term financing that sustained Western. Like the wandering Caliph of Baghdad, power in 
the eighteenth century circulated beyond the walls of courts in the crowded streets of trading 
centers. There was no coincidence in the fact that Scheherazade’s first tale portrayed neither 
Sultans nor harems, but a merchant on a long business trip. 
 
Merchants and Genies 
“The Tale of the Merchant and the Genie” tells the story of a merchant who is suddenly 
confronted by a terrifying genie as he stops for a rest by the road. Threatened with immediate 
execution, the merchant asks the cause of the genie’s wrath, to which the genie replies: “did not 
you take dates out of your portmanteau, and as you eat [ate] them, did not you throw the shells 
about on both sides? . . . when you threw your nut-shells about, my son was passing by, and you 
threw one of them into his eye, which killed him” (18). The merchant then begs for a year’s 
reprieve. The genie agrees with great reluctance, doubting the merchant’s promise that he will 
return. Nevertheless, when Scheherazade continues the story on the second night, the merchant 
has been granted a year to settle his estate, free his slaves, and say goodbye to his family. The 
story creates an obvious parallel with Scheherazade’s own predicament. The genie’s reluctance 
to grant the merchant his year reinforces the questions of trust and credibility that we see cast in 
gendered terms within the framing tale. In both cases, the character in a position of power is 
asked to accept words in lieu of the body that he has claimed. 
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As Scheherazade continues the tale these concerns with power, language and trust take on 
a decidedly financial overtone. Despite the cost of fulfilling his own promise, the merchant 
returns to the same spot to die; his promise, all the characters agree, is inviolable. But while the 
merchant waits for the genie to appear, a series of three passersby pause, one after the other, to 
hear the merchant’s unusual story and to witness its outcome. When the genie arrives and moves 
to cut off the head of his victim, the first man intervenes to offer the genie a trade: “I will tell you 
the history of my life, and of the bitch [dog] you see and if you think it more wonderful and 
surprising than the adventure of the merchant you are going to kill, I hope you will pardon the 
poor unfortunate man the third of his crime” (22). After the first tale succeeds, the second and 
third witnesses in turn offer a story, each more wonderful than the last, in return for a pardon of 
another third of the merchant’s crime. The first two stories involve human beings who are 
transmogrified into animals as punishment for their crimes and are then cared for by their human 
victims. The last witness’ story, however, remains a mystery to Scheherazade’s listeners as she 
only promises that it was, in fact, more wonderful even than the two stories of transformation 
told by the other witnesses. 
“The Tale of the Genie and the Merchant” thus begins with a simple exchange of one life 
for another and becomes a complex transaction in which the one-year “loan” of a life produces 
an unlooked-for value in the form of three stories. The genie agrees to divide the value of the 
merchant’s life, trading a third of its value for each story. However, since each story must be 
more wonderful than the previous one, each third of the merchant’s culpability is of comparably 
greater value. The plot structure thereby extends the original “trade” of lives in time and in scope 
such that the merchant’s life serves as a sort of capital asset on which interest is paid in the form 
of stories. Because each story must provide more pleasure than the previous one, the witnesses’ 
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tales produce a steady accumulation in value. And thanks to Scheherazade’s refusal to tell the 
last of these nested tales, the final value of these stories is left open; the audience is invited to 
imagine a story that produces infinite pleasure to the genie and the witnesses. 
We could catalogue “The Tale of the Genie and the Merchant” as one more story about 
stories and dismiss the commercial implications of the merchant character, but in fact, merchants 
and traders are ubiquitous in Arabian Nights’ Entertainments. Nor should this come as any 
surprise, given the commercial contexts in which these tales evolved. As recent scholars remind 
us, the Ottoman Empire and neighboring states all of the way to China sustained themselves with 
revenue from the port cities, entrepôts and land routes that for centuries constituted the world’s 
largest and most elaborate commercial network. These regions produced their own credit 
cultures in which financial success generally entailed capital investment in an assortment of 
enterprises. Long before French and British merchants maneuvered for a share of the global trade 
in the eighteenth century, cities like Aleppo, Baghdad, Cairo, and Constantinople grew large and 
rich from the far-flung trade routes of Asia, North Africa and the Middle and Near East. The 
medieval and early-modern stories that Galland fashioned into a European collection belonged to 
a much earlier period of economic growth in the Eastern hemisphere, but resonated with the later 
growth of trade in Western European states.54 
In many ways, the cultural assumptions needed to fuel these two periods of commercial 
expansion were similar. One must begin, for instance, with the simple assumption that the 
tendency of value to change across time and space can be harnessed to produce wealth. Such an 
assumption comes naturally in a region that gleans its revenue off the transportation of goods 
 
54 Scholars note that the tales of Alf Layla wa Layla had lost their popularity in the Eastern trading centers 
by the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Arabic scholars point to the tales’ subject matter and 
vernacular dialect as indications that they never belonged to the established literary tradition, though Robert Irwin 
rightfully points out that the stories existed in manuscript form and so reflect both written and oral literary 
conventions. See Robert Irwin’s survey of the tales’ reception history in The Arabian Nights: A Companion. 
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from places where they can be purchased cheaply to markets where they can be sold for a profit. 
Likewise, the very susceptibility of markets to disaster or windfall makes time an important tool 
in the search for financial opportunity. Marxist criticism has elaborated on how such markets 
reinforce our understanding of value as relative and produce the concept of the fungible 
commodity. But I am more concerned here with the relatively straightforward relationship that 
these tales create between financial value and narrative.  
Scheherazade’s first tale creates a parity amongst saleable goods, stories and bodies by 
placing them all amongst the wide net of commodities. This in turn allows the tale to make a 
point about how value emerges from the interchange of unlike goods and allows Scheherazade to 
demonstrate the importance of trust, or more specifically of crediting, to the workings of  this 
system. The genie’s dilemma models the question posed in a slightly different fashion by 
Scheherazade’s one thousand tales: can words stand guarantor for the bodies that create them? 
As in other British literature of the period, textual bodies emphasize the double nature of text as 
both a part of the material world and part of the immaterial world of language. In a system that 
depends on both political and financial texts to bind these two worlds together, textual bodies 
often signal an anxiety about the ability of words to maintain these bonds and likewise about the 
credibility of those who produce text. Scheherazade’s story works to convince the listener that 
the ties between credit and credibility can produce more than they would destroy. 
Scheherazade’s merchant understands the inviolability of his oath and the importance of 
credibility within a larger economic system. His promise stands in for and guarantees the 
presence of a physical object (in this case, the body of the merchant himself) that will not be 
physically present until a designated time in the future. And to the extent that the merchant 
fulfills his promise, that future claims a certain predictability. However, this is where the 
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similarities between the early-modern Ottoman trade culture and its later British counterpart 
ends. Where eighteenth-century British culture built its financial systems on the predictability of 
a mathematical future, the stories of Alf Layla wa-Layla describe a commercial culture that finds 
opportunity in the unpredictability of a future shaped by the divine. Arabian Nights’ reflects its 
stories’ origins in their valorization not just of trust, but also of risk. The most successful of the 
merchants and traders in the tales eschew the careful long-term planning of a Robinson Crusoe 
for the more immediate prospects of the unknown. One such tale, “The Story of Cogia Hassan 
Alhabbal,” introduces a poor rope trader turned wealthy merchant by the economic experiments 
of two friends. In Alhabbal’s story, the wealthier man gives the rope trader capital to invest in his 
trade. A series of chance events robs Alhabbal of his capital, including a bird who swoops down 
to steal from his head the turban in which he has hidden the money. Finally, the poorer man 
gives Alhabbal only a bar of lead. The lead’s usefulness on a particular evening sets off an 
equally bizarre series of events that finally bring Alhabbal his enormous wealth and win the 
poorer man his bet. 
In “The Story of the Sleeper Awakened,” the emphasis on luck shifts to an emphasis on 
cleverness and trickery. A merchant’s son lavishes half of his inheritance on entertainments, only 
to discover that the friends he gains through his generosity depart as soon as his money runs out. 
Like Schahriar, the merchant’s son from “The Sleeper” attempts to solve the problem of false 
friends by swearing to spend no more than a single evening with any acquaintance. But on the 
evening he happens to choose the disguised Caliph for his evening company, Abon Hassan falls 
prey to one of Caliph Haroun Alraschid’s practical jokes. Slipping a drug into his companion’s 
drink, the Caliph has Hassan transported to the palace where an elaborate production by those at 
court convinces the victim that he has become the Caliph. The next day, he is returned 
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unconscious to his home, but is unable to recover from the illusion. After a stay in a lunatic 
asylum, poor Hassan is rescued by Alraschid, who reveals the truth behind his trick and favors 
Hassan with a place at court and a wife. The irony of the story is that Hassan learns again to be a 
spendthrift. When he and his wife run out of money to support their expensive habits, they raise 
cash by deceiving the Caliph and his wife with an illusion that the Sultan fortunately finds more 
entertaining than offensive. Specifically, Hassan pretends that his wife has died, presents her 
corpse to the Caliph and receives gifts in consolation. On the same day, Hassan’s wife tells the 
Sultaness that it is Hassan who has died as presents his corpse. The trick creates confusion 
between the Caliph and his wife until the ruse is revealed and the Caliph rewards Hassan and his 
spouse for their cleverness. If a lesson is to be learned from “The Sleeper Awakened,” it is surely 
not that wealth must be saved or closely managed. Success in the world that these characters 
inhabit belongs to those who are more resourceful than reasonable, more clever than cautious. 
In creating his own collection of these stories, Galland chose to play up the elements of 
risk and chance. To the surprising adventures of Caliph Haroun Alraschid and his subjects, 
European editions added “The Story of Ali Baba, and the forty Thieves destroyed by a Slave” 
and, of course, “Aladdin; or the Wonderful Lamp.” Like the seven-part “Story of Sindbad the 
Sailor,” these tales depict wealth as something to be found, happened upon, and seized in the 
most unlikely of circumstances. Any culture for which wealth brings both luxury and power is 
bound to find such stories appealing. But the depictions of wealth in these tales have something 
more to tell us about the early-eighteenth-century cultures that read them so avidly. Added by 
Pétit de la Croix at the request of Galland’s publisher after the success of the first four volumes, 
“The History of Prince Zeyn Alasnam, and the King of the Genii” tells the story of a young 
prince who turns spendthrift after his father’s death, leaving his mother to hold together a 
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rebellious kingdom. Unconcerned, Zeyn loses himself in a series of dreams that lead him in 
search of a great treasure. The dreams finally lead him to the king of the genies, who orders the 
prince to bring him a virgin who is perfectly pure of heart in return for granting him an 
unimaginable fund of riches. The genie also demands of him a condition; “She must also be 
perfectly beautiful, and you so much master of yourself, as not even to desire to enjoy her, as you 
are conducting her hither” (579). The prince’s task is to gather up this rare treasure and to receive 
her solely as a commodity for exchange, rather than as an object of desire. At the end of the story 
the genie awards the prince with both the wealth and the virgin, the prince having successfully 
made the transition from thoughtless spendthrift to well-controlled capitalist. 
In this tale of risk and capital, the prince’s desire serves a necessary function. Sexual 
desire was a regular component in seventeenth-century oriental tales, where it was used to denote 
the unstable shifts of political power. Just as the fictional bodies in these early tales were prone 
to equally swift gains and losses in political clout as players in the game crossed from one court 
into another, the bodies and goods of Arabian Nights’ belonged to a world in which commercial 
value fluctuated within a ceaselessly changing context. But we might better identify Prince 
Zeyn’s desire as anticipation. A story like “The History of Prince Zeyn” does not tell us much 
about the psychological experience of desire, but it can tell us a tremendous amount about the 
needs of the financial systems in which its readers operated. The difference between the virgin 
and the genie’s treasure is, for modern readers, disturbingly slight. Within this tale both are 
simply textual characters that denote exchangeable goods, and both derive their enormous value 
from their rarity. But unlike his thirst for treasure, Zeyn’s desire for the virgin threatens to 
destroy her value as a commodity. In her relation to Zeyn’s character, the virgin elicits an 
approach to wealth that prefigures its own end. The Prince already has found the limits to his 
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own coffers; if he is to avoid the destruction of yet another source of wealth, he must identify a 
form of value that promises continuing, perhaps even infinite, rewards. 
“The History of Prince Zeyn” challenges its reader to discriminate between two forms of 
desire, one that is self-terminating and a second that is productive. In their analysis of desire in a 
capitalist economy, Deleuze and  Guattari begin by insisting that desire  “is never an 
undifferentiated instinctual energy.”55 Inseparable from the social, political and economic 
“assemblages” that constitute our world, desire is a productive force that (except in the case of 
the schizophrenic) is alternately shaped, thwarted and re-directed by capitalism.56 Deleuze and 
Guattari’s work thus places desire in correspondence with the potentials and capacities of human 
beings on the one hand, and at the heart of a system that perverts those capacities on the other.57 
Arguing that desire is shaped by and invested in the social systems we inhabit, Deleuze and 
Guattari privilege pre-conscious desire over conscious interest or the psychoanalytic unconscious 
in the formation of the individual and the social system. Desire, then, escapes from the 
confinement of Lacanian imaginary order and blends the Lacanian “real” with the flow of 
semiotic fields. 
Given their formulation of desire, Deleuze and Guattari necessarily confront the fact that 
desire can always take two directions. Because it belongs to the social machine, desire can have a 
conservative effect by pulling individuals or groups back toward the mechanisms that formed 
 
55 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 215. Deleuze and Guattari’s work is a critique 
of Freudian and Lacanian concepts of desire. There is, however, a rich tradition of literary studies that use 
psychoanalytic and Hegelian frameworks to articulate how desire functions in Western perceptions of the East. See 
Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon, 1978); Robert Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity, Theory and 
Race (London: Routledge, 1994); and Jyoti Puri, Women, Body, Desire in Post-colonial India: Narratives of Gender 
and Sexuality (New York: Routledge, 1999). 
56 Deleuze and Guattari would make a distinction between a system and an assemblage, arguing that the 
various manifestations of the social, political and economic in our world are neither fixed nor unified as the word 
“system” implies. Nonetheless, I use the term system throughout this discussion for clarity. 
57 Deleuze and Guattari do not distinguish clearly between desire and human drives, but argue that the 
“affects or drives form part of the infrastructure itself.” Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 63. 
 167 
them. But desire can also allow individuals to “take flight,” and when it does this, desire rides the 
currents of capitalism’s fluid de-territorialization.58 In Toward a Minor Literature, Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that Kafka seized upon this latter form of desire in his novels as the only 
resistance to a social-political machine that has harnessed revolutionary desire. The thematic and 
structural proliferation that pervades Kafka’s novels serve to “accelerate the speed of 
segmentalization,” already underway in capitalism.59 Citing Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari 
describe literature in this vein as “less a mirror than a watch that is running too fast. Since there 
is no way to draw a firm distinction between the oppressors and the oppressed or between the 
different sorts of desire, one has to seize all of them in an all-too-possible future.”60 Deleuze and 
Guattari offers a critical perspective from which we can begin to explain the intertwining of 
semiotics, financial value and desire in the tales of Arabian Nights’.  The protagonist in “The 
History of Prince Zeyn” clearly is meant to learn the value of capital as a commodity, and in the 
process he learns that capitalism functions through a desire re-directed toward the future. As the 
character’s dream-visions indicate, this future is not defined by a binary between reality and 
imagination, but by its existence in an indistinguishable flux of reality and semiotics that is, in 
some sense already present. 
As “The History of Prince Zeyn” casts its reader both backward and forward to the 
framing tale of Scheherazade and Schahriar, the text reminds us that material reality and the 
world of signs and symbols is conflated in this rapidly progressing marketplace. Like Prince 
Zeyn, Schahriar must master a different relationship to the woman before him, one that produces 
not treasure, but text. As we might expect from Arabian Nights’ patterns of repetition, the self-
 
58 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1986), 56-60. 
59 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, 58. 
60 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, 59 
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terminating quality of Schahriar’s desire finds a parallel in the traditional allegorical form of the 
fable. The Vizier’s original use of allegory to dissuade his daughter from her project works in 
just this way; once the analogue is opened and unpacked, the fable itself becomes superfluous, 
valueless. Scheherazade has argued that the fable does not in fact function in this manner, that 
for every fable that reaches one conclusion she can find countless others that reach the opposite 
conclusion. Allegory does not reduce narrative to a single fixed meaning, but that is not to say 
that allegory does not work. Jayne Elizabeth Lewis’ study demonstrates how the fable can create 
a bounded space in which conflict can be allowed a limited but necessary play. Scheherazade’s 
nested, winding, proliferating fables suggest a genre that resists even this notion of boundaries. 
Narrative always creates doors through which new characters, new events and new 
interpretations can enter, and Scheherazade’s tales open those doors time and again to remind us 
that no narrative ever necessitates its own ending and that no transaction is never “final.” 
This infinite potential of narrative does not simply mirror the infinite production of value 
promised by credit and capitalism. For early eighteenth-century Britain, the relationship between 
sign and meaning that makes allegory work becomes the means by which capitalism fulfills its 
promise of endless desire and presumably, endless wealth. To collapse sign into meaning is to 
bring an end to the story, or in the financial world of credit notes, to exhaust or redeem. On the 
other hand, a representational language system, like a representational currency, can produce 
nothing but that which it represents. In between these two extremes, however, lies a type of 
language that can produce what never was and give it existence in the material world. Early 
eighteenth-century capitalism was heavily colored by a print culture and economic model that 
together resisted any boundaries being placed between the material and the textual world.61 The 
 
61 Recent scholarship in Consumer culture emphasizes links between social information systems and the 
material world. Much of this overlaps with Baudrillard’s concept of sign value. See Grant David McCracken, 
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physical body participated in this framework such that, even when bodies were not being directly 
exchanged for money or goods, they could be deployed to produce sign value or transmuted into 
text. This fact helps us to explain the strange link between bodies and words that permeates 
Arabian Nights’ Entertainments, but also gives us those images and descriptions of eighteenth-
century bodies clothed in Eastern-inspired garb. 
Briton’s financial revolution created a future that was mathematically present. That future 
could exist and produce its own realities only through an interlocking semiotics of language and 
mathematics. Stories like that of Prince Zeyn reflect the penultimate step in the shift over to a 
new marketplace dynamic between sign and value. The young prince’s tale demonstrates the 
difference between an approach to wealth that produces more wealth and an approach that 
produces only its own endings. In the framing tale of Schahriar and Scheherazade, Arabian 
Nights’ Entertainments reminds us that the immense treasure that Prince Zeyn obtains is no 
material treasure at all, but is composed of mere words on a page. The fables’ insistence on a 
correlation between language and bodies tells us that what Schahriar gains by deferring his 
wife’s execution is more substantial than mere words, or conversely, that Schahriar and 
Scheherazade are themselves less substantial than actual bodies. We can note that Schahriar’s 
delay provides his spouse with the time necessary to produce heirs, but these pregnancies and 
births are left out of the English-language editions of the tales. They are left out because they are 
immaterial (one cannot avoid the pun here); the tales privilege anticipation over consummation, 
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nurturing a relationship with the material world that emphasizes the extent to which all that is 
material is also in some sense sign.  So long as one sign-object leads to another, the tales seem to 
say, there is no end to anticipation, no end to pleasures, and no end to production. Arabian 
Nights’ Entertainments illustrates how this dynamic creates an infinite potential for new stories 
and new pages, but also for more editions with greater sales. Quite appropriately, that 
proliferation will continue three hundred years later with movie deals as the stories merge again 
and again with the material world of our sensory experience. 
Within a few decades of the first editions of Arabian Nights’ Entertainments, the oriental 
tale was shifting again to re-envision the relationship of bodies to things and the relation of the 
human mind to time. As Britain entered the second half of the eighteenth century, texts that once 
had enjoyed widespread popularity were considered crude and inappropriate by those espousing 
a more regulated British body.62 My final chapter looks at three authors who were instrumental 
in adapting the oriental tale to mid-century aesthetics and anxieties. In tales by Samuel Johnson, 
John Hawkesworth and Francis Sheridan, we see early efforts to distance the physical body from 
the sign world of the marketplace and, not coincidentally, from the conceptual future of 
mathematical time. 
 
62 For a seminal study on this shift, see Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, The Politics and Poetics of 









The Oriental Tale and the Future as Illusion: 
Johson’s Rasselas, Hawkesworth’s Almoran and Hamet, and Frances Sheridan’s Nourjahad 
 
 For all of the magicians, genies and tricksters that inhabit its pages, the stories of Arabian 
Nights’ Entertainments show only the slightest interest in the power of illusion. Magic is always 
real, and with only one or two exceptions, those who believe in the unbelievable are proved right 
in the end. The oriental-tale tradition remained strong into the middle of the century, later 
reshaping itself under the cultural forces of Romantic thought. But by mid-century, oriental tales 
increasingly set aside the play of meaning and value so evident in earlier texts for an anxious 
new focus on illusion. More than a convenient literary trope or a commentary on the plight of 
mankind, the dangerous illusions that we find in mid-century oriental tales stem from a re-
characterization of the body and its relation to the material world. From Johnson’s Rasselas and 
John Hawkesworth’s Almoran and Hamet to Francis Sheridan’s Nourjahad, oriental tales begin 
the process of separating the physical and material from the world of text and sign, and they do 
so most often at the level of the human body. In the process, these texts attack the mathematical 
time constructs that bind the future to an infinitely expansive present and leave us instead with a 





In an often-quoted passage, Rasselas’ teacher, Imlac, succumbs to a moment of 
enthusiasm as he explains to his pupil the task of poets. The poet, he explains, examines 
“species” rather than individual characteristics and notes “general properties and large 
appearances”: 
he does not number the streaks of the tulip, or describe the different shades in the verdure 
of the forest. He is to exhibit in his portraits of nature such prominent and striking 
features, as recall the original to every mind; and must neglect the minuter 
discriminations, which one may have remarked, and another have neglected, for those 
characteristicks which are alike obvious to vigilance and carelessness.1 
Imlac’s definition positions the poet somewhere between literary aesthetics and scientific 
discourse, between language and taxonomy, often associated with neoclassical thought. Johnson 
himself undeniably claims a place in that mid-eighteenth-century effort to categorize and 
universalize secular knowledge, and this project surfaces throughout Rasselas.  
Johnson’s tendencies toward empiricism and even skepticism have been well 
documented, and they can make his concepts of universal knowledge difficult to establish.2 
Johnson’s work makes clear that universal knowledge must be derived from local, experiential 
 
1 The History of Rasselas, ed. D.J. Enright (London: Penguin, 1976), 61-2. All other references are to this 
edition and are cited by page number within the text. 
2 See for instance, Jack Lynch, “Samuel Johnson, Unbeliever,” Eighteenth-Century Life 29.3 (2005): 1-19; 
Robert Voitle, Samuel Johnson, the Moralist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 168–80; Martin Maner, 
The Philosophical Biographer: Doubt and Dialectic in Johnson's "Lives of the Poets" (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1988), esp. 32–56; Fred Parker, "The Skepticism of Johnson's Rasselas," in The Cambridge 
Companion to Samuel Johnson, ed. Greg Clingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 127–42; Fred 
Parker, Scepticism and Literature: An Essay on Pope, Hume, Sterne, and Johnson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 232–81. Similarly, critics have approached the tension in Johnson’s conception of literature and knowledge 
as a blending of classicism and empiricism. See Walter Jackson Bate, The Achievement of Samuel Johnson (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1955). 
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knowledge, whether he is grounding the aesthetic standards of the critic or the moral conclusions 
of characters. A recent article by Mark Wildermuth demonstrates the importance of articulating 
an interplay of scientific and aesthetic discourses when framing Johnson’s effort. Wildermuth 
borrows from eighteenth-century science and twenty-first-century chaos theory to describe 
Johnson as “an early modern chaologist.”3 According to Wildermuth, Johnson responds “to the 
perturbations introduced by science and philosophy in the eighteenth century” by articulating “a 
complex mimetic system tracing emergent structures in the field of literary criticism implicated 
by the interplay between classical tradition and the new empirical skepticism.”4 Wildermuth is 
primarily concerned with Johnson’s critical work, but his foray into science suggests a more 
obvious context for Rasselas. Johnson’s struggle to identify critical standards might foreshadow 
chaos theory, but the process by which he isolates the qualities of the human mind are more 
resonant of eighteenth-century botany. Whether Johnson knew anything of his contemporary, 
Carl Linnaeus, the search for what Imlac would call the “original” traits of human experience 
takes on distinct Linnean overtones.5 
The analogy is not perfect, of course. Where Linnaeus sought to find a universal set of 
classifications into which all plants could be fit, Johnson strives in Rasselas to articulate a single 
human nature, and specifically the aspect of that nature that constitutes the human mind’s 
relationship to the future. In his introduction to the tale, Johnson addresses those readers who 
expect too much from the future: 
 
3 Mark E. Wildermuth, “Samuel Johnson and the Aesthetics of Complex Dynamics,” The Eighteenth 
Century: Theory and Interpretation 48.1 (Spring 2007): 45-60, 46. 
4 Wildermuth, 46. 
5 In his biography of Johnson, Lawrence I. Lipking notes that Johnson is not known to have owned any of 
Linneaus’ works or to have met the scientist during Linnaeus’ visit to England. Samuel Johnson: The Life of an 
Author (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), n.64, p. 123. 
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Ye who listen with credulity to the whispers of fancy, and persue with eagerness the 
phantoms of hope; who expect that age will perform the promises of youth, and that the 
deficiencies of the present day will be supplied by the morrow; attend to the history of 
Rasselas prince of Abissinia. (39) 
The tale, of course, produces a series of disappointments for its characters as they journey to find 
a life that brings happiness. And while the survey of urban and pastoral, wealthy and poor lives, 
offers a myriad of particular reasons for disappointment, the real culprit in the story is the human 
mind’s flawed approach to the secular future. Noting the unattainable nature of happiness in this 
tale as well as the universalizing discourse in Imlac’s speech on poets, Samuel T. Joeckel argues 
that Johnson is simply shifting the search for universal standards from criticism to human 
experience: 
Such a conception, transposed into Johnson’s other discourse, works to universalize 
happiness into a type, not unlike the men and women of Shakespeare. Happiness 
becomes a transcontextual experience, unattainable precisely because it devalues the 
particularities, peculiarities, and individualities that are often the locus of true 
experiences of happiness. Working to encompass everybody, happiness “naturalized” 
touches nobody.6 
Joeckel’s point that happiness as an experience emerges as a “type” in Johnson’s writing is well-
taken; Rasselas performs similar tricks with parenthood, poverty, fear, and a number of other 
aspects of life that its characters come to know as stock experiences. What makes happiness, or 
more accurately the false anticipation of happiness, most interesting in Johnson’s tale is that it is 
not simply one type of experience among many, but the primary experience of human existence. 
 
6 Samuel T. Joeckel, “Narratives of Hope, Fictions of Happiness: Samuel Johnson and Enlightenment 
Experience” Christianity and Literature 53.1 (Autumn 2003): 19-38, 26. 
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Much as the sexual organ of flowers serves as the essential means for identifying and classing an 
entire planet’s worth of botanicals, this illusory desire is at the center of Johnson’s understanding 
of the human species. 
 Johnson’s argument that the imaginative relationship to the future modeled in Rasselas is 
central to human experience begins with his choice of genre. Fables in the British tradition have 
always nourished an exaggerated sense their own textuality. During the seventeenth century, 
fables invited readers to see the text’s (and its characters’) dual existence in the material world of 
objects and bodies and in the immaterial world of language. But the title-page advertisement for 
Arabian Nights’ Entertainments showed that this framework already was beginning to slip by the 
opening decade of the eighteenth century. Readers most likely experienced the text as a printed 
story collection and as a luxury good. Now, however, fictional texts could promise to convey 
knowledge about the “real” customs and manners of people in the East. By mid-century, fables 
worked within a different understanding of the place of text. Rather than affirming a bond to the 
material world through its allegorical references to historically people and events, Johnson’s text 
provides him distance from his subject and from all of the cultural and contextual specificity of 
the world outside the tale. Johnson’s fable uses its self-conscious textuality to mark its subject, 
not as typographic, but as type. Much as a botanist’s sketch will detach its subject from climate 
and environment to isolate it on a blank background, Johnson’s allegory extracts its subject from 
the cultural specificity of politics, trade, and luxury marketplaces (even as Johnson offers his 
story to that very marketplace). 
But Johnson has a problem in that his subject is not visible; the central theme in Rasselas 
is a persistent and always unsatisfied desire that exists solely in the immaterial world of the 
human imagination. For botanists, the troublesome context from which their subjects needed to 
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be isolated was conceived largely in terms of place and space. Place needed to be de-localized 
and universalized into pure space. Johnson must wrestle instead with a specificity of time, and he 
does so through forms of history: that of the species and that of the human mind.7  These two 
frames develop simultaneously in the story, but I begin with Johnson’s species history. 
Like the artists of eighteenth-century botanical studies, Johnson needs a canvas uniform 
enough to show his “original” in its purest type. Johnson finds that canvas in a version of history 
that is only coming into its own at the mid-century. Time in this formulation is a scientist’s table, 
history spread out over centuries so that patterns and commonalities can be identified as 
simultaneous and thus ever-present. With an historical time that surpasses any effort to imagine 
its scope, Johnson presents as unchanging those aspects of the human mind about which he is 
concerned. Thus after his protagonists have completed their study of the present inhabitants of 
Cairo and its surroundings, Johnson turns their attention from novelty to history:  
You wander about a single city, which, however large and diversified, can now afford 
few novelties, and forget that you are in a country, famous among the earliest monarchies 
for the power and wisdom of its inhabitants; a country where the sciences first dawned 
that illuminate the world, and beyond which the arts cannot be traced of civil society or 
domestick life. (103) 
Imlac then leads his students on a trip out to the pyramids in order to provide them with evidence 
of this past. Notably, they are not looking for evidence of the Egyptian past, but evidence of the 
human past: “to see men we must see their works, that we may learn what reason has dictated, or 
passion has incited, and find what are the most powerful motives of action” (104). 
 
7 Paul Alkon, “Johnson and Time Criticism,” Modern Philology 85.4 (May,1988): 543-57, surveys some of 
Johnson’s uses of time, arguing that time in Johnson’s criticism most often carries a beneficial association with truth 
and in Johnson’s other work often denotes healing or a beneficent view of mortality. 
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This understanding of history differs considerably from the ways in which we as twenty-
first-century readers are likely to think of it. Johnson’s narrator never shows any interest in 
establishing a line of continuity from the historical past to the present. Instead, the historian 
distills all information into knowledge that emerges as timeless natural law. Writing about an 
oriental tale published in The Rambler, Carey McIntosh captures the way in which Johnson’s 
allegory makes use of history: “Johnson’s allegory . . . approaches the choice of life from the 
largest of perspectives; it outlines the history of some of the human imperfections that sabotage 
the quest for a secure sublunary refuge.”8  Johnson’s historical time operates as an expansive 
representational field in which we might discern the “general properties and large appearances” 
of the human being stripped of cultural differences. As a result, Rasselas’ use of Eastern settings 
has the effect of eliminating exoticism and subordinating cultural particularity. Claiming that 
“Human life is every where a state in which much is to be endured, and little to be enjoyed,” 
Johnson’s tale does not concern itself with the differences in place, much less with the specifics 
of Ottoman or Persian territories (65).  
And yet Johnson’s text relies on the cultural specificity of its eastern setting to prove its 
case. The previous century of oriental tales had used perceived similarities in the religious, 
political and economic dynamics of East and West. Johnson needs a different quality from his 
“Orient,” a sense of long duration. The function of the Islamic East in Johnson’s tale thus differs 
significantly from its function in earlier oriental tales.9 Johnson certainly makes use of the 
 
8 Carey McIntosh, The Choice of Life: Samuel Johnson and the World of Fiction (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1973),115. See also John A. Vance, Samuel Johnson and the Sense of History (Athens: University 
of Georgia Press, 1984). 
9 But see Rajani Sudan, “Mud, Mortar, and Other Technologies of Empire,” The Eighteenth-Century: 
Theory and Interpretation 45.2 (Summer 2004):147-69, in which the author places Rasselas and Pope’s “Windsor 
Forest” in context with British imperial ambitions in India. See also Clement Hawes, “Johnson and Imperialism” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Samuel Johnson, ed. Greg Clingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 114-26; and John Wiltshire, “’From China to Peru’: Johnson in the Traveled World” in The Cambridge 
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oriental tale’s association with sexual desire and absolute power (the abduction of Pekuah 
provides the tale with at least one harem). And the lead characters’ journey across a landscape 
dotted by commercial centers shows Johnson’s indebtedness to Arabian Nights’ Entertainments. 
But Johnson’s real interest in the Orient lies in its long past. The scarce comparative work that 
does go on in Rasselas indicates that by mid-century, Britons were beginning to imagine 
themselves as the greater commercial power. Imlac explains to his student: 
In enumerating the particular comforts of life we shall find many advantages on the side 
of the Europeans. They cure wounds and diseases with which we languish and perish. We 
suffer inclemencies of weather which they can obviate. They have engines for the 
despatch of many laborious works… And, if we descend to the privacies of life, their 
habitations are more commodious, and their possessions are more secure. (65) 
Clearly, Johnson expects his British audience to pride themselves on their superior technologies 
and wealth.10 But Imlac is careful to note that the ascendancy of Europe is only a small point in 
the great expanse of human history. Johnson sidesteps any suggestions of a progressive history 
when his teacher offers no reason for the European rise beyond “the unsearchable will of the 
Supreme Being” (64).  Johnson’s East is not a place of commercial dominance, nor a space of 
luxury or voluptuousness, despite the utopic descriptions of the Happy Valley. This Orient is 
morally very much the same as the Europe with which it is compared; as Imlac would say, 
Europe and the Eastern Empires are of the same “species.” By tapping into the longer history of 
civilization in North Africa and the Middle East, Johnson can deploy his East as evidence that 
 
Companion, 209-23. Christopher Hodgkins reads Rasselas as a critique of imperial ambitions in Reforming Empire: 
Protest Colonialism and Conscience in British Literature (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2002). 
10 The year of Rasselas’ publication coincidentally witnessed seminal military successes in both North 
America and in India. In addition, Britain had begun to make more substantial inroads into the trade routes and 
markets under Ottoman control, thus contributing to a British imagining of military and economic superiority for the 
first time. For recent work on the Ottoman empire during the period, see Colin Imber, Keiko Kiyotaki and Rhoads 
Murphey, eds., Frontiers of Ottoman Studies, 2 vols (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005). 
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certain traits have always been present and are therefore essential to human nature, a conceptual 
maneuver that normalizes the marketplace dynamics with which Johnson was familiar. 
We must not mistake Rasselas’s contextually neutral East for an expression of cultural 
tolerance on Johnson’s part, and it is certainly no less problematic than depictions of  Eastern 
nations as threatening, irreligious or perverse.  Johnson’s use of Eastern history as a site for 
scientific survey invokes the same assumptions about local culture and resources that funded the 
horticultural ventures of the period. Beth Fowkes Tobin has demonstrated how horticultural 
projects and botanical images served to subordinate local knowledge and local contexts, thus 
nourishing Britain’s underlying justifications for colonial management.11 Johnson’s text 
undoubtedly plays its part in Britain’s evolving ideas about the nations to Europe’s east, but 
Rasselas is more directly concerned with the management of people at home. In her discussion 
of political-economic discourse, Mary Poovey argues that early eighteenth-century efforts to 
collect, classify and use political-economic data gave way to an emphasis on moral philosophy in 
the middle part of the century.12 According to Poovey, changing perceptions about the nature and 
mechanisms of political power ushered in new approaches to managing Britain’s populations. 
Where seventeenth-century Stuart monarches imagined that an absolute monarchy might govern 
the nation’s finances and trade with the assistance of political economy, a limited monarchy and 
more powerful public required a different tack. Thus Poovey tracks through the works of Defoe 
and Hume a new emphasis on human taste and emulation as a means of understanding and 
 
11 Beth Fowkes Tobin, Colonizing Nature: The Tropics in British Arts and Letters, 1760-1820 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 144-97. 
12 Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and 
Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
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guiding human behavior.13 We might add to this list Johnson’s troubled fascination with 
anticipation and desire. 
Johnson’s use of vast historical timeframes to isolate his subject still leaves him with one 
more time experience that must become universal before he can identify the true nature of its 
“original.” This second version of time lies within the human mind in the act of anticipation. For 
this history, Johnson develops a protagonist who will model the journey from a full, embodied 
present to a time construct in which the mind perpetually strays into past and future, leaving the 
present behind. The Happy Valley provides a spatial metaphor for the unadulterated present. 
Within its walls, residents mark time’s passage only by a series of delights and pleasures that 
come in abundance. Neither Rasselas nor those around him have any reason to think of the future 
or to recall the past. The Valley thus represents the satisfaction of all possible anticipations: a 
place in which future prospects are fully redeemed in the present and where time itself has little 
value or purpose. The original crisis in the text arises from the protagonist’s inability to be 
content with such a perpetually full present. Unaccountably disgusted with his life, Rasselas 
begins to isolate himself from those around him. Though Rasselas first appears unique in his 
discontentment, we later learn that none of the Valley’s residents are truly happy; this sort of 
contentment is impossible for human beings.14 And Johnson has his protagonist compare the 
insatiability of human appetites with those of the animals that populate the edges of the valley.  
The protagonist’s discontent serves as Johnson’s device for introducing a time experience 
more familiar to his readers as, unsatisfied with the present, Rasselas learns to find solace in an 
 
13 Poovey, 144-213. 
14 Noting the Edenic nature of the Happy Valley, critics argue that Rasselas’ discontent demonstrates the 
impossibility of find on earth that desire for a place that can only be found in heaven. See Edward Tomarken, 
Johnson, ‘Rasselas,’ and the Choice of Criticism (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1989); Gwin Kolb, 
“The ‘Paradise’ in Abysinnia and the ‘Happy Valley’ in Rasselas,” Modern Philology 56.1 (August 1958): 10-6; and 
Robert J. Mayhew, “Nature and the Choice of Life in Rasselas,” SEL: Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 39.3 
(Summer 1999): 539-56. 
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imagined future beyond the Valley. Rasselas’ imagination has changed the nature of his temporal 
experience, and the narrator adjusts accordingly by moving from the vague time references of the 
early part of the tale to more specific measurements.  The tale tells us that Rasselas spends 
twenty months of his life in imaginary adventures and “hourly preparations for the various 
incidents of human affairs” (46). Rasselas himself realizes how much time has been wasted only 
when a particularly vivid daydream brings him abruptly back to the present. While sitting on a 
bank by the water, Rasselas imagines an “orphan virgin robbed of her little portion by a 
treacherous lover” and starts up to chase the villain “with all the eagerness of real pursuit” (46-
7). The strange chase becomes a metaphor for Rasselas’ pursuit of happiness as he realizes that 
his object always lies slightly ahead of him in both time and space. But not until he comes up 
against the walls of the Valley does Rasselas comprehend that his target is a figment of his 
imagination. That realization prompts the young prince to reflect on the time that he has spent in 
imaginary pursuits, and it is here that Johnson introduces a use value for time. 
Once time has a use value for the protagonist, Rasselas moves toward a simple version of 
the fixed, spatial understanding of time that I have called mathematical time. A pre-delineated 
space to be moved through and to “fill” with human activity, this conception of time allows 
Rasselas his first experience of modern regret:  
He now felt a degree of regret with which he had never been before acquainted. He 
considered how much might have been done in the time which had passed, and left 
nothing real behind it. He compared twenty months with the life of man. “In life, said he, 
is not to be counted the ignorance of infancy, or imbecility of age. We are long before we 
are able to think, and we soon cease from the power of acting. The true period of human 
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existence may be reasonably estimated as forty years, of which I have mused away the 
four and twentieth part. (47) 
The narrator’s commentary begins in the spirit of a Protestant commentary on mortality and lost 
time. But by the end of the passage, the estimates of years and life spans suggest that Johnson’s 
narrative is indebted to a political-economic discourse. The final sentence reads almost as much 
like an early insurance pamphlet as a didactic tale. By measuring time as one would distance, 
Rasselas can estimate a fixed span for his own usable time. 
Rasselas’ first experience of regret operates as a mirror image of the anticipation that 
filled his thoughts until that moment. He has only learned to turn his eyes backward to the space 
behind rather than the views before him. Johnson’s protagonist has now modeled a sort of history 
of time in the human imagination.15 From the first introduction of an alternative future to an 
awareness of time as something to be spent or wasted, Rasselas learns to comprehend time as 
fixed space in which one is compelled to wander forward or back in imagination. His progress 
models a mythical development of the modern time experience. Johnson’s text arrives at the 
same basic philosophical conclusion that inspired the second essay of The Rambler: 
That the mind of man is never satisfied with the objects immediately before it, but is 
always breaking away from the present moment and losing itself in schemes of future 
felicity; and that we forget the proper use of the time now in our power, to provide for the 
enjoyment of that which, perhaps, may never be granted us, has been frequently 
remarked . . .16 
 
15 R.S. Krishnan, “’The Shortness of Our Present State’, Locke’s Time and Johnson’s Eternity in Rasselas,” 
Journal of Evolutionary Psychology 19.1-2 (March 1998): 2-9, also argues for the importance of Lockean temporal 
experience to the development of Rasselas’ character. See also Regina Hewitt, “Time in Rasselas: Johnson’s Use of 
Locke’s Concept,” Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 19 (1989): 267-76. 
16 Samuel Johnson, The Rambler (London: printed for J. Payne and J. Bouquet, 1752), 10. 
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We recognize this theme as what Scott Joeckel calls “Johnson’s paranoiac fear of the 
imagination.”17 But Johnson’s insistence on identifying illusions about the future as endemic to 
the human species, regardless of individual circumstance or of cultural or historical context, 
seems to have occluded the degree to which Johnson’s dangerous anticipation belongs to the 
very culturally specific temporal concerns of eighteenth-century Britain. 
As he sets out from the Happy Valley, Johnson’s protagonist comprehends temporality in 
the same manner as did Isaac Bickerstaff some fifty years earlier.18 Rasselas is a creature in 
motion with regard to a fixed temporal landscape, one whose imaginative “views were extended 
to a wider space” (46). In 1710, Steele’s Bickerstaff demonstrated the sheer folly of confusing 
those mathematical representations of the future in averages and probabilities necessary to the 
emergent economy with the radically contingent future of the individual human being. 
Bickerstaff’s faulty calculations and detailed fantasies helped to stir his sense of heady 
excitement at the thought that he could not only foresee his future, but rush forward to meet it. 
But Steele’s essay did not reject the mathematical future that Bickerstaff so badly misconstrued. 
Johnson, however, does. Rasselas provides no cultural context to explain why its protagonist 
should become entranced with this spatialized future or with the spatial past. The reader is left to 
assume that the cognitive developments Johnson has so carefully described with his protagonist 
are endemic to the human mind.  
When eighteenth-century botanists sketched a subject in isolation from the flora, fauna, 
soil, and air in which it was found, they eliminated the complex environment that made that 
subject what it was. Johnson eliminates from his sketch those mathematically based 
constructions of the future that had become central to the British state and its marketplaces. So 
 
17 Samuel T. Joeckel, “Narratives of Hope, Fictions of Happiness: Samuel Johnson and Enlightenment 
Experience” Christianity and Literature 53.1 (Autumn 2003): 19-38, 30. 
18 See my earlier discussion of Richard Steele’s narrator in Chapter Two. 
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Rasselas shows us its protagonist in motion, but we no longer see the culturally-shared concepts 
that formed his imagination of the future. Rasselas now moves toward nothing at all as Johnson 
relegates the mathematical future to a mere illusion of the human mind. 
Johnson’s protagonist is himself a type, a sketch of the human species in its most 
essential state, so there is some irony in the reality with which Rasselas leaves us. Johnson’s text 
argues that the future is nothing but an illusion, and that the human mind’s fatal flaw is its 
inability to remain in the present. In Imlac’s words, “The truth is, that no mind is much employed 
upon the present: recollection and anticipation fill up almost all our moments” (104). This 
forgotten present may be only rarely marked by the mind, but significantly, it is always marked 
by the physiological body.  Johnson’s tale thus reveals how the shift that Poovey identified as a 
move from political economics to moral philosophy refigured the relationship between present 
and future into a binary of reality and illusion that is paralleled by a distinction between the 
material presence of the body and the non-existent world of the imagination. The present (and 
material presence) are now defined primarily by a human sensory experience that creates strong 
distinctions between that which is present to the body and that which is created only secondarily 
in the mind. Within such a framework, the future can exist only and merely in the individual 
human imagination. For this reason, desire in Johnson’s oriental tale no longer connects 
characters to the material world. The old tropes that let desire signal shifts in value over time no 
longer function. Now desire constantly threatens to disassociate the human mind from the 
material world that it seems to crave. Desire becomes the troubling point at which the material 
world and the human mind fail to meet. 
  
Almoran and Hamet 
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 Rasselas marks a turning point in how the oriental tale would interpret and misinterpret 
the workings of a sign-oriented marketplace. But Johnson was not the only author participating 
in this change. His protégé, John Hawkesworth, made use of the oriental tale as a didactic tool in 
The Adventurer during the years before Johnson wrote Rasselas.19 Though he is most well-
known now for editing a controversial edition of James Cook’s journals, Hawkesworth’s 
contemporaries recognized him as a long-standing member of literary and theatrical circles. 
Hawkesworth took over as editor for The Gentleman’s Magazine in 1744 after Johnson gradually 
gave up his duties there. Hawkesworth left the magazine in 1752 to start The Adventurer. He 
then produced a well-received edition of The Works of Jonathan Swift and in 1756 began to take 
an active part as an author and editor, working with David Garrick on productions for the 
London stage. Hawkesworth’s own 1761 drama, Edgar and Emmeline; A Fairy Tale: In a 
Dramatic Entertainment of Two Acts, was played several times in London, raising the author’s 
hopes for the success of a new oriental tale for the stage. Hawkesworth wrote Almoran and 
Hamet: An Oriental Tale with the intention of having it also produced for the stage. But after 
Garrick declared the tale’s magical effects to be too expensive for the stage, Hawkesworth turned 
his drama into a narrative for publication in 1761. 
The story of two eastern princes who inherit the throne jointly, Almoran and Hamet 
includes many of the tropes readers had come to expect from oriental tales. Combining genies 
and a strong didactic tone, Hawkesworth’s tale clearly shows the influence of both Arabian 
Nights’ and Rasselas, but Hawkesworth offers its own response to questions posed by the 
modern marketplace. In the early part of the century, Arabian Nights’ Entertainments modeled 
for its British readers a system of sign value in which consumerism produced meaning and 
 
19 The standard biography for Hawkesworth is John Lawrence Abbott, John Hawkesworth: Eighteenth-
Century Man of Letters (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982). 
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meaning operated a type of value. In this system, eighteenth-century Britain’s two time frames 
worked in concert to create an endless source of value through the consumer’s acts of 
anticipation and deferral. Johnson’s tale sidesteps the complexity of this framework by casting 
anticipation as pure human delusion. Hawkesworth, however, confronts that framework more 
directly. Subordinating the issues of time and the human mind, Hawkesworth argues that it is not 
the future, but signs that are the dangerous illusion. This focus leads Hawkesworth somewhat 
coincidentally toward the same emphasis that emerge from Rasselas. In scenes like the one in 
which Rasselas sets off in a real chase after an imagined girl, Johnson’s work necessarily puts 
emphasis on the human body as the marker of a present from which the mind had strayed. 
Hawkesworth, too, relies on images of the body. But his bodies are determinately physiological, 
marking not the present, but a presence that lies beneath the illusions created by signs. Bodies 
produce, but signs deceive. 
Hawkesworth began to develop this emphasis on the physiological in a short tale that he 
published before Almoran and Hamet, and notably, before Johnson wrote Rasselas. Published in 
The Adventurer in 1753, “Amurath: an Eastern Story” involves another ill-suited heir to the 
throne, in this case a young Sultan who is given a magic ring to aid him in his role as ruler. 20  
The ring works by applying pressure to his finger whenever the Sultan makes a poor decision: 
“’This ring,” said he, “shall mark out to thee the boundaries of good and evil; that without 
weighing remote consequences, thou may’st know the nature and tendency of every action.”21 
The ring, of course, serves as a material representation of the Christian conscience and brings the 
tale in line with an older tradition in which believers struggle to interpret correctly the signs of 
good and evil. But Hawkesworth puts this tradition to contemporary use in a world that depends 
 
20 John Hawkesworth, “Amuranth: An Eastern Story,” in The Adventurer, vol. 1, 5th edition (13 January, 16 
January, 20 January  1753): 165-194. 
21 Hawkesworth, “Amuranth” 167. 
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on the changeability of every “nature and tendency” to produce value. Hawkesworth’s readers 
are accustomed to an oriental-tale tradition that plays with unexpected events and “remote 
consequences” as part of the seduction of its readers. “Amurath” recasts the genre’s dual interest 
in meaning and financial value into a study of moral value and offers its Christian message as a 
means of fixing that value in time.  
Significantly, Hawkesworth chooses to register Amurath’s failures as a series of physical 
transformations. The Sultan begins a moral slide downward as he gradually becomes inured to 
the warnings of his ring. When he reaches his lowest point, the Sultan finds himself cast into the 
shape of a monster and banished from his city. Thereafter the Sultan starts on the road to 
redemption, transforming into something closer to humanity each time he improves his moral 
character. Hawkeworth’s narrator specifies that the Sultan experiences his circumstances 
throughout this process as the beast or animal that he is. Hunger and pain, loyalty and want, grow 
ever more complex as he approaches his original form. And though the tale falls well short of a 
Humean naturalism, “Amurath” suggests an emerging emphasis on the physiological body as an 
important factor in the making of human cognition. In “Amurath” we see very little concern for 
how this physiological body works with or against the traditional literary function of bodies as 
signs in the oriental-tale tradition. By the time that Hawkesworth publishes Almoran and Hamet, 
however, the effort to assert the physiological body over and against the sign appears as an 
important cultural project. 
Almoran and Hamet begins with the two brothers ascending the throne upon their father’s 
death. The elder brother, Almoran, gives free reign to his desires while the younger Hamet takes 
a more moderate path. A supernatural being intervenes to support Almoran’s ambitions, fitting 
him with a talisman that permits the bearer to exchange appearances with a person of his 
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choosing. After Almoran has fallen into his own magical traps, the genius reveals himself to be a 
divine messenger and grants Hamet the throne and the young virgin who has been the object of 
both brothers’ desires. 
Like a moral philosopher, Hawkesworth’s narrator delineates the various causes and 
effects that have shaped the two main characters. Time appears as an important factor in the 
shaping of both characters, though each approaches the future differently. Hamet is unaware of 
his father’s bequest, so he grows up as a second son and foresees the likelihood of his 
assassination at the first hint of trouble in his brother’s realm. This perspective leads Hamet to 
dwell less on the secular world and more on the sacred domain of an afterlife: 
as the first popular commotion which should happen after his brother’s accession to the 
throne, might probably cost him his life, he was very inquisitive about the state into 
which his spirit would be dismissed by the Angel of Death, and very diligent to do 
whatever might secure him a share of the permanent and unchangeable felicity of 
Paradise.22 
Though his subordinate position deprives him of the strength to lead, Hamet’s status means that 
the divine future shapes and colors Hamet’s present: “to his mind futurity was present by 
habitual anticipation . . . so that his devotion was not periodical but constant” (5). In contrast to 
his younger brother, Almoran grows up with every whim satisfied and every honor easily gained. 
His experience means that Almoran’s anticipation directs him no further than the immediate 
secular future: 
 The views of Almoran were terminated by nearer objects; his mind was perpetually 
busied in the anticipation of pleasures and honours, which he supposed to be neither 
 
22 Oriental Tales, ed. Robert L. Mack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 5. All further references to 
this text are from this edition and are cited by page number within the text. 
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uncertain nor remote; these excited his hopes, with a power sufficient to fix his attention; 
he did not look beyond them for other objects, nor enquire how enjoyments more distant 
were to be acquired . . . (6) 
Almoran’s position as heir serves to support an imagination that is too much invested in the 
secular future to consider the divine future that lies beyond. 
Hawkesworth shows the influence of mid-century moral philosophies in his delineation 
of these two characters as cognitive beings; the narrator painstakingly traces the remote origins 
of each thought and emotion in his characters throughout. But he clearly has reached different 
conclusions about the nature of human anticipation than those set out in Rasselas. Anticipation 
may be endemic to the human mind, but its object is constructed by individual experience. As in 
Rasselas, there is no reference to finance or the marketplace in Hawkesworth’s treatment of time. 
Instead, Hawkesworth articulates his characters’ time experiences through religious concepts. 
Hamet’s character thus demonstrates the necessity of subordinating the secular future to the 
sacred as a means of curbing the effects of the imagination and the strength of human desires. 
Hawkesworth makes no effort to discredit the secular future as mere illusion; he simply 
diminishes its importance by borrowing from a longstanding Christian conception of time. 
By invoking Christianity’s sacred time, Hawkesworth’s narrative fixes an endpoint to the 
otherwise endless deferral and production imagined in Arabian Nights’ Entertainments. Such a 
move necessarily operates as a critique of worldly desires, including the hunger for luxury goods 
that drives the trade in oriental tales. However, Hawkesworth’s use of Christian time is not 
simply a throwback to an early tradition. Almoran and Hamet responds to the oriental-tale 
tradition and to British capitalism of the period at their most complex levels. In Almoran’s 
transforming talisman and his magical death, the tale attacks a cultural framework that blurs the 
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boundaries between the material world inhabited by physical bodies and the immaterial world of 
language. It is not only that secular time is bound to give way to the divine, but also that text 
offers no miraculous transformations nor any escape from the inevitable ending. 
When Almoran receives the talisman from the genius (genie) in Hawkesworth’s later tale, 
he takes it with the intention of deceiving the young virgin, Almeida, and seducing her. The 
genius already has granted Almoran the throne, the prevention of Hamet’s marriage to Almeida, 
and physical possession of the would-be bride. But Almeida’s continued refusals leave the Sultan 
angry and disappointed: 
With the soul of Almoran, I should have the form of Hamet: then my wishes would 
indeed be filled; then would Almeida bless me with consenting beauty, and the splendor 
of my power should distinguish only the intervals of my love; my enjoyments would then 
be certain and permanent, neither blasted by disappointment, nor withered with satiety. 
(66) 
Almoran’s disappointment picks up on the argument set forth by Johnson in Rasselas, but also 
follows a path laid out by Arabian Nights’ Entertainments. To the question of whether desire can 
be productive, Johnson argued that anticipation will inevitably be met with either disappointment 
or satiety. Hawkesworth’s tale doesn’t need to reach this conclusion because it turns its focus 
instead on the binding of language and the material world that the earlier tales had proposed as a 
solution. Almoran receives an emerald cut with twenty-four facets: 
on each side of it is engraven one of those mysterious characters, of which are formed all 
the words of all the languages that are spoken by angels, genii, and men… Point only to 
the letters that compose the name of him whose appearance thou wouldst assume, and it 
is done. (68) 
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The talisman encapsulates that magical tie between word and body that became a source of 
production in Arabian Nights’ and in the British marketplace. Words, in this case names, do not 
represent their counterparts in the material world; they belong to a metonymic world in which 
materiality and textuality perpetually bleed back and forth into one another. Almoran’s talisman 
takes part in this cultural construction, but with one glaring limitation: this talisman produces 
nothing but illusions. 
 Once Almoran accepts the talisman, Hawkesworth uses this plot device to make a clear 
distinction between the self-perceived identities of his two characters (their minds, emotions, and 
sensory experiences) and the outer shells of their bodies. As a result of this dynamic, each 
character has two identities. The reader continues to follow Almoran as the selfish and strong 
older brother and Hamet as the upstanding younger brother, but each now has a visual character 
that “reads” differently from his true identity. Hawkesworth’s plot thus distinguishes between 
bodies that are physiologically present within the world of the narrative and bodies that, even 
within the confines of the narrative, are merely visual signs. The narrator gives us Hamet’s 
decidedly physical response to the talisman’s magic transformation: “Hamet was seized with a 
sudden languor, and his faculties were suspended as by the stroke of death. When he recovered, 
his limbs still trembled, and his lips were parched with thirst” (73). Hamet perceives no lasting 
difference in himself until he looks at his own reflection in a well and recognizes his brother’s 
face. The tale does not register Almoran’s transformation, but instead notes the difficulties it 
causes when the Sultan attempts to interact with those around him: “’What I am,’ said he, ‘is, to 
this wretch, the object not only of hatred but of scorn; and he commends only what I am not, in 
what to him I would seem to be’” (70). Almoran’s confusion reflects the narrative’s strange 
direction; the magic device that should allow the Sultan to discover truth behind falsehood 
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instead serves only to create further confusion as both Almeida and the guards constantly shift 
their words to negotiate the responses they read on the Sultan’s assumed face.  
In arguing for a political reading of Almoran and Hamet, Robert Mack says of these 
scenes, “The movement of loyalties and affiliations in the story leaves the reader with a slightly 
queasy, sickening movement of uncertainty.”23 Amidst all of the confusion, character-as-identity 
remains strikingly stable in opposition to character-as-sign. Hamet remains loyal and steadfast, 
Almoran self-serving and insatiable, despite the changes to their readable surfaces. This 
distinction between the two functions of “character” ties Hawkesworth’s oriental tale to a larger 
shift in narrative forms during the middle of the century. Deidre Lynch argues in The Economy 
of Character that the early part of the eighteenth century understood character primarily in its 
visual function: 
The uses of character at issue in the first part of the century reveal, in other words, 
enthusiasms that were adapted to what I will call “typographical culture”: an interest in 
the material grounds of meaning and a fascination with the puns that could link the 
person “in” a text to the printed letters (alphabetic symbols, or “characters” in another 
sense) that elaborated that text’s surface. In this context, most talk about character was 
not talk about individualities or inner lives. It is talk about the systems of semiotic and 
fiduciary exchange — the machinery of interconnectedness — that made a commercial 
society go. 24 
The commercial society to which Lynch refers is the flooded marketplace of the early eighteenth 
century in which not only new texts but also new goods had yet to be defined and categorized as 
they would be in the latter part of the period. By the end of the century, however, character has 
 
23 Robert L. Mack, “Introduction” in Oriental Tales: vii- xlix, xxvi  
24 Deidre Shauna Lynch, The Economy of Character: Novels, Market Culture, and the Business of Inner 
Meaning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
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taken on its second function as a reference to identity, psychological processes or so-called inner 
meanings. Lynch contextualizes this shift as part of an adaptation to a more established 
marketplace in which “the ground rules that had defined the interrelations of literacy, aesthetic 
competence, and literariness” have changed.25 The act of reading character in the later period 
promises an individuality detached from social circumstance on the one hand and signals social 
prestige on the other, as narrative forms get placed within a hierarchy of literary and cultural 
value. 
 Lynch’s analysis gives us an invaluable basis for understanding the emergence of this 
second function for character, and her study demonstrates how the act of reading character came 
to be associated with a private, psychological experience of narrative. Hawkesworth’s tale 
reminds us that the oriental tale always had been and remained even at mid-century a genre 
crucially entwined with issues of materiality. The tale constructs an insistently stable form of 
character-as-identity in Almoran and Hamet through its representations of the physiological 
body. Each brother’s identity, beliefs and behaviors develop in accordance with that character’s 
embodied experiences. The exchange of visual features has no effect on this new “inner self” 
because the mind’s sense of its own presence never changes. 
As if to make perfectly clear the dangers of confusing text with body, Hawkesworth’s 
tale finally ends the life of Almoran with one more talisman. The genius appears a final time to 
offer each brother a magic parchment embossed with Solymon’s seal. Both brothers seem to 
require the parchment’s magic in order to avert death, but Hamet resists the temptation to save 
his life with magic and at the expense of his brother’s life. Almoran, however, accepts the 
parchment with glee and follows the instructions to burn the paper, thus prolonging his life and 
making all of his wishes come true. But just as the emerald talisman could offer only the illusion 
 
25 Lynch 6. 
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of a different body and no real transformation of the material world, so too is the parchment a 
trick. Activated by Almoran’s guilt before god, the magic words transform the material body 
only insomuch as they turn the Sultan’s living body to stone: “the figure of Almoran, which was 
hardened into stone, expanded by degrees; and a rock, by which his form and attitude are still 
rudely expressed, became at once a monument of his punishment and his guilt” (112). In the final 
reckoning, Almoran’s reliance on the magical bonds between the material world and the world of 
signs proves fatal. But he is left ironically as a material object himself, to be read by future 
generations “that the world might know, that, to the wicked, increase of power is increase of 
wretchedness” (113). 
 Though Hawkesworth’s oriental tale has been largely forgotten in comparison with 
Rasselas, Almoran and Hamet was well-known in its own time.26 Like Hawkesworth, Frances 
Sheridan moved freely as an author among many genres. Her only oriental tale, The History of 
Nourjahad, might well have been influenced by Johnson’s Rasselas with its didactic focus on the 
human imagination. But the narrator’s attention to physiological experience in Nourjahad shows 
that if the dominant trend in narrative was a movement away from that earlier playful tension 
between body and sign, the oriental tale nevertheless retained its ability to confront the 
marketplace’s reliance upon bodies that were always partially signs and signs that had the power 
to produce value. 
 
The History of Nourjahad 
Frances Sheridan wrote The History of Nourjahad from a financial exile in France shortly 
before her death. The tale was published posthumously in 1767, and remained popular into the 
nineteenth century. Like Johnson’s Rasselas, Nourjahad was its author’s first effort at the 
 
26 See Robert L. Mack’s introduction to Oriental Tales, xix-xxvii. 
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popular oriental-tale genre. Sheridan made her name as a playwright and as the author of two 
very successful novels. And though her choice of genre might well have been partially 
determined by financial need, Sheridan nonetheless takes the oriental tale a step beyond its 
familiar uses. As in other oriental tales of the eighteenth century, Nourjahad addresses the 
challenges and seductions of the future, but Sheridan’s tale recognizes a complexity in time that 
other mid-century tales do not. Using the capacity of narrative to bind its readers to different 
temporalities, Sheridan reminds us that in the wake of the financial revolution, every subject 
lives in the tension between two times. 
Set in a fictional Persian Court, the story involves a young prince, Schemzeddin, who has 
just inherited the throne.  Elders in the court advise the new Sultan not to appoint his childhood 
friend, Nourjahad, as First Minister, cautioning that Nourjahad will show himself to be 
avaricious and pleasure-seeking in the future. When Schemzeddin lures Nourjahad into a 
confession of his deepest wishes during a seductive scene in the seraglio gardens, Nourjahad 
fails the test by expressing his wishes for infinite wealth and immortality. That evening, 
however, an angel appears in Nourjahad’s apartment to grant him both wishes. Immortal and 
infinitely wealthy, Nourjahad nevertheless remains imprisoned in a luxurious palace by the 
Sultan. The tale follows Nourjahad’s moral decay as he grows indolent, “effeminate” and 
ultimately cruel. At this point Sheridan introduces her most innovative plot device. Three times, 
Nourjahad’s self-indulgence results in a period of unearthly sleep, first for a period of four years, 
then forty, and then twenty.  Each time the protagonist wakes to a thoroughly disorienting world, 
surrounded by people he cannot recognize and at a loss for his own context. The expected ending 
to the fable comes when Nourjahad realizes his errors and repents. 
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Only after Nourjahad’s repentance does Schemzeddin reveal to his friend and to the 
reader the fact that the entire experience has been staged.  In fact, Schemzeddin’s agents have 
drugged Nourjahad at appropriate times, and made all of the necessary changes to the young 
man’s environment in order to convince Nourjahad of the passage of time. The angel turns out to 
be Mandana, Nourjahad’s favorite lover in disguise, and all of the story’s losses prove fictional. 
So, says Schemzeddin, “In the space of fourteen moons . . . thou hast had the experience of four 
times so many years.”27  
Critics note the compelling effect of the narrative’s temporal play. In her reading of  
Nourjahad and Sheridan’s earlier novels, Margaret Anne Doody notes that time in Nourjahad 
actually fails to progress in spite of the protagonist’s sense of duration.28 Placing this effect 
alongside the oddly circular plot movements of the novels, Doody argues that Sheridan is 
emphasizing in all three works a point of origin past which the protagonists cannot progress, thus 
opening up questions of moral ambiguity. In Doody’s words, “the most vivid effects concern the 
hero’s fatiguing immortality of error, stuck at age twenty-three over a period of sixty years, and 
his bewilderment after each fit of oblivion” (355-6).  Sheridan’s innovation, writes Doody, “is 
found in her handling of time . . . time proceeds in a spiral, or rather a helix, doubling back on 
itself . . . the inner meaning of a series of actions or happenings can be understood only by 
circling back to an original point or time, a point of departure . . . Progressive time is 
annihilated.”29 Doody concludes that Nourjahad functions as a proto-feminist text, not so much 
because of the gender roles played by its characters, but because this formulation of closed-off 
 
27 Frances Sheridan, The History of Nourjahad, in Oriental Tales, 115-94. 
28 Margaret Anne Doody, “Frances Sheridan: Morality and Annihilated Time,” in Fetterd or Free: British 
Women Novelists, 1670-1815, ed. Mary Anne Schofield and Cecilia Macheski (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
1986): 324-58. 
29 Doody 355. 
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time and its failure to progress evokes a sense of powerlessness that characterizes the female 
experience in the British eighteenth century.30 
Doody’s analysis of time in Nourjahad bears a striking resemblance to some of the 
critical comments on time in Mille et une Nuits or Arabian Nights’ Entertainments noted in the 
previous chapter. Confronted with narrative backtracking and deferral, the critic associates this 
temporal structure with a female effort to resist masculine authority. In the background of this 
critique lies an eighteenth-century culture that assigns rational causality and progress to a post-
Enlightenment, masculine public realm. The presence of gender issues in all of these works is 
undeniable, but at this point we can articulate with more precision why Sheridan’s tale confronts 
Nourjahad’s “boundless” desire as an issue of temporality (25). Nourjahad’s wish for endless 
wealth and the limitless time of immortality reflects the structure of Sheridan’s eighteenth-
century marketplace. When the magically immortal Nourjahad considers filling his leisure time 
with reading, he wonders at the limits of mortal knowledge: 
How circumscribed, said he, is the knowledge of a paltry historian! Who is at the pains of 
collecting the scanty materials which a life of forty or fifty years perhaps affords him . . . 
How infinitely superior will my fund of information be, who shall myself be an eye-
witness to events as extraordinary as these, and numbered a thousand times over; for 
doubtless the same things which have happened, will happen again. (55) 
The irony is that Nourjahad is not immortal within the confines of the tale’s plot, but he is 
immortal in the same way that the texts he dismisses are immortal. The historian’s texts span 
 
30 In its attention to gender contexts, Doody’s analysis converges with Felicity Nussbaum’s reading of 
Nourjahad. Nussbaum argues that Nourjahad is feminized by his confinement and forced to indulge in romantic 
fantasies to make his imprisonment bearable.  Sheridan’s protagonist, then, is forced to live the fictional genre to 
which women are drawn by psychological and cultural necessity. Felicity Nussbaum, Torrid Zones: Maternity, 
Sexuality, and Empire in Eighteenth-Century English Narratives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1995): 114-34. 
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centuries and will themselves last for centuries beyond the limited years of their authors. In less 
grand fashion, the text of government bureaucracies, legal documents, and financial instruments 
conquered mortal time in Sheridan’s Britain and nourished a marketplace with apparently 
boundless potential.  But to accomplish this, Britain’s marketplace obscured the purchasing, 
trading, investing, reading, and consuming physical bodies on which it depended. Sheridan’s 
fictional character illustrates the dangers of a system in which the mortal body’s limits are lost. 
The secret authors of Nourjahad’s punishments create temporal disorientation in their 
victim by using the physical bodies of lovers, children and servants to indicate much longer 
expanses of time than have actually passed. The first punishment episode occurs after Nourjahad 
consumes alcohol in violation of  Islamic law. He falls into a drunken sleep and, waking, calls 
for his lover, Mandana. As a servant informs Nourjahad that Mandana has died in childbirth, 
Sheridan draws our attention to a fundamental indicator of human time progression: 
Ah traitress, cried Nourjahad, how darest thou thus mock the sorrow of thy master, and 
traduce the chastity of my beloved.  Thou knowest it is not more than three moons since I 
received her a virgin into my arms, and does thou presume to impose so ridiculous a story 
on me as that of her having died in childbed?  My lord, answered the slave, it is more 
than three years since Mandana died.  Audacious wretch, cried Nourjahad, wouldst thou 
persuade me out of my senses?  (37-8) 
Sheridan’s wording is quite precise here; Nourjahad must be persuaded “out of his senses,” for 
his senses tell him, as they tell the unwary reader, that time should have progressed according to 
the pace of the story up to this point.  That is to say, we have no narrative or descriptive 
indicators to help us through this transition, only the sudden revelation of a three-year-old child 
whose physical presence finally convinces Nourjahad that he now lives in a new time.   
 200 
 The two magical sleep episodes that follow will repeat this pattern with slight variations.  
In the second punishment, Nourjahad awakes twenty years later to the sight of a seraglio of 
“wrinkled and deformed old hags” in place of the beautiful women he had looked on only the 
night before (48).  In the third and final episode, the bodily signs of time are replaced by 
Nourjahad’s first transgression of political or historic time.  After a forty-year sleep, he wakes to 
find the sultan dead and the empire in mourning by order of the new ruler. 
 Sheridan’s train of punishments for her protagonist repeatedly isolates him. As a result 
she is able to draw a distinction between the fragile hold our minds have on an internal time 
sense tied to consciousness and an externalized social time indicated by standard markers of 
change (daylight, seasons, physical development, aging, historic era).  What is more, 
Nourjahad’s isolation in time mirrors the text’s enclosed and isolating spaces.  As a matter of 
internal plot considerations, Nourjahad’s isolation is necessary to make Schemzeddin’s staged 
illusion appear real. But the walls surrounding Nourjahad throughout this tale (first at 
Schemzeddin’s garden and then in Nourjahad’s palaces) serve a thematic function as well. The 
walls that isolate Nourjahad are a simple reflection of the desire and anticipation that isolate 
Nourjahad psychologically from his society. 
Following the path laid out by Johnson, Sheridan illustrates the seduction of the imagined 
future in the scene that follows the angel’s first visit. Nourjahad’s pleasure in the anticipation is 
so great that he cuts himself off from other people and even from material realities in order to 
indulge in his fantasies of the future: “For the three succeeding days his thoughts were so 
perplexed and divided, that he knew not which of his favourite schemes he should first enter 
upon.  Satisfied with having the means in his power, he neglected those ends for which he was so 
desirous of them” (31). More in love with his future than his present, the protagonist languishes 
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on his bed dreaming up possibilities, and only emerges at the Sultan’s command. Nourjahad 
finds it necessary to lie to the Sultan and to those around him about his new condition, a lie that 
originates a split in his character. At this moment in the text, Nourjahad begins living in two 
distinct times. He is lost in the false time of his own consciousness while also living in the 
socially shared time of those around him. Sheridan reinforces the sense of reality that attaches to 
the first time by including her reader in its experiences and durations. Of course, the trick is that 
it is the second time that is real and not the first.  
 Nourjahad’s infinitely deferred ending necessarily changes the way that he values the 
people, objects and experiences that are part of his daily life. Just as he dismisses the knowledge 
of historians for being “paltry” in comparison with the centuries to which he looks forward, 
Nourjahad chooses to avoid any attachment to the few people around him, as they are bound to 
die and be replaced over and over again. Believing that he will never face a divine judgment, 
Nourjahad dismisses religious stricture as well. As a result, he soon grows morally corrupt and 
murders his most faithful servant, Cadiga, in a fit of rage. And when he awakes this time, all of 
his slaves and servants have fled: “I rouse myself like a savage beast in the desart, whose paths 
are shunned by all the children of men” (60). Cadiga’s brother, Cozro, is left to care for 
Nourjahad, and he soon brings the guilty man to a state of remorse. Nourjahad will pass the final 
test by braving death to save Cozro, at which moment Schemzeddin and his cohorts reveal their 
ruse. 
His immortality having become a nightmare, Nourjahad is relieved at the conclusion of 
the tale to find that his decades have been only a few months and his behavior during that time 
has brought no lasting consequences (Cadiga is found to be alive, and his erstwhile slaves and 
servants apparently harbor no lingering resentments). The story of Nourjahad’s moral decline 
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and redemption argues that the ephemeral nature of the human body is necessary to curb the 
excesses of the imagination, to limit the mind’s forays into an illusory future that political 
economic thought promotes. Without that limit, Sheridan’s tale suggests, moral systems shatter 
and social bonds disappear. Insisting on its own limitations, the physical body asserts itself 
against the temporal structures of the marketplace. And one is tempted to imagine this resistance 
as a battling back of human intuitive time against the mathematical constructs that had 
complicated and often supplanted it since the last years of the seventeenth century. But 
Sheridan’s tale leaves the most compelling question in the narrative unresolved. Nourjahad 
believes that, even as he indulged alone in his experience of immortality, he was also partaking 
in the shared time of those around him. He attempts to calibrate his own sense of duration 
through his bodily experience and through the physiological changes most basic to the human 
species. Nourjahad “reads” the aging bodies of his harem women, the pregnancy of his lover, and 
the growing body of his son as markers of a uniquely physiological time experience. And in spite 
of all of these markers, Nourjahad fails dramatically. The infinite spans of mathematical time 
Nourjahad believes he has been granted leave him isolated in his own imagination, but so too 
does his embodied experience of the present. In other words, Nourjahad’s morally unacceptable 
illusions make his temporal disorientation dramatic, but in reality, those who live within the 
abstracted world of finance are never fully oriented to its time frames, if only because 
mathematical time has no embodied present. In the tension between what Benedict Anderson 
called the “meanwhile” of social belonging and Nourhajad’s delightful but isolating walled 
garden, Sheridan seems to have offered no clear means for distinguishing between illusion and 
reality.31 The tale suggests that we have no choice but to live in a modern double-time, that we 
 
31 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991). 
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are equally bound to the real time of consciousness and to the social moment for which we 
constantly recalibrate our minds and bodies.  
Like the rest of her generation, Sheridan understood the sheer economic productivity of 
individual anticipation, its gift of voracious readers and theater audiences, fashionable masses 
and busy traders. And perhaps Nourjahad’s author was conscious of the financial and social 
changes that Joseph Addison and Daniel Defoe had promoted so vigorously. But in beginning 
with the assumption that modern temporal experience arises out of a binary of presence and 
illusion, Sheridan’s text struggles to present a remedy for the apparent isolation of the human 
imagination. As do other mid-century authors, Sheridan finds herself reaching for a physiological 
body “beneath” the sign, a materiality that will mark the presence of a public that has no 











The History of Nourjahad reflects a final transition in the oriental tale as a narrative 
genre. After Sheridan’s death the genre makes a definitive move toward the tropes and themes 
that we now associate with the Romantic era. While texts like Maria Edgeworth’s “Murad the 
Unlucky” continue to play with the oriental tale’s capacity for allegorical didacticism, other 
narratives begin using the oriental tale’s boundaries as space in which to explore the inner world 
of imagination and consciousness opened up by the developments of previous decades. William 
Beckford’s Vathek and Lord Byron’s The Giaour take part in this shift, and there is no 
coincidence in the fact that both authors chose this genre to explore an imaginative social 
isolation expressed in insistently sexual overtones. From its beginnings in the seventeenth 
century, the oriental tale served as perhaps the primary expression of the magical bond between 
the expanding material world of the marketplace and the endless capacity of the sign. But as new 
conceptions of the human mind replaced early political economics, literary traditions tore apart 
those bonds, rendering the sign a mere transparent representation on the one hand and relegating 
its creative properties to a make-believe world of human imagination on the other.  
Neither mathematical time nor its essential role in the marketplace ever disappeared, of 
course. In our own age, financial value continues to vacillate wildly and with a rapidity that only 
a time concept that has no sense of duration could create. In spite of this instability, both 
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individuals and states continue to rely on the economic future imagined by eighteenth-century 
mathematicians, political leaders and financiers. But the legacy of eighteenth-century financial 
innovations extends well beyond the realm of finance. In his work on the future created by state 
financing in the eighteenth century, Robert Mitchell notes the significance of that future to 
poetry as late as the first decades of the nineteenth century.1 Literary forms continue to model, 
critique and promote the processes by which societies comprehend mathematical time and 
individuals imagine themselves as part of, or conversely isolated from, a mathematically-derived 
public.
 
1 Robert Mitchell, Sympathy and the State in the Romantic Era: Systems, State Finance, and the Shadows 
of Futurity (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
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